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REASON AND CONVICTION: NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL
RELIGION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Steven J. Heyman*
ABSTRACT
One of the most intense debates in contemporary America involves conflicts between
religious liberty and other key values like civil rights. To shed light on such problems, courts
and scholars often look to the historical background of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. But this inquiry turns out to be no less controversial. In recent years, a growing
number of scholars has challenged the traditional account that focuses on the roles of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison in the movement to protect religious liberty in late eighteenthcentury America. These scholars emphasize that most of the political energy behind the
movement came from Evangelical Christians. On this revisionist account, we should not
understand the Free Exercise Clause and corresponding state provisions in terms of the
Enlightenment views of Jefferson and Madison, which these scholars characterize as secular,
rationalist, and skeptical – if not hostile – toward religion. Instead, those protections were
intended to promote religion and especially Christianity.
In this Article, I offer a different understanding of the intellectual foundations of the Free
Exercise Clause. The most basic view that supported religious liberty was neither secular
rationalism nor Christian Evangelicalism but what contemporaries called natural religion. This
view held that human beings were capable of using reason to discern the basic principles of
religion, including the duties they owed to God and one another. Because religion was founded
on reason, individuals had an inalienable natural right to develop their own beliefs and to
worship in accord with them. At the same time, that right was limited by the law of nature,
which required people to respect the rights of others. In this way, the concept of natural religion
established both the foundations and the limits of religious liberty. This view enabled people
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with different religious and philosophical perspectives to find common ground. It provided the
basis for a political coalition between Evangelicals, rationalist Christians, and Enlightenment
liberals that secured the adoption of state and federal constitutional guarantees for religious
freedom.
The Article begins by demonstrating that natural religion and its associated ideas of
natural law and natural rights were central to the intellectual world of eighteenth-century
Americans. Those ideas played a vital part in many areas of thought, including political and
moral philosophy, natural jurisprudence, English law, Christian and Deist theology, and even
Newtonian natural science – intellectual strands that came together in the Radical Whig ideology
that animated the American Revolution. Next, I explain how those ideas can enhance our
understanding of the religious liberty provisions of the first state declarations of rights; the
political controversy that culminated in the passage of Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom in Virginia; and the debates surrounding the adoption of the Federal Constitution and
the Free Exercise Clause itself. Finally, I explore the founders’ views on the problem of
religious exemptions from civil laws, and discuss the implications of this history for our current
debates over civil rights and religious liberty – a subject that the Supreme Court recently
grappled with in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, and that it
has agreed to revisit next Term in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.
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Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and . . . it
is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other.
– Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. 161
INTRODUCTION
In contemporary America, no subject is more controversial than religious liberty and its
relationship to other important values such as civil rights. This subject lies at the heart of recent
cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,2 in which the
Supreme Court considered whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment3 should be
interpreted to exempt businesses with religious objections to same-sex marriage from state civil
rights laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.
To shed light on the meaning of religious liberty and its place in our constitutional order,
courts and scholars often seek to determine how that right was understood at the time of the
founding. But this too turns out to be controversial. Although freedom of religion stands at the
head of the Bill of Rights, discussions of that right during the ratification of the Constitution and
the drafting of the First Amendment are sparse.4 For this reason, it is common to look to the
earlier historical background. In particular, courts and scholars traditionally have focused on the
most important debate over church and state in Revolutionary America: the dispute that took
place during the mid-1780s over Patrick Henry’s proposal to institute a tax for the support of
Christian teaching and worship in Virginia.5 The opposition to this bill was led by James
Madison, whose Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments presented a
powerful and comprehensive defense of religious liberty. After defeating this bill, Madison and
his allies secured the passage of Thomas Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.
The traditional account holds that this bill, like Madison’s Memorial, was based on the
Enlightenment view that individuals had a natural right to use their reason to pursue truth in the

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Bill of Rights,
doc. 2, at 3 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss2.html [https://perma.cc/44P8-J77U]
[hereinafter VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS].
1

2

138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”)
3

4

For an exploration of these debates, see infra Part V.B.

5

See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1947).
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religious realm and that this realm lay beyond the legitimate scope of state authority, which was
confined to such secular concerns as the protection of life, liberty, and property. A few years
later, the same view led Madison to champion the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause as an
essential part of the Bill of Rights. On this traditional account, the Clause should be understood
to reflect the outlook of Madison and Jefferson.6
In recent decades, an increasing number of scholars has challenged this understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause.7 Although they agree that we can gain critical insight from the debate
in Virginia, they interpret it very differently. These scholars observe that most of the political
energy for the defeat of the assessment bill and the passage of Jefferson’s statute came from
Evangelical Christians who were motivated by religious principles. Evangelicals held that the
exercise of state power in this area corrupted religion, usurped the sovereign authority of God,
interfered with individuals’ freedom to respond to God’s will, and impeded their ability to spread
the Gospel.8 On this revisionist view, the founding-era protections for religion should not be
understood in terms of the Enlightenment principles of Jefferson and others, which these scholars
characterize as secular, rationalist, and skeptical – if not hostile – toward religion.9 Instead,
those protections were intended to promote religion and particularly Christianity.10
Other scholars emphasize that the protections for religious liberty reflected both
Enlightenment and Evangelical ideals.11 Yet it is not always clear how the two different
perspectives related to each other.

6

For classic examples of this account, see Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13; Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1879).
7

See, e.g., THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787
(1977) [hereinafter BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA]; JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY (2010);
Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
8

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 178-81.

9

See, e.g., id. at 4, 179-81; McConnell, supra note 7, at 1416, 1449-52.

10

For another insightful work that challenges the traditional account and argues that the origins
of the Religion Clauses are better understood in terms of Christian principles, see STEVEN D.
SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2014).
11

See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965); SIDNEY E.
MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT (1963); NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (2012); JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT ch. 2 (4th ed. 2016).
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In this Article, I propose a different way of understanding the intellectual foundations of
the Free Exercise Clause and its state counterparts. The most basic view that supported religious
liberty was neither secular rationalism nor Christian Evangelicalism but what contemporaries
called natural religion. As I shall show, natural religion – together with the associated ideas of
natural law and natural rights – played a vital role in many areas of eighteenth-century thought,
from political theory and jurisprudence to theology and science.
The concept of natural religion was based on a particular understanding of human beings
and their relationship with God. This view held that humans are endowed with the faculty of
reason. Reason enables them to recognize that they were created by a supreme being and that
they should love, worship, and obey him. In addition to these duties to God, natural religion
embraces the duties that one owes to oneself and to others. Taken together, these three kinds of
duties constitute the law of nature.
The law of nature requires individuals to respect the inherent rights of other people –
rights that arise from their own nature as rational beings. Among the most important of those
rights is religious liberty. Because reason is central to religion, individuals must be free to
pursue spiritual truth and to worship in accord with their own consciences and understandings.
As intelligent beings with the capacity for self-determination, they also are entitled to direct their
own actions and to dispose of their persons and properties as they see fit. This is the basis of the
natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Because these rights would be insecure in a state of
nature, individuals would enter into civil society and establish a government with the force
necessary to protect them. But force has no place in the realm of religion, which must be
determined solely by reason and conscience. It follows that religious liberty is an inalienable
right that is limited only by the inherent duty to respect the rights of other individuals and the
community. In this way, the interlocking concepts of natural religion, natural law, and natural
rights provided a powerful rationale for protecting liberty of conscience.
During the eighteenth century, the idea of natural religion took two different forms.12
The first was Deism. In its pure form, this view held that religion should be based on reason
alone, and it therefore rejected all forms of religion that were based on a belief in divine
revelation, including traditional Christianity. This version of natural religion, which was
advocated by radicals like Thomas Paine, sparked intense discussion around the end of the
eighteenth century, but it had a limited following in America before that time.13
Instead, the most common form of natural religion held that there was no necessary
conflict between reason and revelation. This view maintained that the basic principles of

12

See William Warren Sweet, Natural Religion and Religious Liberty in America, 25 J.
RELIGION 45, 51 (1945).
13

See E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, THEOLOGY IN AMERICA 7, 159-72 (2003).
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religion and morality were founded in reason, but it left open the possibility that God had chosen
to reinforce those principles and to disclose additional truths through revelation. This view had
the potential to establish common ground among people who held a wide variety of religious
perspectives.
It was this form of natural religion that formed the basis for Jefferson’s Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. Although he was a Deist in his private views, his bill used the
language of reason and natural rights in a way that appealed not only to Deists but also to many
Christians. The same was true of Madison’s Memorial. Nor were they the only ones who used
this language: the ideas of natural rights and reason also appeared in several of the leading
Evangelical petitions against Henry’s Assessment Bill.14 In the end, that bill was rejected and
Jefferson’s bill adopted by a political coalition of Evangelicals, rationalist Episcopalians, and
Enlightenment liberals that was led by Madison.
In this way, the ideas of natural religion and natural rights were central to the struggle for
religious liberty in Virginia. This is not to diminish the importance of Evangelical ideas, which
also played a vital role. But to the extent that there was a consensus among the different groups
that fought for religious freedom in that state, it was to be found in their support for Jefferson’s
bill, with its affirmation that “the natural rights of mankind” included the inalienable freedom to
use one’s own mind to form and express religious opinions and worship in accord with them.15
There is good reason to believe that the Free Exercise Clause reflected the same view – a view
that was rooted in the concept of natural religion.16

14

See infra text accompanying notes 456-62 (discussing Presbyterian petition of August 13,
1785); infra text accompanying notes 520-22 (discussing Westmoreland County petition of
November 2, 1785); infra note 529 (discussing General Baptist Association petition of August
13, 1785).
Virginia, Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra
note 1, Amendment I (Religion), doc. 44, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions44.html [https://perma.cc/7D6E-4N38]
[hereinafter Virginia Act].
15

16

In the legal literature, most discussions of rational religion in the founding period focus on
Deism. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemptions, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 377-78 (1989-90) (asserting that “the
governing intellectual climate of the late eighteenth century was that of deism, or natural law”);
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 NYU L. REV. 346, 39193 (2004) (questioning the influence of Deism). One of the few law review articles to discuss
“natural religion” in the broader sense is Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158-62, 195-96 (1991). Other
thoughtful explorations of rational religion during this period include Kathleen A. Brady,
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This Article proceeds in six Parts. The first two demonstrate that natural religion and its
associated ideas of natural law and natural rights held a central place in the intellectual world of
eighteenth-century Americans and were integrally connected with their understanding of
religious liberty. Part I highlights the role that these ideas played in the works of John Locke, the
philosopher who had the deepest impact on America. Part II shows that these ideas also were
essential to many other forms of thought during this period, including leading treatises on the law
of nature and nations; the English jurisprudence of Blackstone and Mansfield; the moral
philosophies of British rationalism and the Scottish Enlightenment; Deist and Christian theology;
and even Newtonian natural science. All these strands of thought came together in the Radical
Whig ideology that shaped the political consciousness of colonial Americans. Part III shows
how natural religion and its related ideas provided the justification for the American Revolution
and were enshrined in the first state constitutions and declarations of rights. Part IV discusses
the vital part that these ideas played in the struggle over religious liberty in mid-1780s Virginia.
Part V explores the light they can shed on the founding-era debates over the protection for
religious freedom in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
Finally, in Part VI, I explore what this history can tell us about the problem of religious
exemptions from civil laws. Contrary to the position of some revisionist scholars, there is no
persuasive evidence that eighteenth-century Americans espoused a general principle that
individuals were entitled to exemptions from laws that regulated conduct in a way that conflicted
with their religious beliefs. As a non-originalist, I do not believe that this history necessarily
should be decisive. It is an open question whether the Supreme Court should overrule
Employment Division v. Smith17 and hold that such laws should be subject to some form of
heightened review. The Court recently has agreed to consider this question in Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia,18 a free exercise challenge to a city’s decision to terminate its foster-care contract

Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to
Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 433 (1999), and Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and
the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
837 (1995). For valuable discussions of eighteenth-century natural religion by historians,
political scientists, and philosophers, see PETER BYRNE, NATURAL RELIGION AND THE NATURE
OF RELIGION chs. 1-5 (1989); MICHAEL J. LEE, THE EROSION OF BIBLICAL CERTAINTY chs. 1-3
(2013); HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976); MILLER, supra note 11;
CLAUDE M. NEWLIN, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA ch. 7 (1962);
PROTESTANTISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (Thomas S. Engeman & Michael P. Zuckert
eds., 2004); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC (1996); B.A. Gerish,
Natural and Revealed Religion, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF EIGHTEENTHCENTURY PHILOSOPHY 641 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2000); Sweet, supra note 12.
17

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

18

104 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123), granting cert. to 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019).
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with a Catholic social service agency which refused on religious grounds to certify same-sex
couples to serve as foster parents. However, if the Court decides to adopt heightened scrutiny for
general laws that burden religious exercise, it ought not to employ this approach to curtail the
application of civil rights laws, such as the ones involved in Fulton and Masterpiece Cakeshop.
Instead, as I shall show, one of the most important lessons that emerges from the history is that
the right to religious liberty does not override the civil rights of other people.
I. JOHN LOCKE ON RELIGION, TOLERATION, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE
A. Locke on Natural Religion
1. The Concept of Natural Religion
Locke’s religious, moral, and political theory is founded on the notion that human beings
are rational creatures.19 Because they are endowed with reason, individuals are free, selfdetermining beings who are capable of directing their own thoughts and actions and pursuing
their own happiness or good.20 To know what that good is, they must seek knowledge about
themselves and the world.
Locke explores the foundations of that knowledge in An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, one of the signal philosophical works of the Enlightenment. According to
Locke, most of our knowledge is quite limited because it is derived from sense experience.21 But
there are two key exceptions to this generalization. First, following Descartes, Locke holds that
we have intuitive knowledge of our own existence.22 And second, he maintains that we are
capable of knowing some truths through deductive reason.23 The most important of these truths

For a fuller exploration of Locke’s views on religion and toleration, see Steven J. Heyman,
The Light of Nature: John Locke, Natural Rights, and the Origins of American Religious
Liberty, 101 MARQUETTE L. REV. 705 (2018) [hereinafter Heyman, Light of Nature].
19

20

See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 1-73,
at 233-87 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (4th ed. 1700) [hereinafter LOCKE,
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING].
21

See id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618; ch. XI, §§ 2–3, 9, at 630–32, 635–36; chs. XV–XVI, at 654–
68.
22

See id. ch. IX, § 3, at 618-19.

23

See id. ch. II, §§ 2-3, at 531-32.
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concern our relationship with God. They form the basis of “Natural Religion,” or religion
insofar as it can be known through reason.24
The first principle of natural religion is that God exists.25 In the Essay, Locke presents
two arguments for this proposition. First, in a version of the traditional cosmological argument,
he contends that all beings can be traced to a first cause that must have existed from eternity, and
that is the source of all the qualities they have.26 Because we are aware of our own existence as
“knowing intelligent Being[s],” we can conclude that we ultimately must have received our
existence and intelligence from another being that is “eternal, most powerful, and most
knowing.”27 This is what we “call God.”28 Second, Locke offers a version of the traditional
argument from design: that only an intelligent being could have “produce[d] that order,
harmony, and beauty which is to be found in Nature.”29
A second truth of natural religion concerns the relationship between humans and God.
Because they are “Inferior [and] Finite” beings, who are created by and dependent upon another
being who is infinite, “omnipotent, perfectly wise and good,” they have a duty “to honour, fear,
and obey God.”30
Third, reason enables humans to discern the moral rules that God has established to
govern their conduct. These rules, which Locke calls “the Law of Nature and Reason,” are
rooted in our nature as “rational Creatures.”31 In the Essay, Locke suggests that by reflecting on
the nature of God and human beings and the relationship between them, reason is capable of
making morality into a demonstrative science that has the same logical rigor as mathematics.32

24

Id. bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.

25

See id.

26

See id. bk. IV, ch. X, §§ 3–5, at 620

27

Id. §§ 5-6, at 620-21.

28

Id. § 6, at 621.

29

Id. § 10, at 624.

30

Id. ch. XIII, § 3, at 651.

31

JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 96, 124, at 332, 351 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (student ed., 1988) (3d printing 1698) [hereinafter LOCKE,
GOVERNMENT].
32

See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. IV, ch. III, § 18, at 549.
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Although Locke never attempted to fully work out the content of natural law, his writings
contain important indications of what it includes. Following the Christian natural law tradition,
he makes a three-fold division between the duties that one owes to God, to oneself, and to
others.33 The first category of duties requires individuals not only to “obey” but also to “honour”
and “worship[]” God.34 The second category embraces an obligation to preserve oneself and not
to take one’s own life or to expose it to the arbitrary power of others.35
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government contains an important discussion of the law of
nature as it applies to the third category – duties to others. As rational, self-determining beings,
individuals are naturally free “to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and
Persons as they see fit.”36 In other words, they have natural rights to life, liberty, and property.
This natural state of freedom is also a state of equality, in which no one is inherently superior or
subordinate to anyone else.37 Locke then uses these ideas to establish the duties that individuals
owe one another: the law of nature and reason holds that because everyone is “equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”38
For Locke, the three propositions we have just discussed – that God exists, that people
have a duty to worship and obey him, and that he has prescribed a law of nature and reason for
them to follow – make up the substance of “Natural Religion.”39 Natural religion lies at the heart
of all reasonable religion. In contrast to ancient texts that may be difficult to interpret and may
generate sectarian controversy, “the Precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible
to all Mankind” by the “light of Reason.” 40 This religion teaches that “the best worship” of God

33

See JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE qu. V, fol. 59–61, at 167–69
(Robert Horwitz et al. eds. & trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990). As the editors explain, this work
was composed in Latin “no later than 1664” and was first published, with an English translation,
in 1954. Id. at 29–30.
34

LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. I, ch. IV, § 7, at 87; bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 3,
at 651.
35

See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk. II, §§ 6, 23-24, 135, at 270-71, 283-85,
357.
36

Id. § 4, at 269.

37

See id.

38

Id. § 6, at 271.

39

LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.

40

Id.
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lies not in elaborate “ceremonies and outward performances,” but rather in “a good life” that is
characterized by piety toward God and virtue in relation to oneself and others.41 Such a life is
not only pleasing to God but also promotes the wellbeing of the society and its members.42
Moreover, because the principles of natural religion can be known by “[c]ommon sense” and
“the common light of nature,” they are matters that the adherents of different religions can agree
upon.43 For all these reasons, Locke maintains that natural religion should have a central place in
religious life.44
2. The Limits of Natural Religion and the Need for Revealed Religion
At the same time, Locke concedes that some matters are beyond the scope of human
reason and natural religion. With regard to worship, for example, while reason teaches that one
should approach God with “a pure heart,” there is no way to know what “outward modes of
worship” he desires other than by divine revelation.45 Likewise, because on Locke’s view
human knowledge can come only from ideas derived from sensation and from reflection on those
ideas, reason can tell people nothing about the spiritual world (other than the existence and
attributes of God), which again can be known only through revelation.46
The most significant limitation on the scope of reason has to do with what can be known
about an afterlife, a subject that is crucial to Locke’s view of religion and morality. Locke holds
that, as rational creatures, individuals are impelled to pursue their own good.47 Although the
interests of different people do not inherently conflict with one another, there are situations in
which they do. In such cases, it will be rational for one person to pursue her own good by

41

JOHN LOCKE, A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION ch. 1 (1692), in 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE 139, 156 (London, Rivington, 12th ed., 1824), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-theworks-vol-5-four-letters-concerning-toleration. [https://perma.cc/Z3M6-DG5K] [hereinafter
LOCKE, THIRD LETTER].
42

See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 2d ed.
1690), in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 45 (Mark Goldie ed.,
Liberty Fund 2010) [hereinafter LOCKE, TOLERATION], http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-aletter-concerning-toleration-and-other-writings [https://perma.cc/DKR2-MQRX].
43

LOCKE, THIRD LETTER, supra note 41, ch. 1, at 156.

44

See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.

45

LOCKE, THIRD LETTER, supra note 41, ch. 1, at 156-57.

46

See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. IV, ch. III, § 27, at 557-58.

47

See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 36–71, at 254–84; id. bk. IV, ch. XXI, § 21, at 720–21.
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inflicting harm on another. The law of nature is meant to restrain such conduct. But laws are
useless if they are not backed up by sanctions.48 It is evident that those who violate natural law
are not always punished in this life.49 It follows that if this law is to be effective, it must be
enforced in a future state where individuals will be requited for their deeds in this world.50 In the
Essay, Locke offers some grounds to believe that such a future state exists, but he does not
contend that its existence actually can be demonstrated by reason.51 This poses a serious
problem for his whole account of morality and religion.
Difficulties like these lead Locke to conclude that human life must be directed not only
by natural religion, which is based on reason, but also by revealed religion, which is based on
faith. In the Essay, Locke defines faith as assent to a proposition not because it has been “made
out by the Deductions of Reason,” but rather because one trusts in the veracity of God, who has
revealed that proposition to human beings.52
When Locke speaks of revelation, he is thinking primarily of the Bible and especially the
New Testament. That revelation makes clear that there is a future state in which human beings
will be rewarded or punished under the law of nature for their conduct on earth.53 In this way,
revealed religion is able to overcome the difficulty encountered by natural religion, which is
incapable of demonstrating the existence of a future state upon which morality ultimately
depends.
3. The Relationship Between Faith and Reason
For Locke, however, this does not mean that faith and revelation supersede reason and
natural religion. Instead, he insists that even with regard to revelation, reason plays an essential
role. To begin with, one must use reason to decide whether something should be regarded as a

48

See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXVIII, §§ 5-6, at 351-52.

49

See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. III, §§ 12, at 74.

50

See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 281.

51

See, e.g., id. at 281-82 (presenting a version of Pascal’s wager).

52

Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 2, at 689.

53

See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AS DELIVERED IN THE
SCRIPTURES ch. XIV, at 154, 162-63 (John C. Higgins-Biddle ed., Clarendon Press 1999) (1695)
[hereinafter LOCKE, REASONABLENESS].
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divine revelation in the first place.54 In the case of the New Testament, Locke maintains that its
authenticity is attested by the miracles that Jesus performed.55
According to Locke, we must also use our reason to assess the content of a purported
revelation. In this connection, he draws a key distinction between propositions that are (1)
“According to Reason,” (2) “Above Reason,” and (3) “Contrary to Reason.”56 Although
revelation can teach the first sort of truths (such as the idea that God exists), it is not necessary
for the knowledge of such truths because they can be demonstrated by reason.57 Instead, the
principal function of revelation is to teach truths that are “Above Reason,” such as the existence
of a future state.58 This is the legitimate province “of Faith.”59
By contrast, Locke insists that revelation can never teach truths that are “Contrary to
Reason,” in the sense that they conflict with the clear knowledge that we attain either directly or
“by evident deductions of Reason” – a term that appears to include the law of nature.60 As
rational beings, we cannot accept as divine revelation anything that conflicts with reason,
because we can never have more confidence that it truly is a revelation than we have in our own
rational faculties, which are “the most excellent Part” of the nature that God has bestowed upon
us.61 By the same token, we must interpret the words of a revelation so that it does not conflict
with reason.62 Thus, even in determining the authenticity and meaning of revelation,
“Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing.”63

54

See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 6, at 693; id. ch.
XVIII, §§ 8, 10, at 694, 695.
55

See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. XIV, at 142–43, 146–47, 153.

56

See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687.

57

Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, §§ 4-5, at 690-91.

58

Id. § 7, at 694.

59

Id.

60

Id. § 5, at 691-93.

61

Id. at 692-93.

62

See id.; id. § 8, at 694.

63

Id, ch. XIX, § 14, at 704.
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On these grounds, Locke rejects what he takes to be the common view that faith and
reason are opposed to one another. Properly understood, faith is “nothing else but an Assent
founded on the highest Reason.”64 Rather than undermining reason, faith “assist[s] and
improve[s]” it by giving us “new Discoveries of Truth, coming from [God, who is] the Eternal
Fountain of all Knowledge.”65 On this view faith and reason are complementary, as are the
forms of religion that arise from them. Natural religion lays the foundations of religion by
teaching human beings everything that can be known about God and morality through reason.
Revealed religion builds on these foundations and completes the edifice that natural religion
began.66

64

Id. ch. XVI, § 14, at 668.

65

Id. ch. XVIII, § 10, at 695.

66

In contrast to the Essay, which sharply criticized those traditionalists who elevated faith above
reason, Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity was directed against Deists who sought to found
religion on reason alone. See, e.g., LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. I, at 5. The
work therefore lays more stress than the Essay on the limits of natural reason and the need for
revelation. Although reason is sufficient to understand the part of natural law that is needed to
govern external interaction between individuals and ensure the peace and prosperity of civil
society (which is the part of natural law that Locke focuses on in the Essay and the Two
Treatises), reason has not led people to comprehend the full range of that law, which also
requires individuals to be inwardly virtuous and to treat one another with charity and good will.
See id. ch. IX, at 58; ch. XII, at 122-23; ch. XIV, at 147-55. This leads Locke to make the
paradoxical remark that “Natural Reason” seems to be incapable of establishing “Natural
Religion in its full extent.” Id. ch. XIV, at 148. Instead, he maintains that our first full and clear
knowledge of the moral law came from revelation. See id. at 149, 155-57. When we consider
the teachings of that law, however, we immediately recognize that they are “agreeable” or
“conformable” to reason. Id. at 149, 153, 156, 159. The law revealed in the Gospels is
substantially the same as the law of nature and reason. See id. ch. II, at 13-14; id. ch. III, at 1921; id. ch. XIV, at 159. On this view, revelation does not supplant or invalidate natural religion,
but instead leads human beings to a clear and comprehensive knowledge of it. Moreover, while
the Reasonableness stresses the advantages of Christianity for salvation, see id. ch. XIV, at 14164, it also suggests that, at least in some circumstances, salvation can be attained through natural
religion alone, see id. ch. XIV, at 139-40; Heyman, Light of Nature, supra note 19, at 767-70. In
short, while the Essay and the Reasonableness engage with different opponents and approach the
relationship between faith and reason from different angles – the former from a naturalistic
standpoint and the latter from the perspective of Christian theology – the two works converge on
a view that affirms the essential harmony of natural and revealed religion.
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B. Locke on Religious Liberty and the Separation of Church and State
1. Religious Liberty
Let us now turn to the role that reason plays in Locke’s defense of religious freedom. His
most comprehensive discussion appears in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689).67 The Letter
begins by advocating for religious toleration in specifically Christian terms.68 True Christianity
is concerned not with “the Pomp of . . . Outward Worship” nor with disputes over doctrinal
purity but with “the regulating of Mens Lives according to the Rules of Vertue and Piety.” 69
Instead of seeking “Ecclesiastical Dominion” over other people or forcing them to embrace a
particular form of worship or belief, Christians are called to show “Charity, Meekness, and
Good-will in general towards all Mankind; even to those that are not Christians.”70
For these reasons, Locke maintains that “Toleration [is] the chief Characteristical Mark
of the True Church.”71 As he soon makes clear, however, his goal is to show that toleration is
required not only by “the Gospel of Jesus Christ” but also by “the genuine Reason of
Mankind.”72 In other words, his argument is founded on reason and natural religion as well as
on revelation. As with the Two Treatises of Government, it is the fusion of these two modes of
discourse that gives Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration the unique power it had for
eighteenth-century British and American readers.
The Letter’s argument begins with the premise that human beings are inherently free.
The philosophical rationale for this premise may be found in the Two Treatises and the Essay. In

67

The Letter was published in Latin in April 1689. See Mark Goldie, Notes on the Texts in
LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at xxix–xxx. That fall saw the publication of an English
translation by Locke’s friend William Popple, which was made with the author’s knowledge but
without his involvement. See id. at xxix. In this Article, I quote from Popple’s translation,
which is the one that has been used in the English-speaking world from Locke’s day to our own.
For a more recent and literal translation, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
(Michael Silverthorne trans. 2010) (1689), in LOCKE ON TOLERATION 3 (Richard Vernon ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
68

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 7-11.

69

Id. at 7-8.

70

Id.

Id. at 7. For some readings of Locke’s argument that emphasize its Christian dimension, see
MILLER, supra note 11, at 75-79; SMITH, supra note 10, at 39-40.
71

72

Id. at 11.
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those works, Locke argues that our freedom is grounded in our capacity for reason, which
enables us to think for ourselves, to direct our actions, and to pursue our own well-being.73
In the Letter, Locke takes this conception of inherent human liberty for granted. In
addition, he distinguishes two sorts of well-being that humans are concerned with: their
temporal happiness and their happiness in the world to come.74 To support their life in this
world, individuals need to acquire external goods through labor.75 But their possession of these
goods is vulnerable to fraud and violence by others.76 As in the Second Treatise, the solution lies
in the social contract.77 To protect their properties as well as their lives and liberties, individuals
would agree to form a civil society and to entrust the rulers with the force necessary to prevent
wrongdoing and protect the society from foreign aggression.78 To secure this protection,
individuals would agree to give up some of their freedom of outward conduct and to follow the
laws adopted by the society.79
By contrast, Locke insists that when individuals enter the social contract, they would not
give up their liberty to form their own religious beliefs or to worship God in the manner they
believe is required to attain eternal happiness and salvation.80 In the Letter, he offers four
arguments for this position. First, he contends that religious liberty is inalienable in the sense
that individuals cannot relinquish it when they enter society:
[N]o man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave it
to the choice of any other, whether Prince or Subject, to prescribe to him what
Faith or Worship he shall embrace. For no Man can, if he would, conform his
Faith to the Dictates, of another. All the Life and Power of true Religion consists

73

See supra text accompanying notes 19-20, 35.

74

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 45-48.

75

See id. at 46.

76

See id. at 46-47.

For Locke’s account of the social contract in the Second Treatise, see LOCKE, GOVERNMENT,
supra note 31, bk. II, §§ 87-89, 95, 99.
77

78

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 46-47.

79

See id. at 33-35, 46-48.

80

See id. at 12-15, 45-46.
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in the inward and full perswasion of the mind: And Faith is not Faith without
believing.81
As this passage indicates, Locke’s defense of religious liberty rests on the same
understanding of religion that we explored earlier – an understanding that seeks to harmonize
faith and reason. In maintaining that “Salvation” depends upon “Faith,” he invokes a doctrine
that is central to Christianity and especially to Protestantism. At the same time, his assertion that
“All the Life and Power of true Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind”
makes clear that he sees religious belief as an exercise of our intellectual faculties.
The same is true of the other arguments that Locke advances for religious liberty. His
second contention is that “[t]he care of souls cannot belong to the Civil Magistrate, because his
Power consists only in outward force: But true and saving Religion consists in the inward
perswasion of the Mind; without which nothing can be acceptable to God.”82 Outward force has
no power to convince “the Understanding.”83 To be sure, the magistrate has the same right that
everyone has to “draw [others] into the way of Truth” by means of “Arguments.”84 But he may
not use penalties for this purpose, for “[i]t is only Light and Evidence that can work a change in
Mens Opinions.”85 In short, religion should be a matter not of coercion but of “reason, and
conviction.”86
Third, Locke argues that even if coercion were capable of changing people’s minds, this
would do nothing to promote the salvation of souls, because rulers have no privileged access to
religious truth. It follows that the interests of true religion would only be harmed if subjects
were compelled “to quit the Light of their own Reason; to oppose the Dictates of their own
Consciences; and blindly to resign up themselves to the Will of their Governors” in such
matters.87 Finally, there is no call for individuals to give up their religious liberty when they
enter society because the beliefs and forms of worship they embrace do not injure others or

81

Id. at 13.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 13-14.

85

Id. at 14.

86

JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), in 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE, supra note 41, at 59, 73.
87

LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 14-15.
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violate their rights.88 It follows that, in matters of religion, “[e]very man . . . has the supreme and
absolute Authority of judging for himself.”89
2. Separation of Church and State
For all these reasons, Locke maintains that when individuals enter civil society, they
would fully retain their liberty of religious belief and worship and would grant the society and
government no power whatever in this area. This brings us to another distinctive feature of
Locke’s view – his argument for a strict separation of church and state. On this view, the state is
a community that is concerned solely with its members’ temporal welfare, an interest that it
promotes by securing their “natural” and “civil rights” to life, liberty, and property.90 The state
has no power to either impose or forbid particular beliefs or modes of worship.91 These matters
lie purely within the province of the “Religious Societies” or “Churches” that individuals
voluntarily form to promote their own salvation.92 Conversely, a church is properly concerned
only with spiritual matters and may not exercise temporal power over individuals, regardless of
whether they belong to its communion.93
3. The Limits of Religious Liberty and Toleration
As the previous section indicated, Locke understands religious liberty in jurisdictional
terms.94 Religious belief and practice are matters to be decided solely by individuals and the
religious societies they voluntarily form, and the state has no authority to meddle in such affairs.
By the same token, however, churches and believers cannot legitimately invoke religion as a
basis for depriving individuals of civil rights such as life, liberty, or property, for these rights fall
within the province and protection of the political community.95 This limitation on the scope of
religious conduct arises from the fundamental division between religion and state that results
from Locke’s theory of natural law and the social contract.

88

See id. at 45-46.

89

Id. at 46.

90

Id. at 12, 23, 44-48, 58-60.

91

See id. at 32-33, 37, 44-45.

92

See id. at 15, 32-34, 37.

93

See id. at 18-23.

94

See id. at 11-12.

95

See id. at 19-20.
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This theory also imposes another important limitation on religious liberty. Locke defends
this liberty on the ground that religion involves a relationship between individuals as rational
creatures and God.96 The law of nature and reason protects this relationship against interference
by other individuals, churches, or the state.97 But just as that law grants individuals a right to
religious liberty, it forbids them to use that liberty in a way that violates the natural rights of
others (for example, by performing rituals involving child sacrifice).98 In these two ways – by
separating the spheres of state and religion and by grounding religion in reason – Locke uses the
theory of natural religion to establish the foundations and the limits of religious liberty.
Finally, Locke also uses that theory to argue that some religious beliefs are not entitled to
toleration at all. To begin with, this is true of religions whose adherents claim the right to
dominate or impose their own beliefs on other people.99 Because beliefs of this sort deny the
equal status and rights of others, they are “contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules
which are necessary to the preservation of Civil Society.”100 Locke also would deny toleration to
atheists on the ground that they reject even the natural religion which he regards as the
foundation of morality, including the obligation to keep the promises upon which the social
contract is based.101 On the other hand, he makes clear that religious liberty extends to all human
beings who recognize “the Being of a God,” including Jews, Muslims, and pagans102 – a clear
indication that on his view religious freedom is not based simply on the liberty that Christians
enjoy under the Gospel,103 but also is founded on nature and reason. In short, for Locke,
“Liberty of Conscience is every mans natural Right.”104

96

See id. at 13-17, 26-29, 31-32, 45-46.

97

See id. at 19-32, 60.

98

See id. at 20, 37-38, 60.

99

See id. at 49-51.

Id. at 49-50; see also id. at 57 (stating that the fundamental principle of the Letter is “That
every Man [should] enjoy the same Rights that are granted to others”).
100

101

See id. at 52-53.

102

Id. at 39-40, 52, 58-59.

103

See id. at 36.

104

Id. at 53, 60.
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C. Conclusion
In the political, philosophical, and theological works we have explored, Locke places
reason at the heart of religion. According to Locke, reason shows human beings that God exists,
that they have a duty to worship and obey him, and that he has given them the law of nature to
guide their conduct. In addition to establishing these principles of natural religion, reason points
to the need for faith and revelation, which reinforce and perfect those principles. Reason also
provides a justification for religious liberty. As rational beings, individuals have both a right and
a duty to use their minds to seek the truth concerning God and what he requires them to believe
and to do to attain salvation. At the same time, reason defines the limits of religious liberty,
which cannot properly be invoked as a justification for denying the equal status and rights of
others.
II. NATURAL RELIGION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT
Although Locke’s view of natural religion and freedom of conscience had a deep impact
on eighteenth-century Americans,105 his view was far from alone. Those concepts were central
features of the intellectual world they inhabited. This Part surveys the role that those ideas
played in a wide range of fields, including natural jurisprudence, English law, moral philosophy,
theology, natural science, and the Whig ideology that informed the American Revolution.
A. The Law of Nature and Nations
Although Locke employed the idea of natural law in a powerful way, he did not offer a
systematic account of its content. For that, eighteenth-century Americans looked to writers on
the law of nature and nations such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean-Jacques

105

See, e.g., STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990) (discussing Locke’s impact on eighteenth-century Puritan
thought in America); ZUCKERT, supra note 16 (same); ALAN P.F. SELL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIVINES (1997) (exploring Locke’s influence in England and America).
For an important colonial-era work that draws on Locke to defend religious liberty, see ELISHA
WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (Boston: S. Kneeland & T.
Green, 1744), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805,
at 51 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1990), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/sandoz-political-sermons-of-theamerican-founding-era-1730-1805-2-vols [hereinafter POLITICAL SERMONS]. Permanent citations
for volume 1 of this work can be found at https://perma.cc/6MZ4-6J28, and for volume 2 at
https://perma.cc/9FCF-8ULX. For discussions of this work, see MILLER, supra note 11, at 94101, and ZUCKERT, supra note 16, at 183-93.
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Burlamaqui, and Emer de Vattel – authors who were frequently invoked in the political discourse
of this period.106
A leading exposition of natural law could be found in the works of Pufendorf, which
were an important source for Locke’s own thought on the subject.107 Pufendorf’s magisterial
treatise on The Law of Nature and Nations appeared in 1672.108 The following year, he
published an abridgment for students and the public which was soon translated into English as
The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature.109
Pufendorf’s account of natural law will seem largely familiar to anyone who has read
Locke’s Two Treatises. Individuals are rational beings who are naturally accountable to no one
but God.110 The state of nature is a condition of natural liberty and equality, in which individuals
are free to direct their own actions within the law of nature and reason.111 Because they would
be in danger of violence in a state of nature, they would agree to form a civil society and to
establish government for mutual security.112

106

See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 41, 132
(enlarged ed. 1992).
On Locke’s complex relationship with Pufendorf’s thought, see JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN
LOCKE 201-04 (1994).
107

108

See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (photo reprt.) (Basil Kennett
trans., 4th ed., London, J. Walthoe et al. 1729),
[https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32437121669218] [hereinafter PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE].
109

SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE
(Andrew Tooke trans. 1691, Ian Hunter & David Saunders ed., Liberty Fund 2003) (1673),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/pufendorf-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-ofnature-1673-2003 [https://perma.cc/U7S6-E2NY] [hereinafter PUFENDORF, DUTY]. For a more
recent and literal translation, see SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1673).
110

See PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. II, ch. I, § VIII, at 169-70.

111

Id.

112

See id. bk. II, chs. IV-V, at 187-98.
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Like Locke, Pufendorf holds that the law of nature is established by God and knowable
by “the Light of Reason.”113 That law specifies the duties that one owes to God, oneself, and
others.114 The first category, or “[t]he Duty of Man towards God, so far as can be discover’d by
Natural Reason,” is what Pufendorf calls “Natural Religion.”115 The chapter that he devotes to
this subject in Whole Duty of Man is the fullest account that can be found in works on the law of
nature and nations.116
As Pufendorf explains, the duties of natural religion can be divided into two parts. The
“Theoretical” part obliges individuals to use reason to form true ideas about God.117 These ideas
are that God exists, that he created the universe, that he “governs the whole World, and
particularly Mankind,” and that he is infinite in perfection.118
Pufendorf then turns to “[t]he Propositions of Practical Natural Religion,” which concern
the internal and external worship that human beings should render to God.119 Internal worship
consists in regarding him with love, reverence, and honor, while external worship involves
public and private prayer as well as doing one’s best to obey his commands.120
For Pufendorf, natural religion is an essential part of natural law theory not only because
it determines the inherent duties that people owe to God, but also because religion is essential to
social order.121 The fear of God is necessary to restrain the unruly passions and conduct of
individuals, which cannot effectively be controlled merely by temporal punishments or a sense of

113

Id. bk. I, ch. III, §§ X-XI, at 56-58; PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch.
III, § XIII, at 132-35.
114

PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. III, § XII, at 59-60.

115

Id. ch. IV, § 1, at 60.

116

See ch. IV at 60-69.

117

Id. § I, at 60.

118

Id. § II-V, at 60-64; cf. PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. IV, § III, at

15.
119

PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. IV, § VI, at 64.

120

Id. §§ VI-VII, at 64-66.

121

See id. ch. III, § XII, at 59.
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moral duty.122 For this reason, religion is properly regarded as “the utmost and firmest Bond of
Human Society.”123
In a later work, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society
(1687), Pufendorf brings his natural law theory to bear on the problems of religious toleration
and church-state relations.125 Like Locke, he argues that, as “Rational Creatures,” human beings
are inherently free to worship God in accord with their “own Opinion[s]” as informed by reason
or revelation.126 Individuals would not surrender this freedom when they submit to civil
government, which is established not “for Religions sake” but for the security “of their Liberty,
Life, and Fortunes.”127
124

Despite what initially appears to be a strong defense of religious liberty and church-state
separation, Pufendorf contends that sovereigns possess substantial authority with regard to
religion. Because religion is essential to social order, they not only should take care to promote
natural religion among their subjects, but may also prohibit actions that subvert natural religion,
such as public idolatry, blasphemy, and denial of God’s existence.128
Pufendorf goes considerably further when discussing the authority of sovereigns in
modern European states. To maintain public peace and tranquility, it is desirable that there be
“but one Faith and Religion in a State,” especially if it is the true religion of Christ as “contained
in the Holy Scripture.”129 Accordingly, the sovereign has authority, with “the general consent of
his Subjects,” to establish a “Public Form of Religion” within the society; to require that it “be
professed by all,” especially the clergy; and to command that no other doctrines be taught either

122

See id. ch. IV, § VIII, at 67-69.

123

Id. at 67.

124

SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE NATURE AND QUALIFICATION OF RELIGION IN REFERENCE TO
CIVIL SOCIETY (Jodocus Crull trans. 1698, Simone Zurbuchen ed., Liberty Fund 2002),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/pufendorf-of-the-nature-and-qualification-of-religion-inreference-to-civil-society [https://perma.cc/ALF3-K58Q] [hereinafter PUFENDORF, RELIGION].
125

See Simone Zurbuchen, Introduction to id., at xi.

126

Id. §§ 1-3, at 12-15.

127

Id. § 5, at 17.

128

See id. § 7, at 20.

129

Id. at § 49, at 104, 106.
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in public or in private.130 When doctrinal disputes arise, the sovereign may convene synods to
resolve them.131 Individuals who insist on teaching “erroneous Doctrines” may be “silenced” or
– if all else fails – “banished.”132 The sovereign also has authority to ensure that the church has
adequate revenues, to erect and maintain church buildings and schools, and to participate in the
selection of ministers.133
This account of Pufendorf’s views raises a puzzle. How is it possible to reconcile his
position that religious liberty is an inalienable aspect of natural liberty, and that civil government
is established for the sake of security rather than religion, with his approval of the establishment
of a public religion and his view that the government is not necessarily bound to grant religious
toleration to dissenters? The answer appears to lie at least partly in his views on natural and
revealed religion and the role of religion in society. In contrast to Locke, Pufendorf seems to
hold that natural religion has no effect whatever in promoting the salvation of souls, which can
come about only in the ways offered by divine revelation.134 From the standpoint of natural law,
the function of natural religion – and religion in general – is to provide the “Bond” or “Cement”
of human society, by giving individuals the strongest possible incentive to obey the laws and
refrain from harming one another.135 In a society whose members are Christians, the only
religion that is capable of holding the society together is Christianity.136 Thus, in such a society,
the government should promote not only the principles of natural religion but also Christian
beliefs and worship by establishing them as the public religion of the commonwealth.137 That
does not mean that the government is justified in imposing a religion on individuals by force, for
that would conflict with their inherent freedom as well as with the very nature of religion, which

130

Id. at 106-07.

131

See id § 46, at 99-100.

132

Id. at 107.

133

See id. §§ 43, 45, at 95-96, 97-99.

134

See PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, preface, at 19-20; bk. I, ch. III, § XII, at 59-60;
bk. I, ch. IV, § VIII, at 66; PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. IV, § III, at
156; cf. PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, § 8, at 22 (asserting that salvation cannot be
attained through natural religion alone).
135

PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. IV, § VIII, at 67-69; PUFENDORF, RELIGION,
supra note 124, § 5, at 17-18.
136

See PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, § 49, at 106.

137

Id. § 48, at 102-03; id. § 49, at 106-07.
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can be apprehended only by reason and faith.138 Within limits, it may be appropriate to tolerate
those who hold different beliefs, especially when they are willing to live quietly and peaceably in
the society.139 But when religious dissent threatens to undermine social peace and order, the
government has the authority to suppress it or, as a last resort, to expel the dissenters.140
In this way, Pufendorf seeks to reconcile the competing values of individual liberty and
social order in the area of religion. He does this by recognizing a limited right to religious
freedom while at the same time defending the traditional institution of an established church,
now reconceived as an institution that promotes social order as much as one that advances true
religion and the salvation of souls. The tensions and contradictions that exist within this view
are obvious, for although Pufendorf insists that civil government is not formed for the sake of
religion, the powers that he would grant the government in this area may result in far-reaching
limits on religious liberty. In this respect, his position stands in striking contrast to that of Locke,
who takes the idea of a natural and inalienable right to religious liberty to its logical conclusion
by holding that the state has no power whatever in the religious sphere.141

138

See PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, §§ 1-3, at 12-15.

139

See id. §§ 49-50, at 105-08.

140

See supra text accompanying note 132.

141

See supra text accompanying notes 90-93. In their own treatises on the law of nature and
nations, Burlamaqui and Vattel follow Pufendorf in recognizing substantial authority in the
sovereign over religious teaching and worship, while at the same time affirming that subjects
have an inviolable natural right to liberty of conscience. See JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW vol. 2, pt. III, chs. II-III, at 404-15; pt. IV, ch. II, §§
XXXII-XXXVI, at 460-62; ch. VIII, § XVI, at 515 (Thomas Nugent trans. & Petter Korkman
ed., Liberty Fund 2006) (2d ed. 1763), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/burlamaqui-the-principlesof-natural-and-politic-law [https://perma.cc/G6HQ-Z3B5]; EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS bk. I, ch. XI, § 114, at 147-49; ch. XII, §§ 125-57, at 155-85 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797 ed.), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vattel-the-law-ofnations-lf-ed [https://perma.cc/4T6B-N6G9]. By contrast, in his notes on Pufendorf, the great
commentator Jean Barbeyrac endorses Locke’s views on religious toleration and the separation
of church and state. See PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. VII, ch. IV, § XI, n.
2, at 665-66 (Barbeyrac’s note). The concept of natural religion also was an important one for
all these authors. See, e.g., BURLAMAQUI, supra, vol. 1, pt. II, ch. 4, §§ VII-VIII, at 148-50;
VATTEL, supra, bk. I, ch. XII, § 126, at 157-58; Jean Barbeyrac, An Historical and Critical
Account of the Science of Morality, in PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, § I, at 1-3;
§ VI, at 14-16; § 32, at 86-88.
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We can therefore view Locke and Pufendorf as representing two competing models of
religious liberty and its relationship to the state. Both thinkers begin with the notion that human
beings are rational creatures who are inherently free to use their minds to pursue the truth about
God. For Locke, this religious liberty amounts to an inviolable natural right and the state has no
authority with regard to religion. By contrast, while Pufendorf recognizes the value of religious
freedom, he subordinates it to the imperatives of social order, which he believes is best ensured
through the traditional means of an established religion. The history of religious liberty in the
eighteenth century involves an ongoing conflict between these two models. We now turn to
some of the ways this debate played out within the English legal tradition.
B. English Law and the Toleration Act of 1689
For founding-era Americans, one of the most authoritative articulations of the concept of
natural law could be found in Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England.142 In this work, Blackstone not only presents a comprehensive account of English law,
but also seeks to rationalize and defend that law by showing that it is consonant with the law of
nature.143 Following the tradition that we are exploring, Blackstone explains that, as rational
creatures endowed with free will, human beings are necessarily subject to the rules of justice that
God has established for their conduct – rules that are founded in “the nature of things,” that are
discoverable by reason, and that are intended to direct people toward their own “real
happiness.”144 In addition to duties toward God, including worship and obedience, these rules
prescribe the duties that one owes to oneself and one’s neighbor.145 Taken as a whole, these
duties make up “what we call ethics, or natural law,” or “natural religion.”146
This account of natural law provides the foundation not only for “natural duties” but also
for “natural rights.”147 Those rights consist of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property.148 After canvassing the ways that they are recognized and protected by English law,

142

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Wilfrid Prest gen. ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1765-69) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES].
143

See, e.g., 1 id. Introduction § 1, at 32-36. All page references are to the first edition of the
Commentaries.
144

Id. Introduction § 2, at 39-41.

145

Id. at 39, 45, 54.

146

Id. at 41, 55.

147

Id. at 54 (second emphasis added).

148

See id. bk. I, ch. 1, at 125-36.
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Blackstone boasts that (as Montesquieu put it) England “is the only nation in the world, where
political or civil liberty is the direct end of its constitution.”149
Yet in many ways Blackstone struggles to reconcile the principles of liberty with the
needs of social order and the content of English law. Nowhere is this clearer than in his
discussion of the criminal law regarding “Offenses Against God and Religion.”150 Blackstone
voices the liberal sentiment that all religious persecution is “highly unjustifiable upon every
principle of natural reason, civil liberty, or sound religion.”151 But he cautions that this position
should not be taken “into such extremes, as may endanger the national church,” for “there is
always a difference to be made between toleration and establishment.”152 “[T]he preservation of
christianity, as a national religion” is essential not only because of “its own intrinsic truth” but
also because of its importance to “the civil state.”153 For example, all confidence in oaths and
other forms of veracity would be undermined if people did not believe in “a future state of
rewards and punishments” – a belief that is “clearly revealed” and “forcibly inculcated” by the
teachings of Christ.154 The state therefore is justified in punishing “all affronts to Christianity”
or to the established church.155 Although some historical measures were excessively harsh,156
“[e]very thing is now as it should be.”157 In particular, Blackstone defends the existing laws
against apostasy, heresy, blasphemy, and reviling the worship or liturgy of the Church of
England.158 He also denounces “the protestant dissenters” whose “spirit” and “doctrines” had led
them to overthrow the church and the monarchy during the Civil War.159 Concededly, the

149

Id. at 140-41 (citing 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 5 (Thomas
Nugent trans., London, J. Nourse & P. Vaillant 1750)).
150

4 id. ch. 4, at 41.

151

4 id. at 51.

152

Id.

153

Id. at 43.

154

Id. at 43-44.

155

Id. at 44, 49-51.

156

See, e.g., id. at 43-44 (rejecting the death penalty that formerly was prescribed for apostasy).

157

Id. at 49.

158

See id. at 43-51, 59.

159

Id. at 52.
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Restoration Parliament went too far when it criminalized mere nonconformity to, or separation
from, the established church, however much such conduct might proceed from “perverseness,”
“weakness of intellect,” or “misguided piety.”160 But the legislature acted with “a spirit of true
magnanimity” when it enacted the Toleration Act of 1689, which suspended the penal laws with
regard to many Protestant dissenters, thereby leaving them “at full liberty to act as their
conscience shall direct them, in the matter of religious worship.”161 At the same time,
Blackstone praises the Corporation and Test Acts, which reserved all civil offices to members of
the national church162 – a policy that he insists is inherent in the very “idea of a national
establishment.”163
Shortly after its appearance in 1769, Blackstone’s discussion drew a sharp rebuke from a
leading English nonconformist, Joseph Priestley, who objected not only to his narrow view of
religious liberty but also to the harsh language he directed against Protestant dissenters.164 In
response, Blackstone explained that he had intended that language to refer not to contemporary
dissenters but to their ancestors, the Puritans who had overthrown the monarchy in the 1640s.165
Conceding that the language was ambiguous, he promised to revise it in the next edition.166 He
also stressed his commitment to religious liberty.167 At the same time, he insisted that

160

See id. at 52-53.

161

Id. at 53. By contrast, Blackstone argues that Parliament historically was justified in
enacting severe penal laws against Catholics because of the threat they posed to the state. See id.
at 54-57. But he expresses hope that as this threat diminishes, the laws against Catholics also
would be eased. See id. at 57.
162

Corporation Act, 13 Car. 2 stat. 2 c. 1 (1661); Test Act, 25 Car. 2 c. 2 (1673).

163

4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, ch. 4, at 52-53, 57-58.

164

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, REMARKS ON SOME PARAGRAPHS IN THE FOURTH VOLUME OF DR.
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RELATING TO THE DISSENTERS
(1769), reprinted in AN INTERESTING APPENDIX TO SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1773),
https://ia600207.us.archive.org/31/items/interestingappen05john/interestingappen05john_bw.pdf
[https://perma.cc/99K5-UFL2] [hereinafter INTERESTING APPENDIX].
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, A REPLY TO DR. PRIESTLEY’S REMARKS ON THE FOURTH VOLUME OF
THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769), reprinted in INTERESTING APPENDIX,
165

supra note 164, at 35, 39.
166

See id. at 40.

167

See id. at 38-39.
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nonconformity was still a crime under English law and that this crime was only partly done away
with by the Toleration Act.168
The controversy continued the following year with the publication of a work called
Letters to the Honourable Mr. Justice Blackstone by the English dissenting minister Philip
Furneaux.169 As Furneaux read the Commentaries and the reply to Priestley, Blackstone
maintained that the Toleration Act did not abolish the crime of nonconformity even with respect
to Protestant dissenters, but merely suspended the penalties that the law would have imposed on
them.170 In response, Furneaux contended that religious liberty was among the most sacred and
valuable “rights to which men are entitled by nature,” and that the nation had recognized this
when it adopted the Toleration Act.171 On this view, the Act should be interpreted not to suspend
the penalties for nonconformity but to relieve that conduct of its criminality.172
As support for this position, Furneaux pointed to a recent judicial decision known as the
Sheriff’s Case.173 For some years, electors in London had carried on a scheme to raise money for
a new city hall. They would elect to office someone who was known to be a Protestant dissenter,

168

See id. at 40-41.

169

PHILIP FURNEAUX, LETTERS TO THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLACKSTONE (1770). My
references to this work are to the revised edition which appeared the following year. PHILIP
FURNEAUX, LETTERS TO THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLACKSTONE (2d ed. 1771),
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32437121564914 [hereinafter FURNEAUX, LETTERS].
170

FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, letter I, at 7.

171

Id. letter 4, at 108-09.

172

See id. letter I, at 10-25.

173

See id. at 17-22. This decision unfortunately does not appear in the English Reports. The
fullest account of the case, together with two of the leading opinions, may be found in the
appendices that Furneaux included in the second edition of his Letters. See id. at 223
(Furneaux’s explanation of the background); id. app. 1, at 235 (Justice Foster’s argument in
Court of Judges Delegates (1762)); id. app. 2, at 249 (Lord Mansfield’s speech in House of
Lords (1767)). Mansfield’s speech is also printed in Hansard’s Debates. See 16 THE
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 316 (1813),
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=EZg9AAAAcAAJ&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA315
[https://perma.cc/DRQ4-WAE5].
.
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and who therefore was barred from holding municipal office by the Corporation Act.174 Under
the terms of a London by-law, the person was then subjected to a heavy fine for refusing to
undertake the office to which he had been elected.175 The dissenters eventually mounted a legal
challenge to this practice.176 In 1767, they prevailed when the House of Lords ruled in favor of a
nonconformist named Alan Evans who had been elected sheriff.177 In an eloquent opinion,
William Murray, Baron Mansfield, who was Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench,
declared that nothing is “certainly more unreasonable, more inconsistent with the rights of
human nature, more contrary to the spirit and precepts of the Christian Religion, more iniquitous
and unjust, more impolitic, than Persecution. It is against Natural Religion, Revealed Religion,
and sound Policy.”178 This view, he contended, was embodied in the Toleration Act, under
which “the Dissenters way of worship . . . is not only exempted from punishment, but rendered
innocent and lawful; it is established: it is put under the protection . . . of the law.”179 For these
and other reasons, the city’s scheme was unlawful.180
Furneaux’s critique of Blackstone also relied upon another leading decision called
Omichund v. Barker.181 In that case an Indian merchant from Calcutta sued an English official
for financial fraud.182 The defendant responded that because the plaintiff was Hindu, his
testimony was inadmissible because he was “incapable of swearing upon the Gospels.”183 The
judges rejected this contention. Invoking Pufendorf and almost “[a]ll other Writers in Divinity,
Morality, the Law of Nature or Nations, or any other Science relative to this Subject,” Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke explained that the practice of taking oaths was not peculiar to Christianity

174

See FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, at 223-34.

175

See id. at 223.

176

See id. at 224.

177

See id. at 225.

178

Id. app. 2, at 278 (speech of Lord Mansfield).

179

Id. at 266.

180

See id. at 283-84.

181

Of the Sufficiency and Disability of a Witness (Omichund v. Barker), 2 Equity Cases
Abridged 395, 22 Eng. Rep. 337 (Ct. of Chancery 1744).
182

Id. at 397-98.

183

Id. at 398.
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but “follows from the Principles of Natural Religion.”184 All that was required was that the oath
taker believe in “a God, and that he will reward and punish Men for their Actions” if they swear
falsely.185 The judges concluded that individuals were entitled to give evidence by swearing in
the manner prescribed by their own religion.186 In his Letters, Furneaux cites Omichund to
support his argument that natural religion and not revelation is the foundation of judicial oaths,
and so there is no justification for punishing individuals merely because their regard for oaths is
based on considerations other than Christian doctrine.187
In response to objections from writers like Priestley and Furneaux, Blackstone made
certain changes in the Commentaries.188 But while those changes softened the tone of the
discussion, they were unable to resolve the deep contradictions that lay at the heart of his effort
to reconcile principles of religious liberty with the establishment of religion, at least as the latter
was embodied in the English law of his day.
In addition to criticizing Blackstone’s position, Priestley and Furneaux published
affirmative arguments for religious liberty. In An Essay on the First Principles of Government,
Priestley argued that “the best interests of mankind” would be promoted by “unbounded liberty,
in matters of religion.”189 Furneaux’s Essay on Toleration made a Lockean case for religious
freedom based on “the nature of religion” as well as “the origin, and the ends, of civil
government.”190 As we shall see, his writings made a strong impression on Jefferson and
Madison and contributed in important ways to their views on religious liberty.191
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Id. at 408 (opinion of Hardwicke, C.).
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Id. at 404 (opinion of Willes, C.J.); see also id. at 405-06 (opinion of Lee, C.J.).
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See id. at 412 (opinion of Hardwicke, C.).
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FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, at 67-69 & 69 n.*.
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For a comprehensive account of these changes, see 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra
note 142, at 294-300 (varia to chapter 4).
189

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE
NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 115 (London: J. Johnson, 2d ed. 1771)
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/priestley-an-essay-on-the-first-principles-of-government
[https://perma.cc/X8L5-VB74].
190

PHILIP FURNEAUX, AN ESSAY ON TOLERATION §§ I-II (photo. reprt. n.d.) (London: T. Cadell,
1773) [hereinafter FURNEAUX, TOLERATION].
191

See infra notes 443, 469, 471.
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C. Moral Philosophy
During the eighteenth century, one strand of British philosophy emphasized the role of
reason in morality while another stressed the importance of emotion. The concepts of natural
law and natural religion held an important place in both views.
1. Sentimentalism and the Scottish Enlightenment
As many scholars have shown, founding-era Americans were substantially influenced by
the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment.192 That is especially true of Francis Hutcheson, a
Presbyterian minister who held the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow from
1730 to 1746. Hutcheson’s views were developed in a series of works that culminated in A
System of Moral Philosophy.193
Hutcheson holds that the purpose of moral philosophy is to direct human beings to the
course of action which will “promote their greatest happiness and perfection,” insofar as this can
be discerned through observations “from the constitution of nature” without the assistance of
“supernatural revelation.”194 The resulting rules of conduct “are called the LAW OF NATURE.”195
In contrast to theorists like Locke and Pufendorf, however, Hutcheson rejects the notion
that morality is primarily based on reason.196 Instead, he contends that just as human beings
have an aesthetic sense that enables them to perceive the beauty of objects, they have a moral
sense that enables them to perceive the goodness of intentions and the actions that follow from
them.197 This goodness consists in benevolence or the desire to promote “the happiness of
others.”198

192

See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978). For an overview of this school of
thought, see KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996).
193

FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (photo. reprt.) (Glasgow, R. & A.
Foulis 1755), https://archive.org/details/systemmoralphilo01hutc/page/n6
[https://perma.cc/XR5L-9AVE] [hereinafter HUTCHESON, SYSTEM].
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1 id. bk. I, ch. I, § I, at 1.
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Id.
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See id. bk. I, ch. 4, § III, at 56-57.
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See id. § IV, at 58.
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Id. § VII, at 62.
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On this view, morality is ultimately a matter of the heart rather than the head.199 Yet
reason does have an important place in Hutcheson’s scheme. Although the moral sense can
recognize that goodness consists in universal benevolence, reason is needed not only to
“corroborate” our moral sense but also to determine what actions will in fact promote the
good.200 The conclusions that reason reaches on this subject constitute the laws of nature.201
Following the Christian tradition, Hutcheson maintains that the essence of these laws
consists in love toward God and neighbor.202 Two chapters of the System are devoted to duties
toward God.203 After reciting the traditional arguments for his existence, Hutcheson focuses on
what reason can ascertain about his moral character.204 By reflecting upon the order and
harmony of the visible world as well as upon their own nature and moral sentiments, human
beings can recognize that God is benevolent, that he created “rational creatures” from “a desire
to communicate [his own] perfection and happiness” to them, that he “exercises an universal
providence” over the world, and that his laws are “good and just, adapted to the interest and
perfection of the whole.”205 Indeed, Hutcheson goes so far as to contend that God’s benevolence
provides good reason to hope in eternal life, a future state in which virtuous conduct will be
rewarded.206 “This opinion,” he asserts, “is natural to mankind, and what [God] designed that
they should entertain.”207
On this view, God himself is “the source of the highest happiness to [rational creatures],
the noblest object of their contemplation and veneration, of their love, esteem, hope, and secure
confidence, and the best pattern of their imitation.”208 This is “the foundation of all piety, and all
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See id. § VI, at 61.

200

See, e.g., id. § X, at 69; id. § XIII, at 78; id. ch. 6, § III, at 106; 2 id. bk. II, ch. 17, § II, at 119.

201

See, e.g., 1 id. bk. II, ch. 1, § 1, at 227.

202

See id. bk. II, ch. I, § I, at 228.

203

See id. bk. I, pt. II, chs. 9-10.
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See id. ch. 9, §§ I-XVI, at 168-208.

205

Id. §§ V-XVI, at 174-208 (quotations at 206-08).

206

See id. §§ XIV-XV, at 199-204.

207

Id. § XIV, at 200.

208

Id. § XVI, at 207.
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joy in religion.”209 Hutcheson then elaborates upon the natural duty to worship God both
internally – “in the sentiments and affections of the soul” – and externally – “in the natural
expression of these . . . sentiments and affections” though instruction, praise, prayer, repentance,
and so on.210
In these ways, reason confirms what Hutcheson regards as the natural human disposition
toward piety and devotion.211 “Notions of Deity and some sort of worship have in fact as
universally obtained among men, as living in society, the use of speech, or even propagating
their kind; and thus may be counted as natural.”212
According to Hutcheson, natural religion is also more fundamental than revealed religion.
The “primary way by which God discovers his will concerning our conduct” is not by Scripture
but by “the constitution of nature, and the powers of reason, and moral perception, which he has
given to mankind.”213 Revelation supplements reason, but God does not mean to treat human
beings as “children” by relieving them of the responsibility to discover for themselves how they
ought to live.214
Hutcheson’s account of natural religion provides the foundation not only for a moral duty
of religious worship but also for a right to religious freedom. As he explains, it “must always be
unjust” to compel people to profess religious opinions or to perform religious actions contrary to
their beliefs, “as no interest of society can require it, and such profession and action must be
sinful to those who believe it to be so.”215 Nor is this “right of private judgment”216 confined to
the religious sphere. Instead, Hutcheson holds that “the very constitution of the rational mind”
gives “every intelligent being” a “natural right” to form “his own opinions, speculative or

209

Id. at 174.

210

Id. ch. X, §§ I-IV, at 210-19.

211

Id. at 63.

212

Id.

213

Id. bk. II, ch. 3, § VIII, at 268-69 (citing RICHARD CUMBERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS
introduction & ch. 1 (Jon Parkin ed., John Maxwell trans., Liberty Fund 2005)
(1672), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cumberland-a-treatise-of-the-laws-of-nature
[https://perma.cc/364E-ZZNJ]).
OF NATURE

214

2 id. bk. II, ch. 17, § VII, at 131-32.
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1 id. bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 296.

216

2 id. bk. III, ch. IX, § I, at 311-12.
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practical, . . . according to the evidence that appears to him.”217 This right is an “unalienable”
one which “cannot be subjected to the will of another.”218
At the same time, Hutcheson observes that few people have both the time and the
inclination to “exercise this right of private judgment vigorously.”219 Thus, to promote the good
of society and to “prevent the influence of dangerous enthusiasts or rogues,” it is both the interest
and the duty of the magistrate to appoint persons to provide moral and religious instruction to the
people.220 But while the government does have a limited role in promoting religion, it must do
so in a way that does not compel one to worship in a particular manner or impose punishment for
one’s religious sentiments, so long as “they are not hurtful to society” or used as a pretense “for
invading the rights or properties of others.”221
Hutcheson’s general approach to morality can also be found in later Scottish philosophers
including Adam Smith,222 Thomas Reid,223 and Henry Home, Lord Kames.224 Although they
differed with one another in important respects, they all maintained that morality was rooted in
the senses or feelings, and the idea of natural religion held an important place in their thought.
Smith’s views are particularly interesting. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he argues that
religion is natural to human beings, and he connects it with their sense of justice and belief in an
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1 id. bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 295.

218

Id.
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2 id. bk. III, ch. IX, § I, at 311-12.
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Id. at 312.
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Id. §§ I-II, at 312-15.
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See infra text accompanying notes 225-26.
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See, e.g., THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS (1788), in INQUIRY AND ESSAYS 297
(Ronald E. Beanblossom & Keith Lehrer eds., Hackett 1983); THOMAS REID, PRACTICAL ETHICS
112, 117-26, 145, 255-58 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 1990).
224

See HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND NATURAL
RELIGION (Mary Catherine Moran ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (3d ed. 1779),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/kames-essays-on-the-principles-of-morality-and-natural-religion
[https://perma.cc/5D4P-MJ77]. For a discussion of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers’
influence on Jefferson, see WILLS, supra note 192, at 200-05.
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afterlife.225 And in The Wealth of Nations, he argues that the interests of individual liberty,
social peace, and rational religion all would be promoted by doing away with establishments that
granted a monopoly to a particular sect and instead allowing many small sects to compete with
one another for adherents.226
2. Rationalism
Other British philosophers based morality on reason rather than sensation. A good
example is Richard Price, a liberal clergyman who was well-known to Americans as a strong
supporter of their Revolution.227
In A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Price maintains that theorists like
Hutcheson undermine the objectivity of morality when they base it on the sensations that
individuals experience when they perceive actions.228 Instead, Price holds that morality is
founded on “self-evident principles” that can be discerned through reason and intuition, such as
the precepts that it is right for intelligent beings to pursue happiness and wrong for them to
violate the rights of others or to inflict misery on innocent persons.229 “Reason is . . . the natural
and authoritative guide of a rational being,” and the morality that it dictates is a “universal LAW”

225

See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. II, sec. ii, ch. 3, §§ 11-12, at 91;
id. pt. III, ch. 2, §§ 3-13, at 163-70 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976)
(6th ed. 1790).
226

See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
bk. V, ch. I, pt. III, art. III, at 273-79 (Edwin Cannan ed.) (London, Methuen 1904),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/smith-an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-ofnations-cannan-ed-vol-2 [https://perma.cc/9JUR-7BXD].
227

See RICHARD PRICE, TWO TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY, THE WAR WITH AMERICA, AND THE
DEBTS AND FINANCES OF THE KINGDOM (1778), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 14 (D.O. Thomas ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter PRICE, TWO TRACTS]; MAY, supra note 16, at 171.
For an exploration of Price’s moral philosophy, see J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF
AUTONOMY 380-88 (1998). Some other leading treatments of morality and natural religion from
a rationalist perspective include those of Samuel Clarke, see infra text accompanying notes 27883, and William Wollaston, see WILLIAM WOLLASTON, THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED
(London, S. Palmer 1725),
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=H68WAAAAQAAJ&rdid=bookH68WAAAAQAAJ&rdot=1 [https://perma.cc/3NT2-E5PR].
228

RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS ch. I, § 1, at 13-17 (D.D.
Raphael ed., Clarendon Press 1974) (3d ed. 1787).
229

See id. § 3, at 45, 53; ch. VII, at 157-64, 168.
-34-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3623251

Origins of the Free Exercise Clause [June 9, 2020 draft]
that governs not only humans but “[t]he whole creation.”230 “It is the source and guide of all the
actions of the Deity himself, and on it his throne and government are founded.”231
As this discussion indicates, Price’s account of reason and morality is closely connected
to the idea of natural religion. God is the creator of the world, the embodiment of moral
perfection, and “the fountain of reason and wisdom.”232 Human beings depend on him for their
existence and well-being.233 For these reasons, it is inherently proper for them to love, honor,
and worship him as well as to trust in “his all-directing providence.”234
In the book’s final chapter, Price returns to these themes and argues that his account of
morality can help to explain and prove “some of the principal Doctrines of Natural Religion.”235
From the ideas that morality and the divine will are founded on reason, one can infer that the
Deity is benevolent, that he created the world to promote the happiness of his creatures, and that
he governs it in accord with justice.236 Because justice does not always prevail in this world, it is
reasonable to believe that there is a future state in which individuals will be rewarded or
punished for their conduct in this life.237 Yet there are limits to what reason can tell us about an
afterlife.238 It is here that “the Christian revelation” is particularly valuable, for in addition to
“confirm[ing] to us whatever we can gather from reason on these subjects,” it promises that the
virtuous will enjoy a never-ending life of “complete happiness.”239
Price’s account of natural religion and morality also provides a justification for liberty of
conscience. After doing our best to determine whether a course of conduct is right or wrong, we
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Id. ch. VI, at 109.
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Id.
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Id. at 113.
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Id.
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Id. ch. VII, at 138-44.
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Id. ch. X, at 232, 236.
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Id. at 236-55.
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Id. at 255-65.

238

Id. at 263 n.*.
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Id. at 263-64 n.*; 270.
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have a duty to act according to “the sincere conviction of our minds.”240 To be sure, society is
entitled to act in “necessary self-defense, when the consciences of men lead them to hurt others,
to take away their liberty, or to subvert the publick.”241 In all other cases, however, it is not only
impious but “a contradiction to common sense . . . for any men to pretend to a power to oblige
their fellow men to worship God in any manner different from that which is most agreeable to
their consciences; that is, in any way but that in which alone it is acceptable and right in them to
do it.”242 In his writings on the American Revolution, Price expands on this view, describing
“religious liberty” as one of “the unalienable rights of human nature”243 and firmly connecting it
with the idea of “a rational and liberal religion.”244
3. Uniting Reason and Sentiment
Although philosophers like Hutcheson and Price differed in their methodology, the
substance of their teachings on morality and natural religion had much in common. This is an
important theme in the lectures on moral philosophy given later in the century by the Rev. John
Witherspoon, the president of the College of New Jersey (later Princeton), who was a leader in
revolutionary politics and a signer of the Declaration of Independence.245 Although he agrees
with Hutcheson that moral sense or conscience is an essential “principle of our nature,”
Witherspoon sees no occasion to reject reason as an equally important principle.246 Instead, after
reviewing these and other approaches to morality, he concludes that “we ought to take the rule of

240

Id. ch. VIII, at 179.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

PRICE, TWO TRACTS, supra note 227, at 33, 81. Once again, Price insists that this liberty does
not entitle one to “encroach on the equal liberty of others,” for it would be contradictory to hold
“that every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to destroy.” Id. at 81.
244

RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1785),
in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 227, at 116, 133 [hereinafter PRICE, OBSERVATIONS].
245

JOHN WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY (photo. reprt., n.d.) (Varnum Lansing
Collins ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1912) (1800),
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=M2gVAAAAYAAJ&rdid=bookM2gVAAAAYAAJ&rdot=1 [https://perma.cc/7K3P-YM3T]. On Witherspoon, see J. DAVID
HOEVELER, CREATING THE AMERICAN MIND: INTELLECT AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL COLLEGES
117-27 (2002); MILLER, supra note 11, at 135-41, 149-51.
246

WITHERSPOON, supra note 245, lect. III, at 17.
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duty from conscience enlightened by reason, experience, and every other way we can be
supposed to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention in creating us such as we are.”247
After reviewing the main proofs for the existence of God, Witherspoon turns to the
substance of natural religion.248 Our internal duties to God require us to love, venerate, and trust
him, while our external duties involve the natural expression of these sentiments through worship
and prayer.249 Witherspoon maintains that “not only private, but public and social worship is a
duty of natural religion.”250 Moreover, he agrees with those who contend that “the magistrate
ought to make public provision for the worship of God, in such a manner as is agreeable to the
great body of society.”251 At the same time, Witherspoon insists that “all who dissent from [this
public worship must be] fully tolerated,” for every individual has an “unalienable” “right to
judge for himself in all matters of religion,” as well as in “matters of opinion” more broadly.252
Like all other rights, however, religious liberty must not be exercised in a way that violates the
rights of others.253 These are the doctrines of natural religion and moral philosophy that James
Madison studied when he attended Witherspoon’s lectures as a Princeton undergraduate in the
early 1770s.254
D. Theology
Remarkably, the concept of natural religion played an essential role not only in
disciplines like natural jurisprudence, moral philosophy, and political theory, which were
founded on natural reason, but also in much of the theology of the period.
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Id. at 23-30.
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Id. lect. VI, at 37-43; id. lect. VII, at 43-45.
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Id. lect. VII, at 47-52.
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Id. at 49.
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Id. lect. XIV, at 113.
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Id.; id. lect. VIII, at 56; id. lect. X, at 69.
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See id. at 111; lect. VIII, at 57.
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1. Deism
Of course, this is true of Deism, which we may be defined (in Locke’s words) as “pure
Natural Religion” or religion based on natural reason.255 In De Veritate (1624), the work that is
often regarded as the founding text of modern Deism, the English aristocrat Edward, Lord
Herbert of Cherbury, maintained that all true religion is founded upon five basic truths that are
accessible to all through reason.256 These truths are that God exists, that he is to be worshipped,
that religion should focus on virtue and piety rather than doctrine or ceremony, that one can
atone for misconduct through repentance and amendment of life, and that there is a future state
of rewards and punishments.257 Herbert did not foreclose the possibility of special revelation
from God, but he insisted that individuals must think for themselves and use reason to determine
whether something is a revelation or not.258
Deism was an increasing topic of discussion in late seventeenth and early eighteenthcentury Britain. Some Deists claimed to remain within the Christian tradition in an effort to
reform it.259 A prominent example was Matthew Tindall, a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
In Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), Tindall maintained that the will of God was
identical to the “Law of Nature, or Reason; . . . which is common . . . to all rational Creatures.”260
“[T]he Design of the Gospel” was not to alter this law but rather to restore it by “free[ing] Men
from that Load of Superstition which had been mix’d with it” over the ages.261
Tindall’s emphasis on reason led him to strongly defend liberty of conscience. Echoing
Locke, he wrote that “no Man can any more discern the objects of his own Understanding, by the
Faculties of another, than he can see with another Man’s Eyes.”262 It follows that anyone “who

255

LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. I, at 5.

256

EDWARD, LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY, DE VERITATE (Meyrick H. Carré trans., 1937). For
a valuable discussion of Herbert, see SCHNEEWIND, supra note 227, at 176-83, on which I have
relied in this paragraph.
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See SCHNEEWIND, supra note 227, at 179-80.
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See HOLIFIELD, supra note 13, at 160.

260

MATTHEW TINDAL, CHRISTIANITY AS OLD AS THE CREATION ch. 1, at 7 (London, 2d ed. 1732),
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demands a Man’s Assent to any thing” without conveying reasons adequate to support it “erects
a Tyranny over his Understanding.”263
In this way, Tindall and other “Christian Deists”264 sought to reform Christianity by
showing that it contained nothing that could not be known through natural reason.265 Other
Deists took a more critical stance toward Christianity or at least toward the texts on which it
claimed to be based.266
As E. Brooks Holifield has observed, Deism in eighteenth-century America displayed a
similar diversity.267 Moderate Deists like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson rejected
what they regarded as the dogmatism of traditional Christianity and the abuses of clericalism, but
supported a form of natural religion and morality that they sometimes associated with Jesus.268
By contrast, the end of the eighteenth century saw the rise of more radical Deists such as Ethan
Allen, Thomas Paine, and Elihu Palmer.269 This group “was aggressive, populist, polemical,
disdainful of a Bible riddled with contradiction and immorality, eager to debunk the gospel
stories, and hopeful that a religion of nature would altogether replace an effete Christianity.”270
Although Deism attracted considerable attention in late eighteenth-century America, it
remained a distinctly minority viewpoint. Yet it was not the only form of American religious
thought that accorded a central place to natural religion. The remainder of this section discusses
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Id.
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Id. ch. 14, at 333.
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John Toland, another leading Deist, took a similar position when he argued, contrary to
Locke, that Scripture cannot not teach anything that is above reason, since any such teaching
would literally be beyond human comprehension. See JOHN TOLAND, CHRISTIANITY NOT
MYSTERIOUS (London, Samuel Buckley, 2d ed. 1696).
266

See, e.g., HOLIFIELD, supra note 13, at 160-61 (discussing writings of Anthony Collins and
Thomas Woolston).
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Id. Leading works in this vein include ETHAN ALLEN, REASON, THE ONLY ORACLE OF MAN
(1784) and THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON (1794), in COLLECTED WRITINGS 665 (Eric
Foner ed., Library of Am. 1995).
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its role in the Anglicanism which prevailed in the southern states and the Congregationalism
which dominated New England.
2. Anglicanism
American Anglican thought was rooted in that of the mother country. In the 1640s, that
nation was torn apart by the religious and political struggles that led to the Civil War. After the
monarchy was restored in 1660, many Anglican theologians reacted to these bitter conflicts by
adopting a more latitudinarian approach which sought to promote religious peace and unity and
which contended that the essence of religion lay in morality rather than ritual or doctrine.271
A major figure in this movement was the Rev. John Tillotson, who served as Archbishop
of Canterbury from 1691 until his death in 1694. In a sermon entitled “Of the Great Duties of
Natural Religion,” he maintained that religion is much more concerned with “the real Virtues of
a Good Life” than with external devotion.272 The moral duties that God requires of human
beings are known not solely or even primarily through “External Revelation,” but also by “a kind
of natural instinct,” by “Natural Reason,” and by the consensus of mankind.273 The duties
contained in revelation are “the same in Substance with the Law of Nature.”274 “[T]he Gospel
teacheth us the very same things which Nature dictated to Men before,” but it has made those
duties “more certain and plain” and offered more powerful motives as well as “a greater
Assistance to the performance of [them].”275
In a companion sermon, Tillotson asserted that “Natural Religion is the Foundation of
Instituted and Revealed Religion,” and that “the great Design of the Christian Religion, was to
restore and reinforce the practice of the natural Law.”276 Finally, he used this view of the
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See, e.g., MARTIN I.J. GRIFFIN, JR, LATITUDINARIANISM IN THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1992).
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JOHN TILLOTSON, Of the Great Duties of Natural Religion, with the Ways and Means of
Knowing Them, in SEVERAL DISCOURSES sermon I, at 1 (Ralph Baker ed., London, Ri. Chiswell
1697), http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A62632.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/5UUN-F2M4].
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Id. at 16, 20-33.
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Id. at 33.
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JOHN TILLOTSON, Instituted Religion Not Intended to Undermine Natural, in SEVERAL
DISCOURSES, supra note 272, sermon II, at 43, 58, 68 [hereinafter TILLOTSON, Instituted
Religion] [https://perma.cc/GT5X-YWRL]. Tindal shows a high regard for Tillotson and quotes
him extensively. See, e.g., TINDAL, supra note 260, ch. 12, at 197.
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centrality of natural religion to argue that it can never be legitimate to persecute individuals “for
not understanding and believing” doctrines that come from revealed religion, for “[n]o Zeal for
any positive Institution in Religion, can justifie the Violation of the natural Law” which requires
people to treat one another humanely.277
The leading Anglican spokesman for rational Christianity during the eighteenth century
was the Rev. Samuel Clarke.278 In 1704 and 1705, he delivered two sets of lectures in a series
that had been endowed by the eminent scientist Robert Boyle to promote natural religion.279 In
the first set Clarke sought to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, while in the second
he argued for “The Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty
of the Christian Revelation.”280 Natural religion holds “that there is one eternal, infinite,
intelligent, all-powerful, and wise being, [who is] the creator, preserver, and governor of all
things”; that human beings are bound to worship and obey him; that people have a duty to
promote the happiness and good of all through a “universal benevolence”; and that they will be
subject to “rewards and punishments” in “a future state” for their deeds in this life.281
For Clarke, these principles of natural religion and morality can be discerned through
reason and should govern every rational being, since they reflect the inherent and “eternal . . .
relations that different things bear one to another,” such as the relationship that human beings
have to God and one another.282 But because people are often blinded by carelessness, prejudice,
false ideas, bad customs, and unruly desires, God has undertaken to confirm and supplement
these principles of natural religion through the Christian revelation.283
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TILLOTSON, Instituted Religion, supra note 276, at 79-80.

For a valuable discussion of Clarke’s philosophy and theology, see Timothy Yenter & Ezio
Vailati, Samuel Clarke, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2018 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/clarke/
[https://perma.cc/VJ2S-8JW4].
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SAMUEL CLARKE, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, THE
OBLIGATIONS OF NATURAL RELIGION, AND THE TRUTH AND CERTAINTY OF THE CHRISTIAN
REVELATION (Edinburgh, A. Allardice, 1823) (1st eds. 1704 & 1705),
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The rationalism represented by Clarke and Tillotson was one of two major strands of
Anglican thought in eighteenth-century America.284 It was promoted by such figures as the Rev.
William Smith, provost of the College of Philadelphia (which later became the University of
Pennsylvania); the Rev. William White, first Episcopal Bishop of Pennsylvania and first
Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States; the Rev. Samuel
Provoost, first Episcopal Bishop of New York; and the Rev. James Madison, who was a cousin
of the statesman, president of the Anglican College of William and Mary, and first Episcopal
Bishop of Virginia.285
A good statement of this rationalist position may be found in a pamphlet published by the
Rev. James Maury, a clergyman and professor at William and Mary who “was the first real
teacher” of the Rev. James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.286 According to Maury, God
addresses humans as “creatures endowed with reason” who are capable of distinguishing
“between good and evil, right and wrong, truth and falsehood.”287 “Reason and revelation alike
are the gifts of GOD,” and while unassisted reason “could never have formed that perfect . . . rule
of religious faith and practice, we are now happily blessed with; yet we contend that the God of
nature never designed revelation entirely to supersede the use of, but only to be, as it were,
supplemental to our natural reason.”288 In line with these views, Maury condemned “that narrow
and uncharitable, that merciless and antichristian spirit, which presumes to limit the divine
favour only to some few,” and which consigns “all the rest of mankind” to fiery persecution in
this world and “eternal damnation” in the next.289

See MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD 121 (2002); see also May, supra note 16, at 11-12, 17,
20-21, 38, 350 (discussing the influence of Tillotson and Clarke in colonial America).
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See NOLL, supra note 284, at 120-21; Charles Crowe, Bishop James Madison and the
Republic of Virtue, 30 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 58 (1964). The other main school of American
Anglicanism during this period was the High Church theology associated with the Rev. Samuel
Johnson, the first president of King’s College (later Columbia University), and Samuel Seabury,
the first Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut. See NOLL, supra note 284, at 120-21.
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(Annapolis: Anne Catharine Green 1771).
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3. New England Congregationalism
The Puritans who settled New England brought with them a strong form of Calvinist
theology. The most authoritative statement of their views can be found in the Westminster
Confession of Faith,290 which was adopted by an assembly of divines in England in 1646 and
endorsed two years later by a convention of clergy in Massachusetts Bay.291 In line with natural
religion, the confession opens by affirming that “the Light of Nature, and the Works of Creation
and Providence . . . manifest the Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of God.”292 After the Fall of
Adam, however, human nature is so deeply “corrupted” that people are imbued with original sin,
naturally inclined to evil, and subject to “the wrath of God.”293 Thus, mere natural religion is
utterly incapable of bringing about salvation, which can only come through grace and faith in
Christ.294 Likewise, knowledge of God must be sought through the revelation that he made in
the Holy Scriptures.295
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the old Calvinist consensus was breaking down.
Some theologians began to take a more rationalist approach to religion. One of the best known
figures was Jonathan Mayhew, the pastor of Boston’s West Church.296 In a series of sermons
delivered in 1748, Mayhew maintained that “the dignity of our nature” is founded upon our
intellectual capacities: “It is principally on account of our reason, that we are said to have been
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See THE HUMBLE ADVICE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES (Edinburgh: Evan Tyler, 1647),
https://ia802700.us.archive.org/11/items/humbleadviceofas00west/humbleadviceofas00west.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NV9M-H3X7] [hereinafter WESTMINSTER CONFESSION].
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See THE CAMBRIDGE PLATFORM OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE, ADOPTED IN 1648, AND CONFESSION
OF FAITH, ADOPTED IN 1680, at 90-91 (Boston, Congregational Board of Publication 1855),
https://ia802300.us.archive.org/3/items/cambridgeplatfo00goog/cambridgeplatfo00goog.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H358-57RP].
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WESTMINSTER CONFESSION, supra note 290, ch. I, § I, at 1. For other traces of natural
religion, see ch. IV, § 2, at 9 (God created human beings “with reasonable and immortal souls . .
. after his own Image); ch. XXI, § I, at 37 (“the light of Nature” shows that God exists, that he is
good, and that he is to be worshipped and served).
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Id. ch. VI, at 12-13.
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See id. ch. X, at 21-22.
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Id. ch. I, § I, at 1.
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On Mayhew’s role in the struggle against Britain, see BAILYN, supra note 106, at 96-99, 255-
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created in the image of God.”297 Like Clarke, Mayhew holds that morality consists of objective
truths that arise from “the nature of God, [and] our relation to him, and one another.”298 Mayhew
also follows the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers in contending that humans have “a moral
sense” that leads them to feel pleasure from seeing good actions and pain from bad ones.299 He
concedes that “our rational faculties are limited, [and so] there is room for our being instructed
by revelation.”300 But he forcefully rejects the strong Calvinist view that our minds are so
darkened by the Fall that we are incapable of discerning religious and moral truths.301
Because Mayhew regards revelation as essential to Christianity, he cannot accept
Tindall’s view that it is merely “a re-publication of the law of nature.”302 As Mayhew makes
clear, however, he sees natural religion as lying at the core of Christianity. The most important
duties of the Christian religion are the same as those “dictated by the light of nature”: they “are
natural moral duties [that are] inforced with revealed and supernatural motives.”303 He
concludes that although “[m]odes and ceremonies of religion” may differ, “the substance of true
religion must necessarily be the same . . . in all countries, to all rational creatures, in all parts of
the universe, in all periods of time.”304
Mayhew also saw an integral connection between the concept of natural religion and “the
right of private judgment,” or “freedom of thought and inquiry in religious matters.”305 The
Westminster Confession had declared that Christians were entitled to “liberty of conscience” but
justified that liberty largely on the ground that “God alone is Lord of the Conscience, and hath
left it free from the Doctrines and Commandments of men, which are in any thing contrary to his

297

JONATHAN MAYHEW, SEVEN SERMONS, sermon II, at 39 (photo. reprt., 2015) (Boston, Rogers
and Fowle 1749), http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N05074.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/K4X8-622Z].
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Id. sermon I, at 5-6; id. sermon VII, at 150-51.
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Id. sermon V, at 97.
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Id. sermon II, at 35.
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See id. at 38-39.
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Id. sermon VII, at 150.
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Id. at 144, 150.
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Id. at 150-51.
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Id. sermon III, at 42; id. sermon IV, at 86.
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Word.”306 Consistent with this limitation, the Confession held that both the church and the civil
magistrate had authority to restrain the “publishing of such Opinions . . . as are contrary to the
light of Nature, or to the known principles of Christianity.”307
By contrast, Mayhew’s defense of private judgment was based squarely on reason and
natural religion. The freedom to judge for ourselves in religious matters and “to worship God
according to our consciences” is rooted in our very nature as rational beings.308 This freedom “is
absolutely unalienable in its own nature,” because it is not only a right but also an “indispensable
duty” which is enjoined by “God and nature and the gospel of Christ.”309 Those who institute
“human tests of orthodoxy” and “punish dissenters” invade “the natural rights of mankind” and
act “in opposition to the authority of almighty God.”310 Jesus and his followers themselves were
“dissenters from the established religion” of the time.311 Indeed, the very idea of “articles of
faith established by law” is no less absurd than “mathematicks established by law.”312
Although Mayhew and other liberal theologians were the foremost advocates of the idea
of natural religion among New England Congregationalists at this time, they were not alone.
The idea also plays a vital role in works of the other two major schools of Congregationalist
thought: traditional Calvinism and the New Divinity of the followers of Jonathan Edwards.313
The former category includes Peter Clark’s sermon on Man’s Dignity and Duty as a Reasonable
Creature, while the latter includes Nathanael Emmons’s discourse on The Dignity of Man.314 To
be sure, there are important differences between these three authors: Clark places a greater
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WESTMINSTER CONFESSION, supra note 290, ch. XX, § II, at 35.
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Id. § IV, at 36.
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See MAYHEW, supra note 296, sermon III, at 46; sermon IV, at 86.
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Id. at 83.
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Id. at 84.
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For a discussion of these three views, see HOLIFIELD, supra note 13, ch. 6.

PETER CLARK, MAN’S DIGNITY AND DUTY AS A REASONABLE CREATURE; AND HIS
INSUFFICIENCY AS A FALLEN CREATURE (Boston, Richard & Samuel Draper, 1763),
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N07331.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/7VX2-KE23]; NATHANAEL
EMMONS, THE DIGNITY OF MAN (Providence: Bennett Wheeler, 1787), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL
SERMONS, supra note 105, at 883.
314
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emphasis on the insufficiency of reason and the need for revelation than do Mayhew and
Emmons.315 But each of them stresses the importance of reason and its harmony with
revelation.316 These themes were also central to the Dudleian lectures on natural religion that
were delivered at Harvard College beginning in the 1750s, and that were given by
Congregationalists of different persuasions.317
E. Natural Science
It is “a commonplace” among historians that “natural religion took enormous support
from the developments in seventeenth century science.”318 Here I shall sketch the position of Sir
Isaac Newton, the most celebrated scientist of the age.319 A summary of his views can be found
in key passages of the Principia and Opticks.320 According to Newton, “Natural Philosophy” or
science proceeds inductively by observing phenomena and then proceeding “from Effects to their

315

See CLARK, supra note 314, at 26-33.

316

See, e.g., id. at 33.

317

Endowed by a bequest by the prominent judge Paul Dudley, these lectures were modeled on
the Boyle lectures in England, see supra text accompanying note 279, and were devoted to
natural and revealed religion as well as other topics. For studies, see LEE, supra note 16, ch. 3;
Leslee K. Gilbert, The Altar of Liberty: Enlightened Dissent and the Dudleian Lectures, 17551765, 31 HIST. J. OF MASS. (Summer 2003), http://www.westfield.ma.edu/mhj
[https://perma.cc/2ECY-4BK2]. The Dudleian lectures are still being given over 250 years later.
For a comprehensive list, see Andover-Harvard Theological Library, Dudleian Lectures,
https://guides.library.harvard.edu/hds/named-lecture-series/dudleian [https://perma.cc/HB5GZ9VP].
318

G.A.J. Rogers, Nature, Man and God in the English Enlightenment, in RELIGION, REASON
(Robert Crocker ed., 2001).

AND NATURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 152

For valuable discussions of religion in Newton’s thought, see ROB ILIFFE, PRIEST OF NATURE
(2017); Robert Iliffe, Newton’s Religious Life and Work (2013),
http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/CNTX00001 [https://perma.cc/5KCCUSL2]; Rogers, supra note 318, at 152-56.
319

320

2 ISAAC NEWTON, THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 387-93
(London: 1729) (“General Scholium”),
http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/NATP00056 [https://perma.cc/JKF3HFZV][hereinafter NEWTON, PRINCIPLES]; 3 ISAAC NEWTON, OPTICKS (2d ed., London: 1718),
http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/NATP00051 [https://perma.cc/93NAGCNF][hereinafter NEWTON, OPTICKS]. My citations are to the website of Oxford University’s
Newton Project, which is producing a definitive edition of his works.
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Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones,” until it reaches the first cause from
which all things began.321 When we observe “[t]his most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets
and Comets,” we recognize that it could not have come about through “mere mechanical causes,”
but only “from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being.”322 This being,
whom we call God, is “Eternal and Infinite, Omnipotent and Omniscient.”323 “[B]y existing
always and every where,” he constitutes time and space.324 In the beginning, he created matter
and established the “general Laws of Nature” such as gravitation.325 His creative intelligence
and choice can be seen in natural phenomena ranging from the solar system to “the Bodies of
Animals.”326 He perceives, understands, and “governs all things” through his “providence.”327
For Newton, these conclusions of scientific inquiry have vital implications for “moral
Philosophy”: “For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first Cause, what
Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as
well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of Nature.”328 In an unpublished
manuscript, Newton expanded on this concept of “natural religion.”329 In addition to requiring
individuals “to give thanks & honour & glory” to God for their existence and well-being, this
religion enjoined them to love their neighbors as themselves.330 This “moral part of religion”
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NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 320, at 380-81.

322

NEWTON, PRINCIPLES, supra note 320, at 388-89.
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Id. at 389.

324

Id. at 390.
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NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 320, at 375-78.
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Id. at 378.
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NEWTON, PRINCIPLES, supra note 320, at 389-91.
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NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 320, at 381.
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Isaac Newton, Of the Religion of the Iews & Christians 1r (n.d.),
http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/THEM00351
[https://perma.cc/B9KZ-3428].
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was of “an eternal immutable nature”; it was “binding to all nations” at all times and lay at the
core of both Judaism and Christianity.331
Thus, Newton did not view science as merely compatible with religion. Instead, as Rob
Iliffe has explained, “he believed that natural philosophy was to a large extent a religious
enterprise through which one could come to an understanding of the way God had created the
world.”332 For Newton, science laid the foundation for a rational approach to religion.333 At the
same time, he accepted the legitimacy of revelation and sought to use reason to determine the
true meaning of Scripture.334 In line with this devotion to reason, he was strongly committed to
liberty of conscience and freedom of inquiry.335
F. The Radical Whig Tradition
Finally, a commitment to rational religion and the rights of conscience was integral to the
Commonwealth or Real Whig tradition – a body of eighteenth-century thought that identified
with the struggles against the Stuarts that culminated in the overthrow of Charles I in the Civil
War and of James II in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.336 As Caroline Robbins explains in her
classic study, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, this tradition encompassed
politicians, clergymen, and lawyers; popular writers and academics; Deists, Protestant dissenters,
and liberal Anglicans.337 It included Hutcheson, Mayhew, Price, and Priestley and drew
inspiration from Locke, Newton, Tillotson, and Clarke.338 In these ways, the Radical Whig

331

Id. at 1r-1v; see also Isaac Newton, Irenicum 35 (n.d.)
http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/THEM00003 [https://perma.cc/A855WYJ8] (presenting a similar account of “true religion”).
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ILIFFE, supra note 319, at 16.
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See id. at 19-21.
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See id. at 16, 20-21.
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See id. at 17-19. For accounts of Newtonianism and natural theology in the eighteenth
century, see JONATHAN I. ISRAEL, ENLIGHTENMENT CONTESTED ch. 8 (2006); JEFFREY R.
WIGELSWORTH, DEISM IN ENLIGHTENMENT ENGLAND: THEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND NEWTONIAN
NATURAL SCIENCE (2009).
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reprint, Atheneum ed. 1968).
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tradition combined the various strands of thought that we have canvassed in this Part. As
Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood have shown, although this tradition had a limited following
in Great Britain and Ireland, it deeply shaped the beliefs of colonial Americans and provided the
ideological origins of the American Revolution.339
The eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen defended what they regarded as the
traditional rights of British subjects and the natural rights of mankind.340 They advocated for
freedom of thought and expression; constitutional government in which the people were
adequately represented; education that reflected modern philosophy and science; the promotion
of moral and civic virtue; and a limited measure of social equality.341 They were also committed
to the protection of religious liberty as an inalienable right.342 This position had been advocated
by the Levellers during the Commonwealth period343 and further developed by Protestant
dissenters during the Restoration.344 At that time, the dissenters were subjected to severe
persecution345 as well as to harsh attacks from some leaders of the re-established Church of
England, who argued that the corruption of human nature after the Fall made individuals
incapable of properly using their own judgment in religious matters.346 As Richard Ashcraft has
shown, the dissenters responded that this position in effect denied that humans were reasonable
creatures.347 Instead, the dissenters
presented a picture of rational individuals having been created in a state of
equality and freedom. . . . These individuals constituted a natural moral

339

BAILYN, supra note 106; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969).
340

See ROBBINS, supra note 336, at 7-8.
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See id. at 5-14.
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See id. at 8-10, 115, 160-71, 236, 328-30.
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(2006).
See RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 51-62 (1986).
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community, since they existed under an established framework of moral
obligations owed to each other and to God. Through the use of their reason, they
were capable of discovering these obligations embodied in the Law of Nature.
This law not only imposed duties, but it also confirmed the rights of individuals,
among which . . . was the right to follow the dictates of one’s conscience.348
This position became the standard Radical Whig view. A good example may be found in
the essays of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon that appeared in The Independent Whig and
Cato’s Letters, works that were widely known in eighteenth-century Britain and America.349
According to Trenchard and Gordon, human beings are said to be created in God’s image
because they are endowed with reason.350 Through the use of reason, they discover that there is
“a First Cause” that made and preserves all things, and they learn their “Duty in relation to God”
and to “one another.”351 These duties of morality constitute “Natural Religion,” which aims to
“promote[] unlimited and universal Happiness to the whole World.”352
For Trenchard and Gordon, our intellectual capacities are also essential for revelation,
which “presupposes Reason, and addresses itself to Reason.”353 Only reason can determine
whether the Scriptures are the Word of God and how they should be interpreted.354 Nor is it
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Id. at 66-67.
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[JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON,] THE INDEPENDENT WHIG (7th ed. 1743),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/gordon-the-independent-whig-4-vols-1720-1743 [hereinafter
INDEPENDENT WHIG]; JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS (Ronald
Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995) (6th ed. 1755), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/trenchard-catosletters-4-vols-in-2-lf-ed [hereinafter CATO’S LETTERS]. Permanent citations for the Independent
Whig may be found at the following locations: volume 1, https://perma.cc/XST5-GHTF; volume
2, https://perma.cc/543Z-BHN3. Permanent citations for Cato’s Letters may be found here:
volume 2, https://perma.cc/AZC9-X9BP; volume 3, https://perma.cc/2C2S-A9BH; volume 4,
https://perma.cc/L2JC-83X6.
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possible to make converts other than by “an Appeal to their Reason, by which they are to judge
for themselves of the Reasonableness of our Religion.”355
Up to this point, Trenchard and Gordon express views that would be accepted by every
rationalist Christian. In some essays, they go further and maintain that Christianity is essentially
“natural Religion restored and improved,” and that it contains nothing that is “mysterious” or
“above reason.”356 In this respect, they side with Christian Deists like Tindall and Toland and
against other rationalist Christians like Locke and Clarke.357 They also differ with Locke in that
they accept the idea of an established church, although they reject the notion that civil offices
should be reserved for its members.358 In common with all Radical Whigs, however, Trenchard
and Gordon hold that the “Devotion which [God] requires must be free, rational, and willing,”359
and they condemn all forms of persecution – a practice that is “incompatible with true Religion,
whether Natural or Revealed,”360 and that invades the core of human liberty by infringing the
inherent “right of every man to pursue the natural, reasonable, and religious dictates of his own
mind.”361
G. Conclusion
Parts I and II have explored the place of natural religion, natural law, and natural rights in
the intellectual world of eighteenth-century Americans. These ideas held that humans are
capable of using reason to discern the principles that govern the natural and moral realms,
including the duties that they owe to God and one another. This conception of reason provided a
foundation for religious belief as well as religious liberty. This set of ideas was present in one
form or another in the natural law theories of Locke and Pufendorf, the English jurisprudence of
Blackstone and Mansfield, the moral philosophy of Hutcheson and Price, the theology of authors
from Herbert to Mayhew, the natural science of Newton, and the Radical Whig tradition of
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Id. at 29.

2 id. NO. LIII, at 218; id. NO. LIV, at 223-24; 4 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 349, NO. 109, at
767, 770; id. NO. 120, at 831, 834.
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See supra text accompanying notes 45-59 (Locke), 259-65 (Tindal and Toland); CLARKE,
supra note 279, at 282-83.
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Id. NO. 59, at 405, 406-07; id. NO. 60, at 413, 414; id. NO. 62, at 426, 428-29; 1
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Trenchard and Gordon. In the rest of this Article, I show how this account of natural religion
and associated ideas can help us to understand what Americans in the founding era meant when
they incorporated protections for religious freedom into the state and federal constitutions.
III. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. The Revolution
In late 1772, a public meeting in Boston issued a statement to the people of
Massachusetts.362 As Gordon Wood has explained, this statement – which became known as the
Boston pamphlet – “was one of the most important in [this] period” because of the powerful
manner in which it articulated the colonists’ ideology and inspired the growing resistance to
Great Britain.363 The pamphlet began with an account of the “Natural Rights of the Colonists as
Men” that was drawn from Locke.364 In addition to life, liberty, and property, the Bostonians
declared that “by the eternal and immutable Laws of GOD and Nature,” everyone “has a Right
peaceably and quietly to worship God, according to the Dictates of his Conscience.”365 As
Locke’s Letters on Toleration demonstrated, this “Spirit of Toleration” was also “‘the chief
charactistical Mark of the true Church.’”366 In a subsequent section on “The Rights of the
Colonists as Christians,” the pamphlet maintained that this inherent right to religious liberty had
been “restored” to “every Subject in England” by the Toleration Act of 1689.367 After
enumerating a long list of other grievances against the British government, the Bostonians
recounted that their ancestors had come to the new world to escape the “cruel persecute[ion of]
all who differed from the established Church,” and expressed concern about the efforts that were
being made to extend the Anglican hierarchy’s power to America – a development that would
endanger “that Liberty with which CHRIST hath made us free.”368 In these ways, the Bostonians

362

THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FREEHOLDERS AND OTHER INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN
OF BOSTON (1772), in 1 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: WRITINGS FROM THE PAMPHLET DEBATE
759 (Gordon S. Wood ed., 2015).
363

Id. at 759 (editor’s introduction).

Id. at 764-67 (citing LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, and Locke’s Letters on
Toleration).
364

365

Id. at 764-65.
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Id. at 765 (quoting LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 7).
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made an argument for religious liberty that was rooted in both natural religion and Protestant
Christianity.
In this litany of “rights and grievances,” the Boston pamphlet “anticipate[d] the
Declaration of Independence.”369 Of course, that declaration also embodies the ideas we have
discussed. Jefferson based the American case for independence on “the Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God”370 – terms that are often found in accounts of natural religion.371 The idea that
human beings “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” also sounds in
natural religion and can be found in various forms in Locke, Hutcheson, and others in the
Radical Whig tradition.372 Finally, the Americans’ concluding “appeal[]to the Supreme Judge of
the world for the rectitude of our intentions” recalls Locke’s discussion of the rights of resistance
and revolution in the Second Treatise, where he explains that when the people become convinced
that the government has become oppressive, they have no alternative but to defend their rights by
force, while “appeal[ing] to Heaven” for the justice of their cause.373

369

Id. at 759 (editor’s introduction).

Declaration of Independence ¶ 1 (1776), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 1,
Bill of Rights, doc. 3, at 4, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s5.html
[https://perma.cc/89YQ-EWTD].
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CULVERWELL, AN ELEGANT AND LEARNED DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE ch. 7, at 62
(Robert A. Greene & Hugh MacCullum eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (1672),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/culverwell-an-elegant-and-learned-discourse-of-the-light-ofnature [https://perma.cc/L2H9-LB3S]; RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL
POLITY bk. I, ch. 3, § 4, at 62 (Arthur Stephen McGrade ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989); and 1
HUTCHESON, SYSTEM, supra note 193, bk. II, ch. 3, § VII, at 265; as well as in Dudleian lectures
such as CLARK, supra note 314, at 13, and EBENEZER GAY, NATURAL RELIGION, AS
DISTINGUISH'D FROM REVEALED 10 (Boston, John Draper 1759),
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B. The First State Constitutions and Declarations of Rights
1. Virginia
In the weeks leading up to independence, representatives of the people of Virginia met in
convention to establish a constitutional framework for the new state. The Declaration of Rights,
which was drafted by George Mason, began by proclaiming that
all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.374
After articulating many other principles of Radical Whig ideology, the Declaration turned to
religion. In Mason’s draft, the sixteenth and final article asserted that
Religion, or the Duty which we owe to our divine and omnipotent Creator, and
the Manner of discharging it, can be governed only by Reason and Conviction,
not by Force or Violence; and therefore that all Men shou’d enjoy the fullest
Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to the Dictates of Conscience,
unpunished and unrestrained by the Magistrate, unless, under Colour of Religion,
any Man disturb the Peace, the Happiness, or Safety of Society, or of Individuals.
And that it is the mutual Duty of all, to practice Christian Forbearance, Love and
Charity towards Each other.375
In both phraseology and substance, this draft clearly owes much to Locke’s Letters on
Toleration. The last sentence echoes his contention that “Charity” enjoins “the mutual toleration
of Christians in their different professions of Religion.”376 Like Locke, however, this provision
does not limit toleration to Christians but extends it to “all Men” as beings endowed with
“Reason.”377 To express this point in the words of article 1, religious liberty is one of the
“inherent rights” that all individuals possess “by nature” and that they do not abandon when they

374

See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. I.

George Mason’s Proposed Declaration of Rights, [ca. 20–25 May 1776],
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0054-0001 [https://perma.cc/X53YHKP3].
375

376

LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 7-12.

377

See supra text accompanying notes 72, 80-89.
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enter civil society.378 This point was made even clearer when the convention adopted James
Madison’s proposal to amend Mason’s language to speak in terms of rights rather than
“Toleration.”379 In its final form, article 16 read:
That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of
all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other.380
Finally, we should observe that this provision bases religious liberty on the core idea of
natural religion: that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction.” Of course,
that does not mean that the provision was intended to denigrate revealed religion in any way; the
concluding reference to Christianity suffices to make that clear. But it is equally clear that the
Convention’s basic assertion is that individuals must be free from compulsion regarding religion
because it inherently involves the use of reason to discern one’s duties to God.
Article 16 condemned the legal penalties and restrictions that had often been imposed on
dissenters from Anglicanism, which was the established religion of the colony. Another
amendment that Madison drafted would have had the effect of abolishing the establishment
altogether.381 Although this effort failed in 1776, it succeeded a decade later when he secured
the passage of Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom – a development that, as Part
IV will show, also was based on ideas of natural rights and natural religion.
2. Pennsylvania
Unlike Virginia, the Pennsylvania colony gave broad protection to religious liberty from
the beginning. The rationale for this protection can be found in The Great Case of Liberty of
Conscience and other writings by its founder, the Quaker William Penn.382 Some of Penn’s

378

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 1.

379

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 18.

380

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16.

381

See id. at 18-19.

382

WILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (1670), in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF WILLIAM PENN 79 (Andrew R. Murphy ed., Liberty Fund 2002) ,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/penn-the-political-writings-of-william-penn
[https://perma.cc/99AA-32DC]. On Penn, see ANDREW R. MURPHY, LIBERTY, CONSCIENCE, AND
TOLERATION: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PENN (2016).
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arguments were based on “the Authority of . . . SCRIPTURE,” such as the contention that religious
persecution violated biblical teachings by “enthroning Man [rather than God] as King over
Conscience.”383 Other arguments were based on “the Authority of REASON.”384 Penn
maintained that individuals have an innate “Instinct of a Deity” which is essential to their very
nature.385 Efforts to restrict their religious liberty “are destructive of the Great Priviledge of
Nature and Principle of Reason,” for “[t]he Understanding can never be convinc’d” by “any
external Violence,” but only “by such Arguments, as are Rational, Perswasive, and suitable to
its own Nature.”386 It follows that “Liberty of Conscience is every Man’s natural Right.”387
A similar fusion of the rationalist and Christian justifications can be found in the first
chapter of the Great Law that was adopted by Penn and the colonial assembly in 1682.388 This
law guaranteed religious freedom to all believers in God on the ground that he alone was “Lord
of Conscience Father of Lights & Spirits [and] the Author as well as Object of all divine
Knowledge Faith and Worship who only can Enlighten the Mind and perswade and Convince the
Understanding of People.”389 As J. William Frost has observed, this provision was written in
such a way that Quakers could interpret “enlightening the mind and convincing the
understanding as referring to the experience of the Inner Light of Christ,” while Anglicans and
Deists could interpret it in more rationalist terms.390 At the same time, the Great Law reserved
civil office-holding to Christians.391 Yet in contrast to the Anglican establishments in the
southern colonies and the Congregationalist establishments in New England, Pennsylvania and

383

Id. at 79, 86-87.

384

Id. at 79. On Penn’s use of natural theology, see MILLER, supra note 11, at 56-60.

385

PENN, supra note 382, at 92.

386

Id. at 94-95.

387

Id. at 110.

The “Great Law” ch. 1 (1682),
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/documents/1681-1776/great-law.html
[https://perma.cc/X5VY-6AFR].
388

389

Id.

390

J. WILLIAM FROST, A PERFECT FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA 13-14
(1990).
391

See The “Great Law,” supra note 388, ch. 2.
-56-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3623251

Origins of the Free Exercise Clause [June 9, 2020 draft]
its sister mid-Atlantic colonies created no established church.392 For these reasons, they came to
be seen as bastions of religious liberty and diversity.393
This libertarian approach was embodied in the new state constitution that was adopted by
a convention in September 1776.394 That document draws on the language of natural religion
and Radical Whig political theory. It opens by declaring that “all government ought to be
instituted . . . for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the
individuals who compose it to enjoy their natural rights, and the other blessings which the
Author of existence has bestowed upon man,” and by thanking him for permitting the people to
deliberately and consensually adopt rules for their own governance.395 The Constitution then
sets forth a Declaration of Rights.396 After affirming the inherent liberty and equality of
mankind, it asserts
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding: And that
no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or
erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or
against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the
being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on
account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And
that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever,
that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of
conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.397
As for the right to hold civil office, the convention initially proposed to extend it to
everyone who acknowledged the being of a God and a future state of rewards and
punishments.398 After this proposal encountered opposition from the Philadelphia clergy, it was

392

See FROST, supra note 390, at 1-3.

393

See id.

394

PA. CONST. of 1776, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp
[https://perma.cc/RQ9V-7JP8].
395

Id. preamble.

396

Id. ch. I.

397

Id. arts. I-II.

398

See FROST, supra note 390, at 65.
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amended to restrict office holding to Christians.399 But the state reverted to the convention’s
original view when a new Constitution was adopted in 1790.400
3. Massachusetts
Perhaps the most fully developed exposition of Radical Whig ideology in the first state
constitutions may be found in the one that was drafted by John Adams and adopted by
Massachusetts in 1780.401 The preamble characterizes the body politic as a “social compact”
which the people make to protect “their natural rights” and to promote “their safety, prosperity
and happiness.”402 After thanking “the Great Legislator of the Universe” for the opportunity to
establish this compact, the document sets forth a comprehensive account of the fundamental
rights of individuals and the community as a whole.403 Like the conventions of Virginia and
Pennsylvania, the Massachusetts convention describes religious liberty in accord with ideas of
natural rights and natural religion. Article II of the Declaration of Rights asserts that “[i]t is the
right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship
the SUPREME BEING, the great creator and preserver of the universe.”404 For this reason, “no
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments,” so long as he does not “disturb the
public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.”405
Although this provision was uncontroversial, that was not true of the next one, which
reflected the state’s Puritan heritage. From the founding of the Massachusetts Bay Colony,

399

See id.; PA. CONST. of 1776, supra note 394, ch. II, § 10.

400

See FROST, supra note 390, at 74-75; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4,
https://www.paconstitution.org/texts-of-the-constitution/1790-2/ [https://perma.cc/5PDNLSAH]. The new Constitution’s protection for the “natural and indefeasible right” to religious
liberty appears in id. § 3.
See MASS. CONST. of 1780, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, ch. 1, doc. 6, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s6.html [https://perma.cc/5JRW-2D4F].
401

402

Id. preamble.

403

Id. preamble & pt. 1 (Declaration of Rights).

404

Id. pt. I, art. II.

405

Id.
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Congregationalism had effectively been the established religion.406 The 1780 Constitution
modified this position but did not eradicate it. As Article III explained, “the happiness of a
people, and the good order and preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon piety,
religion and morality,” which could be maintained only by means of public worship and
religious instruction.407 The towns therefore should be required to provide “for the institution of
the public worship of GOD, and for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of
piety, religion and morality” to be elected by the people of each town.408 All individuals should
be required to attend the instruction of such teachers or ministers if they could “conscientiously
and conveniently” do so.”409 This public teaching and worship was to be supported by taxation,
although each individual would have the right to require that the money he paid be “applied to
the support of the public teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination, provided
there be any on whose instructions he attends.”410
Although this framework theoretically allowed towns to elect ministers from any
Christian denomination, most towns were likely to choose Congregationalists.411 In addition,
while individuals had a right to direct their taxes to their own denominations, they sometimes
encountered legal and practical obstacles to doing so.412 Moreover, some denominations, such as
Baptists, held beliefs that forbade them to accept coerced payments.413 The upshot was that
Article III was likely to maintain the dominance of the Congregational Church. The provision
was vigorously opposed by Baptists and others as a violation of religious liberty, but it was
ratified (in a disputed vote count) and became part of the Declaration of Rights.414

406

See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89, 107-12, 119-20, 131-32, 172-74 (1986).
407

MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 401, pt. I, art. III.

408

Id.

409

Id.

410

Id.

411

See, e.g., ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS 1754-1789, at
386-87 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968) (editor’s introduction) [hereinafter BACKUS
PAMPHLETS].
412

See id. at 387.

413

See ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE (1780), in id. at 385, 392.

414

See WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION 14457 (1967).
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4. Conclusion
Although the Revolutionary-era state constitutions took a range of positions on the
relation between religion and state, they were nearly unanimous on one point: that all
individuals have a natural and inalienable right to form their own religious beliefs and to worship
God in accord with their own “reason,” “conviction,” “conscience,” and “understanding”415 –

DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2, 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra
note 1, Bill of Rights, doc. 4,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss4.html
[https://perma.cc/6JZD-N2U2] (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings.”);
GEORGIA CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga02.asp
[https://perma.cc/X7NC-W3S2] (“All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their
religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State; and shall not, unless
by consent, support any teacher or teachers except those of their own profession.”); GEORGIA
CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5,
https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/government/related_article/constitutions/georgiaconstitution-of-1789 [https://perma.cc/7GZU-GSQZ] (“All persons shall have the free exercise
of religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but
their own.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 399, pt. I, art. II (describing religious liberty as
“the right . . . of all men in society”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, arts. IV-V,
https://lonang.com/library/organic/1784-nhr/ [https://perma.cc/MYH8-234X] (“Every individual
has a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and reason . . . .”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nj15.asp [https://perma.cc/KR2B-CN32] (“[N]o person
shall ever . . . be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a
manner, agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art.
XXXVIII, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp [https://perma.cc/WZ94-XDVY]
(declaring that “we are required, by the benevolent principles of rational liberty, not only to
expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance,” and
providing “that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all
mankind”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § XIX,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp [https://perma.cc/95DY-6RSW] (“[A]ll men
have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, supra note 392, ch. I, art. II (“[A]ll men have a natural
and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences and understanding . . . .”); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16,
quoted supra text accompanying note 1.
415
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ideas that resonate with natural religion. Of course, this is not to deny the importance of
revelation in Americans’ minds. Many people considered the teachings of reason and revelation
to be in harmony with one another. But as this section has shown, when the state declarations
granted protection to religious liberty, they primarily used the language of natural rights and
reason rather than of Christian theology. One can offer several reasons for this choice. First, the
question of religious toleration historically was controversial within Christianity, and that
controversy had not ended by the late eighteenth century. By adopting the language they did, the
states were able to bypass such theological controversies. Second, the language of natural rights
reflected the view that religious liberty is a right that belongs not only to Christians (with all the
problems that would have been involved in determining who qualified and in excluding others)
but to all individuals. And third, the use of such language allowed the declarations to ground the
right to religious liberty in the same principles as the other rights that they protected, such as life,
liberty, property, and freedom of speech.
Accordingly, the state constitutions treated religious liberty as a natural right of mankind.
At the same time, many states limited civil equality or the right to hold office to Christians or

The clearest exception is the South Carolina Constitution of 1778, which confined toleration to
those “persons and religious societies who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state
of rewards and punishments, and that God is publicly to be worshipped.” S.C. CONST. of 1778,
art. XXXVIII, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc02.asp [https://perma.cc/SRP7-6QR5].
In 1790, however, the state acceded to the consensus by providing that “[t]he free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind.” S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, §
1, https://www.carolana.com/SC/Documents/sc_constitution_1790.html
[https://perma.cc/K4UX-HP5L].
Another arguable exception is the Maryland declaration, which provided that “all persons,
professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty.”
MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights art. XXXIII,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp [https://perma.cc/X7ES-B7CR] (emphasis
added) . In virtually the same breath, however, the Declaration asserted that “it is the duty of
every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable to him” and that “no
person ought by any law to be molested . . . on account of his religious persuasion . . . ; unless,
under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or
shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or religious rights.” Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, while Maryland’s provision was hardly a model of clarity, it does not
appear to have been meant to limit religious freedom to Christians or to have diverged from the
prevailing view that this right belongs to all.
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even to Protestants,416 and some states also continued to have some form of religious
establishment.417 As we have seen, eighteenth-century theorists of natural religion were not of
one mind concerning the notion of religious establishments – some like Locke and Price rejected
this notion418 while others like Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Witherspoon accepted it in some
form.419 However, there clearly is some tension between the idea that religious liberty is an
inalienable right that belongs to all alike and the notion that the state may establish a religion and
thereby inevitably favor some over others.420 And there is an even greater conflict between the
principle of religious liberty and the idea that individuals may be denied equal civil or political
rights because of their religious views.
IV. THE BATTLE OVER RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 1780S VIRGINIA
These conflicts came to a head in the battle over religious freedom and disestablishment
that occurred in Virginia during the mid-1780s. This controversy produced the era’s fullest
debate over the meaning of this freedom, and it has long been regarded as providing vital insight
into the ideas that underlie the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, supra note 415, § 3 (guaranteeing “equal
rights and privileges” to all Christians); MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 401, pt. I, art. III
(establishing a system of public teaching and worship and providing that “every denomination of
christians, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the Commonwealth, shall
be equally under the protection of the law”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, supra note 415, pt. I, art.
VI (following Massachusetts in these respects); N.J. CONST. of 1776, supra note 415, art. XIX
(protecting the civil and office-holding rights of Protestants).
416

417

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 406-14 (discussing Massachusetts Constitution of
1780).
418

See supra text accompanying notes 90-93 (Locke); PRICE, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 244, at
240-44.
419

See supra text accompanying notes 129-33 (Pufendorf), 219-21 (Hutcheson), 250-52
(Witherspoon).
420

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 18-19.
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A. The Controversies of the Mid-1780s
1. The General Assessment Bill
Anglicanism was the established religion of Virginia throughout the colonial period.421
All inhabitants were required to attend weekly services in their parish churches and to pay taxes
to support them.422 During the eighteenth century, a limited degree of toleration was afforded to
dissenting Protestant sects, provided that they paid these taxes and complied with strict
regulations regarding worship.423 Members of groups like the Separate Baptists who preached in
defiance of these regulations sometimes faced harsh persecution.424
In 1776, this approach to dissent was repudiated by article 16 of state Declaration of
Rights, which proclaimed that all individuals were equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion.425 The debate then turned to the status of the Anglican Church. The dissenting sects
and liberal allies such as Jefferson and Madison fought to disestablish it.426 Although these
efforts fell short in 1776, the legislature relieved dissenters of the obligation to pay taxes to
support the church.427 The legislature also suspended, and eventually abolished, the duty of all
citizens to pay such taxes.428 Due to lack of revenue and other factors, the church found itself in
increasingly dire straits.429
In 1784, Patrick Henry spearheaded an effort to pass a bill to combat what he and others
regarded as the decline of religion and morality in Virginia.430 Rather than declaring Christianity

421

See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 286, at 1.

422

See id.

423

See id. at 12-32.

424

See id. at 39-42.

425

See supra text accompanying notes 375-81.

426

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 19-37.

427

See CURRY, supra note 406, at 136.

428

See id.

429

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 43-45.

430

See id. ch. 3; CURRY, supra note 406, at 140-41.
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to be “the true Religion,” as an earlier bill sought to do,431 Henry’s bill was premised on the
notion that the spread of “Christian knowledge” was the best way to promote individual morality
and preserve social peace.432 This proposal, which became known as the General Assessment
Bill, effectively would have made Christianity in general the established religion by imposing a
state-wide tax for the support of Christian ministers, teachers, and places of worship.433 Each
individual would be permitted to designate the “society of Christians” to which his taxes should
go.434 In this way, the bill sought to promote Christianity “without counteracting the liberal
principle heretofore adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all distinctions of
preeminence amongst the different societies or communities of Christians.”435
In December 1784, Henry’s bill came close to passage, only to be blocked when the
House of Delegates agreed to Madison’s motion for a delay to allow for consideration by the
people.436 Extensive public campaigns were then launched to mobilize in support or opposition
to the bill.437
Among the most important petitions against the bill was the Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments438 which was written by Madison at the urging of several other
prominent liberals.439 This document offered the most comprehensive and intellectually
powerful defense of religious liberty in eighteenth-century America.

431

BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 56-57, 185-88 (quoting and reprinting a bill considered
by House of Delegates in 1779).
432

A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, Virginia (1784), in
THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 252, 252 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds.,
2009) [hereinafter Assessment Bill].
433

Id. at 252-53.

434

Id. at 253.

435

Id. at 252.

436

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 108-09.

437

See id. ch. 4.

438

Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June] 1785,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 [https://perma.cc/THW5WP3B] [hereinafter Madison, Memorial].
See id. (editorial note). For an insightful discussion of Madison’s views on religion, see
Brady, supra note 16, at 456-60.
439
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Madison’s leading arguments are grounded in the principles of natural rights and natural
religion enshrined in the Declaration of Rights. Quoting Article 16, he asserts that it is “a
fundamental and undeniable truth, ‘that Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence.’”440 It follows that individuals have a right to exercise
religion in the way that their own reason and conscience dictate. Drawing on arguments
developed by Locke and others we have discussed, Madison offers two reasons for regarding this
right as an “unalienable” one.441 The first is that “the opinions of men, depending only on the
evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men.”442 Second,
“what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator,” for “every man [has a duty] to
render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”443 For
these reasons, Madison concludes that individuals do not surrender their right to free exercise
when they enter civil society, and that the state has no jurisdiction whatever over religion.444
Expanding this critique, Madison contends that the Assessment Bill also violates the
principle of natural equality. Quoting article 4 of the Declaration, he reasons that
[i]f “all men are by nature equally free and independent,” all men are to be
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more,
and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all

440

Id. § 1.

441

Id.

442

Id.

Id. The first of these arguments finds classic expression in Locke’s writings. See supra text
accompanying notes 81-86. The second echoes Philip Furneaux’s Essay on Toleration. See
FURNEAUX, TOLERATION, supra note 190, at 12 (arguing that just as the ability to exercise
religion is “a right” that every individual has “with respect to his fellow men, . . . so, with respect
to God, it is a duty which he owes to him”). For Furneaux’s influence on Madison, see
KETCHAM, supra note 254, at 66.
443

Nicholas Miller suggests that, in his second argument, “Madison shifted his emphasis from the
Enlightenment’s focus on reason to more of a religious view of man’s duty toward God.”
MILLER, supra note 11, at 146. By contrast, I would say that both of Madison’s arguments are
best understood in terms of natural religion, a view that sees religious duty as rooted in reason.
444

See Madison, Memorial, supra note 438, § 1.
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are they to be considered as retaining an “equal title to the free exercise of
Religion according to the dictates of Conscience.”445
Relying once more on the idea that religion can be directed only by reason, he continues:
“Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace . . . the Religion which we believe to be of
divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the
evidence which has convinced us.”446 The Assessment Bill violates this equality by imposing a
tax for the support of Christianity, thereby discriminating against non-Christians as well as
against those Christian sects that reject the idea of compulsory support for religion.447 Instead of
“degrad[ing] from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to
those of the Legislative authority,” “a just Government” should secure the rights of all “by
protecting every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which
protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor
suffering any Sect to invade those of another.”448
Like Locke, Madison argues for a strict separation of church and state and warns of the
dangers that arise from their union. Drawing on the Radical Whig view of history, he observes
that “[i]n some instances [ecclesiastical establishments] have been seen to erect a spiritual
tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the
thrones of political tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of
the people.”449
Madison’s defense of religious freedom, like that of Article 16, appeals not only to
natural religion and natural rights but also to a particular conception of Christianity.450 For civil
rulers to use religion to promote their own ends is “an unhallowed perversion of the means of
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Id. § 4 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, arts. 1, 16) (emphasis added by
Madison).
446

Id.

447

See id. §§ 3-4.

448

Id. §§ 8-9.

449

Id. § 8. Many of the same themes can be found in the notes for a speech that Madison gave
during the Assembly’s consideration of the Assessment Bill in December 1784. In that speech,
he also argued that establishments are unnecessary because human beings have a natural
“propensity . . . to Religion.” Madison’s Notes for Debates on the General Assessment Bill,
[Outline B], [23–24 December 1784], https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-0802-0104-0003 [https://perma.cc/ZQ82-EG6P].
450

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 134; MILLER, supra note 11, at 148.
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salvation.”451 An establishment is not necessary to support the Christian religion, which
historically has been advanced by divine providence without support from – and indeed in
opposition to – civil authorities.452 Far from maintaining the purity of Christianity, establishment
tends to corrupt it by promoting “superstition, bigotry and persecution.”453 Instead of social
peace, government intrusions into the religious realm generate sectarian conflict and undermine
the “Christian forbearance, love and charity” that the Declaration of Rights calls for.454 Finally,
those who enjoy “the light of revelation” should desire that it spread to “the whole race of
mankind” – a goal that is undermined by laws that discourage non-Christians from immigrating
to the state.455
The great logical and rhetorical force of Madison’s Memorial comes from the ways that it
draws on both natural religion and Christianity. His central thesis is that the state has no
authority in the religious sphere because individuals have an inalienable right to exercise religion
in accord with reason and conscience. But he also maintains that religious freedom and
nonestablishment are the best ways to promote the Christian religion. This broad approach
allows him to appeal to a wide range of groups, from Deists to liberal Anglicans to many
Evangelical Protestants.
Madison’s was not the only leading petition that highlighted ideas of natural rights and
natural religion. The same was true of a memorial that the Assembly received from the
Presbyterians,456 one of the largest and most influential dissenting groups in the
commonwealth.457 Some of the petition’s arguments are made in specifically Christian terms,
including the assertions that it would be “an invasion of the Divine prerogative” for civil rulers to
meddle in spiritual affairs, and that the progress of Christianity should be left to “the all directing
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Madison, Memorial, supra note 438, § 5.

452

Id. § 6.

453

Id. § 7.

454

Id. § 11 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16).

455

Id. § 12.
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Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Aug. 13, 1785), in SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 432, at 304 [hereinafter Presbyterian Memorial (1785)].
See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 13. On the Presbyterians’ use of natural religion,
see Rhys Isaac, “The Rage of Malice of the Old Serpent Devil”: The Dissenters and the Making
and Remaking of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139, 149-50 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
457
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providence of God.”458 But the petition’s most fundamental claims are that “[r]eligion is
altogether personal” and that individuals have an “unalienable” right to exercise it “agreeably to
the convictions of reason and conscience.”459 The Assessment Bill would infringe the religious
liberty of all, including those “who may be good citizens, but who have not embraced our
common faith.”460 The measure therefore “is a direct violation of [the sixteenth article of] the
Declaration of Rights.”461 The Presbyterians conclude by urging the legislature to enact
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.462
Thus, two of the main petitions against the Assessment Bill relied on arguments drawn
from natural rights and natural religion as well as from the dissenting Protestant tradition. This
was also true of a third set of petitions, which denounced the bill as “contrary to the spirit of the
Gospel and the Bill of Rights.”463 These petitions, which were signed by thousands of
Evangelicals, are discussed in depth below.464
2. Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
In response to this surge of political opposition, the legislature quietly allowed the
Assessment Bill to die.465 With Madison’s leadership, the Assembly then adopted a version of
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.466 This bill, which was first published in
1779, declared
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship,
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his

458

Presbyterian Memorial (1785), supra note 456, at 305-06.
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Id. at 304-05.

460

Id. at 305.
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Id.
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See id. at 306.

463

Petition Against the Bill [from Westmoreland County, Virginia] (Nov. 2, 1784), in SACRED
RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 432, at 307, 307 [hereinafter Westmoreland Petition].
464

See infra text accompanying notes 512-23.

465

See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 286, at 79-80.

466

See id. at 155-63.
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religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall
in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.467
In an extensive preamble, the Bill articulated a rationale that was cast largely in terms of
natural religion and natural rights. The Bill asserted “that Almighty God hath created the mind
free” and made it incapable of external restraint; that he intended for religion to be promoted “by
its influence on reason alone”; “that the opinions and belief of men depend not on their own will,
but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds”; that opinions “are not the object
of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction”; and that government should not interfere with
“principles on supposition of their ill tendency,” but only when they “break out into overt acts
against peace and good order.”468 The “civil rights” we enjoy as members of society “have no
dependence on our religious opinions,” and therefore for the law to deny any individual the
capacity to hold civil office “unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is
depriving him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which, in common with his
fellow citizens, he has a natural right.”469 Finally, the preamble affirms “that truth is great and

467

The following discussion focuses on and quotes from the Bill as Jefferson drafted it. See 82.
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18 June 1779, Founders Online, National Archives,
accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-01320004-0082 [https://perma.cc/54XJ-Q86A] [hereinafter Jefferson Bill]. For the final version, see
Virginia Act, supra note 15.
468

Jefferson Bill, supra note 467.

469

Id. preamble. At first glance, this assertion seems problematic: because civil offices do not
exist in a state of nature, the right to hold them cannot properly be described as “a natural right.”
See Philip Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal
Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 350-51. The logic behind
Jefferson’s assertion becomes somewhat clearer if we consider the passage in Furneaux that
evidently inspired it. As Furneaux explains, although one does not have the right to actually hold
civil offices, “a capacity of being elected or appointed to them, is the right of every good subject;
and being deprived of that capacity is plainly an injury; and every injury done to a man merely
for his religion, and not on a civil account,” is a form of religious “persecution” which is
“contrary to the law of nature.” FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, letter VI, at 164-65
(emphasis added). It follows that imposing such a disability on dissenters prevents them from
“enjoying those privileges and advantages to which, in common with their fellow subjects, they
have a natural claim.” Id. at 167 n.*. For other passages in Furneaux’s Letters that anticipate the
language of Jefferson’s preamble, see id. letter III, at 59 (asserting that “human laws have
nothing to do with mere principles, but only with those overt acts arising from them, which are
contrary to the peace and good order of society”); id. at 60 (stating that the magistrate exceeds
his authority when he punishes individuals “on account of the supposed ill tendency of their
-69-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3623251

Origins of the Free Exercise Clause [June 9, 2020 draft]
will prevail if left to herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has
nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons,
free argument and debate.”470 The Bill concludes by declaring “that the rights hereby asserted
are of the natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the
present or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right.”471
The views expressed in Jefferson’s Bill emerged in part from his reflections on Locke,
Furneaux, and other writers we have explored.472 Like those writers and Madison’s Memorial,
Jefferson’s Bill blended the language of natural rights and natural religion with that of the
Christian tradition. For example, the Bill’s assertion that it was not only “tyrannical” but
“sinful” to “compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves and abhors” had powerful appeal to Protestant dissenters and was
incorporated into the Baptist petitions against the Assessment Bill.473 Christian overtones also
could be heard in Jefferson’s assertion that all attempts to influence the mind by civil
incapacitations or punishments “are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our
religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on
either, as was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on reason alone.”474

principles”); id. letter VI, at 201 (observing that “though they are criminal who do not resist [the
temptation to hypocritically change their religious practice in order to satisfy a legal test for civil
office]; yet, neither are they innocent, who lay the snare in their way”).
470

Jefferson Bill, supra note 467.

471

Id. A few years after drafting the Bill, Jefferson presented a similar defense of religious
liberty which also cited Furneaux. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
query XVII (1782), in WRITINGS 123, 285 & n.* (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of Am. 1984).
On Furneaux’s influence, see supra notes 469, 471. For some passages in Locke that are
echoed in Jefferson’s writings, see LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 14 (“It is only Light
and Evidence that can work a change in Mens Opinions. And that Light can in no manner
proceed from corporal Sufferings, or any other outward Penalties.”); id. at 44 (asserting that the
“Speculative Opinions” that individuals hold “have no manner of relation to the Civil Rights of
the Subjects”); id. at 44-45 (maintaining that the expression of such opinions “does no injury” to
others and that “the business of Laws is not to provide for the Truth of Opinions, but for the
Safety and Security of the Commonwealth, and of every particular mans Goods and Person”); id.
at 45 (suggesting that “Truth certainly would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for
her Self”); see also infra note 475. For discussion, see Stanford Kessler, Locke’s Influence on
Jefferson’s “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,” 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 231 (1983).
472

473

Jefferson Bill, supra note 467; see Westmoreland Petition, supra note 463, at 308.

474

Jefferson Bill, supra note 467.
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Jefferson’s language here seems designedly ambiguous. Christians naturally would take “the
holy author of our religion” to be a reference to Christ, and indeed this phrase was inspired by a
passage in Locke’s Letter that clearly related to him.475 At the same time, the phrase was vague
enough that it might refer simply to the “Almighty God” already mentioned in the preamble.
Many years later, Jefferson recalled that the assembly had overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to
amend the preamble to specify that “the holy author of our religion” was “Jesus Christ” – a
decision that Jefferson regarded as proving that the Act’s “protection of opinion was meant to be
universal” and to “comprehend . . . the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the
Hindoo and infidel of every denomination.”476
Before passing Jefferson’s Bill, the Assembly deleted some of the preamble’s most
rationalistic language, such as the propositions that “the opinions and belief of men . . . follow
involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds” and that religion should progress “by its
influence on reason alone.”477 Yet most of the key language survived, from the declaration that
“Almighty God hath created the mind free” to the closing assertion that religious liberty is
among “the natural rights of mankind.”478 Moreover, the most serious effort to amend the Bill
simply would have replaced Jefferson’s preamble with the language of article 16 of the
Declaration of Rights, with its contention that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and

After observing that Christ sought to bring people into the church not by “Instruments of
Force” but by “the Gospel of Peace,” Locke added, “Tho’ if Infidels were to be converted by
force, . . . we know very well that it was much more easie for Him to do it, with Armies of
Heavenly Legions, than for any Son of the Church . . . with all his Dragoons.” LOCKE,
TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 11. In the notes Jefferson took while reading this passage, he
wrote “our Saviour chose not to propagate his religion by temporal punmts or civil
incapacitation, if he had it was in his almighty power. but he chose to <enforce> extend it by it’s
influence on reason, thereby shewing to others how [they] should proceed.” Thomas Jefferson,
Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, 11 October–9 December 1776,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0222-0007 [https://perma.cc/LQ5SPLBN].
475

476

Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography (1821),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-1756 [https://perma.cc/52AW-755F].
The Assembly’s journals contain no record of this amendment, but it may have been considered
in the Committee of the Whole. See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 158 n.45.
477

For the deleted propositions, see the language marked in italic in Jefferson Bill, supra note
467.
478

See id.
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conviction, not by force or violence.”479 Thus, while the Assembly moderated Jefferson’s
articulation of natural religion, it clearly did not reject that notion, and the core of his position
remained intact. As Madison wrote to him shortly afterwards, the changes to the preamble
“somewhat defaced the composition,” but they “did not affect the substance” of a statute that the
two men believed would “in this Country [i.e., Virginia] extinguish[] for ever the ambitious hope
of making laws for the human mind.”480
B. Interpreting the Virginia Controversy
It is agreed on all sides that the events that culminated in the Virginia Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom shed crucial light on the meaning of the First Amendment,
which was adopted only a few years later. But there is sharp disagreement over how those
events should be understood. Traditionally, courts and historians have focused on the
contributions made by Jefferson, who drafted the statute, and Madison, who shepherded it
through the legislature after leading the successful fight to defeat Henry’s Assessment Bill.481
In recent decades, however, a growing number of scholars has stressed that it was the
Evangelicals who provided most of the political energy that led to the establishment of religious
freedom in Virginia.482 For example, while Madison’s Memorial received about 1,700
signatures – an impressive number for the time – the petitions circulated by Evangelicals
garnered many more.483 Moreover, it was the Presbyterians’ decision to drop their previous
support for an assessment and to endorse Jefferson’s bill that turned the tide, first in the popular
debate and then in the legislature.484 It follows that “[t]he key to understanding the nature of the

479

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16; see BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at
158, 162-63.
480

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Jan. 22, 1786,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0249 [https://perma.cc/FA4UXWDJ].
481

See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.

482

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 143, 175-82; MILLER, supra note 11, at 10911; RAGOSTA, supra note 7; McConnell, supra note 7, at 1437-41.
483

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 147, 175; McConnell, supra note 7, at 1440.

484

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 136-39, 143, 147-49; McConnell, supra note
7, at 1440.
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religious settlement in Virginia rests with the dissenters” rather than with the Enlightenment
rationalism of Jefferson and Madison.485
This revisionist interpretation draws much of its force from the notion that the supporters
of religious freedom held two sharply different views – an Evangelical view that was rooted in
orthodox Christianity and a rationalist view that was secular or at most Deistic.486 During the
1780s, those who took these views came together to promote religious liberty, but they did so for
fundamentally different reasons.487 Evangelicals believed that religious freedom was the best
way to advance the Christian religion.488 By contrast, rationalists were indifferent if not hostile
to Christianity and other forms of organized religion.489 They wished to protect intellectual
freedom and to liberate social and political life from the domination of religion by confining it to
the private sphere.490 Although the two groups joined forces against the religious establishment
during this period, in the end their views were not merely distinct but “diametrically opposed” to
one another.491 When the two positions are framed in this way, one can make a reasonable case
that the defeat of the Assessment Bill and the adoption of the Act for Religious Freedom are best
understood in terms of the conception of religious liberty that was held by the Evangelicals,
whose political support was decisive, rather than in terms of the Deism, skepticism, or irreligion
that they abhorred.
The fundamental problem with this revisionist interpretation is that it fails to take
sufficient account of natural religion and to recognize the way that it established common ground

485

BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 175; see also, e.g., McConnell, supra note 7, at 1446.
Departing from the common understanding, McConnell argues that while Jefferson took an
Enlightenment rationalist approach to religious freedom, Madison took a very different approach
which “echoed evangelical convictions” and exalted “the claims of religious freedom” over those
of civil society. See id. at 1446, 1452-55. As I shall show, however, whatever their private
views may have been, Madison and Jefferson took the same public stance toward religion – an
approach that was rooted in the ideas of natural religion and natural rights. See supra text
accompanying notes 438-55, 467-80; infra text accompanying notes 492-97.
486

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at ix-x, 3, 6, 148, 164, 178-81; McConnell, supra
note 7, at 1437-41, 1445-46, 1449-53.
487

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 178-81.
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See, e.g., id. at 180-81.
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See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 7, at 1449-52.
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See, e.g., id. at 1449-50, 1453.
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McConnell, supra note 7, at 1446.
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between the rationalist and Evangelical positions. In his private correspondence, Jefferson did
express Deist views and evince strong hostility toward traditional Christianity.492 Although
Madison’s youthful letters breathed with Evangelical fervor,493 in later years he “was extremely
reticent about expressing his ideas on matters of faith.”494 Yet whatever the two leaders’
personal views may have been, the position they took in their public writings was based not on
an agnostic or antireligious secularism but on an affirmation of natural religion. Moreover, the
form of natural religion they articulated was one that was open to the possibility of revelation
and that affirmed the right of all individuals to hold and advocate for their beliefs, including
traditional Christian ones. The leading Evangelical defenses of religious liberty in Virginia also
rested in part on the concepts of natural religion and natural rights. It was these concepts that
enabled rationalists and Evangelicals to form an alliance to promote religious liberty. It follows
that the statute and its adoption are best understood neither in terms of secular rationalism nor in
terms of Evangelicalism but rather in light of natural religion and natural rights.
At the outset, we should clarify the question we are interested in. Some forms of history
would focus on the social and political forces that brought about the statute’s adoption or explore
its implications for religion, politics, and society in Virginia. Although these are relevant to our
inquiry, they are not our principal concern. Instead, the question is how we should understand
the normative principle of religious liberty as it was incorporated into the fundamental law of the
state by the Act for Religious Freedom. What did that statute mean from a legal and
constitutional standpoint?
In pursuing this issue, we should begin with the statute’s language. Although its
rationalism was toned down as it made its way through the legislature, it is clearly based on ideas
of natural religion and natural rights. The Act declares that God has created the mind free; that
human beings are capable of reaching “truth” through “free argument and debate”; that they have
an inherent right to form and argue for their beliefs as well as to be free from all compulsion in
this sphere; that they are entitled to full and equal “civil rights” without regard to their religious

492

See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (May 5, 1817),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6753 [https://perma.cc/AU5P-KHJT];
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Adrian Van der Kemp (July 30, 1816),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-0167 [https://perma.cc/Z2LVAJGF].
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See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Nov. 9, 1772),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0015 [https://perma.cc/7H7LHWXJ].
Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion – A New Hypothesis, 38 J. PRESBYTERIAN
HIST. SOC’Y 65, 65 (1960).
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opinions; that those opinions lie beyond the legitimate authority of civil government; and that the
rights asserted are among the inviolable “natural rights of mankind.”495
At the same time, Jefferson’s statute does not articulate these ideas in a way that is
antagonistic to revealed religion, for it speaks respectfully of “the Holy author of our religion,”
“the ministry,” and the “faith” of individuals.496 The statute seems to assume that individuals
reasonably can hold a variety of religious views. It also incorporates a number of points that
would appeal to dissenting Protestants, such as a denunciation of rulers who would impose their
(quite possibly false) opinions on others.497 Yet it studiously refrains from using explicitly
Christian language. In short, like Madison’s Memorial, the Act is a classic instance of a
document that is founded on natural religion but open to revealed religion, that appeals to both
rationalist and pietist defenders of religious freedom, and that secures this freedom to everyone
under the doctrine of natural rights.
This leads to the next point: the Act’s supporters and their views. Although a wave of
Evangelical activity may have ensured the defeat of the Assessment Bill, that activity was not
sufficient to secure the adoption of a law protecting religious liberty. Instead, this result was
achieved by a broader political and legislative coalition that also included Anglicans (or
Episcopalians, as they became known after the Revolution).498
As we have seen, eighteenth-century Anglican thought had both a traditionalist and a
rationalist strand.499 The latter emphasized the importance of reason as well as the harmony
between natural and revealed religion.500 Some rationalists agreed with traditionalists on the
value of an established church.501 But others strongly supported religious liberty and
disestablishment.502 During the mid-1780s, individuals who took this liberal Episcopalian
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Virginia Act, supra note 15.
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Id. preamble.
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Id.
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See, e.g., BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 286, at 80.
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See supra text accompanying notes 284-85.
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See supra text accompanying notes 286-89.

For example, James Maury’s discourse was written to defend the established church against
the challenge posed by Separate Baptists. See MAURY, supra note 286; BUCKLEY,
ESTABLISHING, supra note 286, at 43.
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See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 124-25, 128, 130-31, 164.
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position held about nineteen seats in the House of Delegates.503 Together with a similar number
of Evangelicals, they had the strength to block the Assessment Bill and to enact Jefferson’s
statute.504 A few months later, such efforts to secure religious liberty and to dissolve the union
between church and state were hailed as a triumph for rational religion and “the rights of
humanity” in a sermon preached to the Episcopal Church of Virginia by the Rev. James
Madison, who was soon to become its first bishop.505
The other main part of the coalition for religious liberty consisted of Evangelical
dissenters from the established church. This was not a unified group, however, for it consisted of
distinct denominations, the largest of which were the Presbyterians and Baptists. At this time,
nearly all the Evangelical members of the House of Delegates were Presbyterians.506
Presbyterians had long resented the dominance of the Anglican Church in Virginia.507
They were committed to religious liberty and equality for all Christian sects.508 During the fall
of 1784, they expressed qualified support for an assessment because of religion’s importance for
“the existence and welfare” of society.509 The following summer, however, they changed course
and denounced Henry’s proposal as an invasion of the religious sphere and “a direct violation of
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In a valuable appendix, Buckley lists a group of delegates who favored a church-state
relationship as well as a group that opposed one – a category that he subdivides between
Episcopalian rationalists and predominantly Presbyterian dissenters. See id. app. II, at 192-200.
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See id; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 286, at 80; supra Part IV.A.
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See JAMES MADISON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 3-7 (May 26, 1786) (Richmond, Thomas
Nicholson 1786). In a statement that epitomizes natural religion, Rev. Madison asserted that
“religion, to be profitable to the individual and acceptable to God, must be the result of free
inquiry and the determination of reason. This right of free inquiry, and of judging for ourselves
is a right natural and unalienable.” Id. at 10. For Madison, this right was not only “the glory of
our nature” and “the truest sense of joy and triumph to an American,” it was also “the
indispensable duty of a Christian.” Id.
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See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, app. II, at 199-200.
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See id. at 137-39.
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See Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 24, 1776), in SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 432, at 269, 269-70 [hereinafter Presbyterian Memorial (1776)].
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Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 28, 1784), in SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 432, at 301, 303.
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the Declaration of Rights.”510 As we have seen, their memorial to the General Assembly
contained strong elements of natural religion and urged the adoption of Jefferson’s bill.511 It
therefore is fair to say that ideas of natural religion and natural rights were affirmed by both of
the groups – Presbyterians and liberal Episcopalians – that formed the legislative coalition that
passed the Act for Religious Freedom.
Much of the revisionist case instead focuses on the Baptists. The most widely subscribed
petitions against the Assessment Bill probably were their work.512 These petitions objected to
the bill primarily in Christian terms. By imposing a tax for religious purposes, the legislature
would act “contrary to the spirit of the Gospel” by disregarding Christ’s “plain directions” that
the church and its teachers should be supported “by free Contributions.”513 Even if the bill’s
supporters are correct “that Deism and its banefull Influence is spreading itself over the state,”
the proper remedy is not to establish religion.514 Instead, the rulers should promote religion by
setting a good example as well as by adopting laws to punish immorality.515 Ministers should
show the world that they are called to their work by “divine Grace” and not by a mere desire to
profit from ecclesial employment.516 But on no account should civil government meddle in the
religious realm.517
Several scholars rely on these petitions as important evidence for the view that the
adoption of the Virginia statute should be regarded as a victory for an Evangelical rather than an
Enlightenment view of religious liberty.518 But this evidence does not bear the weight that is
placed on it.

510

See Presbyterian Memorial (1785), supra note 456, at 304-05.

511

See supra text accompanying notes 456-62.

512

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 148-49 & n.12; Isaac, supra note 457, at 150-51.
For a good example of these petitions, see Westmoreland Petition, supra note 463.
513

Westmoreland Petition, supra note 463, at 308.

514

Id.

515

Id.

516

Id.

517

Id. at 307-08.

518

See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 148-49; McConnell, supra note 7, at 1440.
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To begin with, we should recall that the specific purpose of these petitions was to oppose
the Assessment Bill. In turn, the rationale for that bill was that it offered the best way to diffuse
“Christian knowledge” throughout the community and thereby promote social peace and
morality.519 In this context, it is perfectly understandable that the petitions should argue that, far
from promoting true Christianity, the Assessment Bill violated the most basic principles of that
religion as the Baptists understood it. Thus, the bill could be accused of failing on its own terms
by undermining the very goal it was meant to promote. The petitions made no effort to articulate
a general rationale for protecting religious liberty in the new republic. There is no reason to
suppose that, if they had, they would have offered a justification that focused purely on the idea
of Christian liberty to the exclusion of other rationales.
On the contrary, the petitioners took pains to argue not only that the Assessment Bill
contravened “the spirit of the Gospel,” but also that it infringed the natural freedom and equality
of non-Christians by granting Christians exclusive benefits in violation of “the Bill of Rights.”520
In this way the petitioners signaled that they accepted the doctrine of natural rights and
recognized that those rights belonged to everyone regardless of religion.
Although the natural rights argument did not hold center stage in these petitions, it
nevertheless was integral to the position they took. That position was based on a sharp
distinction between church and state. The petitions’ first argument was that the Assessment Bill
violated the doctrines of the Christian church as set forth in the Gospel, while the second
argument was that it violated the principles of the Commonwealth of Virginia as set forth in the
Declaration of Rights. The first argument expressed the Baptists’ own religious beliefs, while
the second appealed to precepts that had been declared by the representatives of all the people of
Virginia. The two arguments were perfectly complementary, and from a Baptist perspective
each would have been lacking without the other.
It is hardly surprising that the petitioners did not undertake to develop a general defense
of religious liberty, for they were well aware that a powerful one already existed in the form of
Jefferson’s Bill. The Baptists had endorsed that bill when it was first published in 1779, and
they were among its principal supporters.521 Some of its key language was incorporated into the
Baptist petitions of 1785, including the assertion that religious matters “are not the object of

519

Assessment Bill, supra note 432, at 252.

520

Id. at 307-08.

521

See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 55; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 286, at 71-

72.
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Civil Government, nor under it’s jurisdiction.”522 The Baptists welcomed the passage of the
statute in 1786, and in later years they strongly identified with it.523
Some scholars have contended that the Baptists supported Jefferson’s statute not for what
it said but for what it did: the law “served their purposes” by disestablishing Anglicanism,
protecting religious liberty, and enabling them to promote “the salvation of a Christian America
through the Gospel message.”524 But some prominent Baptists advocated for religious liberty in
ways that strongly echoed Locke and Jefferson. For example, Elder John Leland presented such
a justification in a sermon entitled The Rights of Conscience Inalienable.525 Leland’s views are
of particular interest because he not only played an important role in Baptist political activity at
this time, but also was instrumental in securing Madison’s commitment to promote a federal
constitutional amendment to secure religious liberty.526
According to Leland, the American states have recognized that civil government should
be based on “compact.”527 Individuals enter civil society to protect themselves and their

522

See Westmoreland Petition, supra note 463, at 308.

523

See Isaac, supra note 457, at 158-59. An early official history of the Virginia Baptists lauded
not only Jefferson’s bill but also Madison’s Memorial, observing that “[f]or elegance of style,
strength of reasoning, and purity of principle, it has . . . never [been] surpassed by any thing in
the English language.” ROBERT B. SEMPLE, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE
BAPTISTS IN VIRGINIA 33, 72 (Richmond, John O’Lynch 1810),
https://books.google.com/books/about/A_History_of_the_Rise_and_Progress_of_th.html?id=4v
EpAAAAYAAJ [https://perma.cc/6XBF-VTST]. Passages like this suggest that contemporaries
saw less difference between the Evangelical and Enlightenment positions on religious liberty
than modern scholars do. Cf. BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 148 (asserting that there was
a “wide gap” between those two positions, but acknowledging that this gap may have been
“unrecognized at the time”).
524

BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 180-81. Buckley offers this assertion not only about the
Baptists but also about the Evangelicals in general. This view fails to capture the position of the
Presbyterians, who highlighted ideas of natural religion and natural rights in their memorial
against the Assessment Bill. See supra text accompanying notes 456-62.
525

JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS,
supra note 105, at 1079 [hereinafter LELAND, CONSCIENCE].
526

See RAGOSTA, supra note 7, at 167-68.

527

LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 525, at 1083.
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property from violence.528 The “rights of conscience” are “inalienable,” for “religion is a matter
between God and individuals,” and one’s “mind should always be open to conviction” and
willing to “receive that doctrine which appears the best demonstrated.”529 Truth comes from
studying “nature and reason” as well as “the bible,” and is best pursued through free and open
discussion.530 It follows that everyone should be allowed to “maintain the principles that he
believes [and to] worship according to his own faith, either one God, three Gods, no God, or
twenty Gods.”531 Human lawmakers may not compel anyone to pay taxes for religious purposes,
and such compulsion would be unjust to Deists, Jews, Catholics, Muslims, and others who reject
Christianity.532

528

Id. at 1084.

529

Id. at 1084-85. In a similar vein, a Baptist petition against the Assessment Bill observed that
“Christianity addresses itself to the understanding and affections of Men, and [seeks] to attach
them to its Interests only by Arguments adapted to convince them of its native excellence, and its
importance to their happiness. If these considerations fail it has no others to propose.”
Remonstrance and Petition of Committee of General Baptist Association at 2 (Aug. 13, 1785,
received by General Assembly Nov. 3, 1785),
http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions [https://perma.cc/QE4S-UF9L]
[hereinafter General Baptist Petition].
530

LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 525, at 1089-90.

Id. at 1089. This statement recalls Jefferson’s famous assertion that religion is beyond the
state’s authority because “it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or
no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” JEFFERSON, supra note 471, query XVII,
at 285.
531

532

LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 525, at 1092-93. In other writings, Leland articulated these
themes in equally powerful terms. See, e.g., JOHN LELAND, THE VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), in
THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 91, 105-09, 117-19, 121-23 (L.F. Greene ed.,
New York, G.W. Wood 1845),
https://ia802605.us.archive.org/11/items/writingsoflateel00lela/writingsoflateel00lela.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RD6N-U6YJ] [hereinafter LELAND’S WRITINGS]; JOHN LELAND, The Yankee
Spy (1794), in id. at 213, 219-29; JOHN LELAND, Short Sayings, in id. at 572, 573, 578-81.
Leland was not alone in taking such an approach. For instance, the first election sermon
delivered by a Baptist clergyman to the Massachusetts legislature also defended civil and
religious liberty in Lockean terms. See SAMUEL STILLMAN, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE
HONORABLE COUNCIL . . . (Boston, T. & J. Fleet 1779),
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N13070.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/D9ZT-N4YP].
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Leland’s views present a paradox. For six decades, he travelled the countryside
preaching a traditional Calvinist message “that human powers were too degenerate to effect a
change of heart by self-exertion” and that individuals could be saved only through faith in the
atoning power of Christ’s death on the cross.533 Yet when Leland sought to persuade the public
to protect religious liberty, he emphasized reason and natural rights. How can these two views
be reconciled?
In part, the answer seems to be that Baptists like Leland did not see as much tension
between the two views as we might today. God was both the creator and the redeemer of the
world. While Leland might believe that salvation came only through faith, that did not negate
the idea that God was also the author of the natural order and of the rights that human beings had
within it. One could believe in “nature’s God” as well as in the God of the Bible; there was no
necessary conflict between understanding life in this world in terms of natural rights and
believing that revelation discloses the only way to attain life in the world to come.534 To put it
another way, however God may have determined to bring about salvation, individuals have an
inalienable right to liberty of conscience in relation to other human beings.535
Leland’s writings also suggest another (not incompatible) way to resolve the paradox. He
is well aware that different forms of discourse are called for in different spheres of life. For
example, although it was reasonable for the statesmen who drafted the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights to declare “that all men came into the world free and independent,” it is
equally reasonable for parents to regard young children as dependent and in need of control.536
By the same token, it may be appropriate to describe religious liberty as one of the inherent
rights of human beings as rational creatures when advocating for its protection in the constitution
of a liberal polity, while asserting that all human beings are naturally sinful when speaking from
an Evangelical theological perspective.537 These different forms of discourse are suited to the
contexts in which they are used and to the audiences to whom they are addressed. On this view,
there is no necessary contradiction between preaching Baptist doctrines regarding salvation, as

JOHN LELAND, Events in the Life of John Leland, in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra note 532, at
2, 28, 39.
533

534

JOHN LELAND, A Blow at the Root (1801), in id. at 233, 255; see also JOHN LELAND, Circular
Letter of the Shaftsbury Association (1793), in id. at 196, 196-99 (presenting reasons for holding
that the Bible is the word of God); JOHN LELAND, An Elective Judiciary (1805), in id. at 283, 294
(stating that the Christian religion involves mysteries that are “not of this world” and that cannot
be understood through natural reason).
535

See, e.g., LELAND, A Blow at the Root, supra note 534, at 239.

536

Id. at 235-36 (paraphrasing MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 401, pt. 1, art. I.).

537

See id. at 237, 239.
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Leland did throughout his ministry, and defending liberty of conscience as a natural right, as he
did in advocating constitutional and legal reform.538
This distinction between different forms of discourse may also shed some light on the
views of Isaac Backus, the Massachusetts pastor and scholar who was perhaps the most
influential Baptist leader in late eighteenth-century America.539 Although his writings on
religious liberty endorsed Locke’s position on the separation of church and state, they generally
relied not on natural rights theory but on Scripture and Baptist theology.540 Yet in 1779 when a
friend asked him to draft a bill of rights in advance of the Massachusetts constitutional
convention, the document he produced emphasized the “natural, inherent, and unalienable rights
of mankind.”541 The article on religion read as follows:
As God is the only worthy object of all religious worship, and nothing can be true
religion but a voluntary obedience unto his revealed will, of which each rational
soul has an equal right to judge for itself, every person has an unalienable right to
act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of his own mind, where
others are not injured thereby.542
The language of rational religion in this passage is unmistakable. To be sure, the
reference to God’s “revealed will” might suggest that “true religion” is based on revelation.543
During this era, however, it often was said that God revealed his will through nature and reason
as well as Scripture.544 In any event, the passage makes clear that “each rational soul” has a right

538

See supra text accompanying notes 529-32; JOHN LELAND, Speech Delivered in the House of
Representatives of Massachusetts, on the Subject of Religious Freedom (1811), in LELAND’S
WRITINGS, supra note 532, at 353.
539

On Backus, see MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 414; MILLER, supra note 11, at 101-13.

540

See ISAAC BACKUS, A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (Boston, Philip
Freeman 1770), http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N09053.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/RLF9-8RYH];
ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773) [hereinafter BACKUS,
APPEAL], in BACKUS PAMPHLETS, supra note 411, at 303; id. at 40-44 (editor’s introduction).
Isaac Backus’ Draft for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution, art. I (1779), in
BACKUS PAMPHLETS, supra note 411, at 487, 487 [hereinafter Backus, Draft]
541

542

Id. art. II, at 487.

543

Id.; MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 414, at 144.

See, e.g., Gerish, supra note 16, at 646-47 (distinguishing between “general revelation”
through nature and “special revelation” through Scripture). For example, Locke maintained that
544
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to use “his own mind” to determine religious truth.545 Thus, while some of Backus’s writings
argue for religious freedom as a matter of “Christian liberty” under the Gospel,546 his draft bill of
rights portrays it as “an unalienable right” of all human beings that has no inherent connection
with Christianity.547 To put the point somewhat differently, Backus’s draft resembles both the
Virginia Declaration and Jefferson’s bill in using some language that resonates with
Christianity,548 but in ultimately affirming that rational creatures have a natural right to use their
own minds to determine religious truth.549
C. Conclusion
The revisionist scholarship of recent decades has greatly enriched our understanding of
the theological ideas and political forces that contributed to the victory of religious liberty and
disestablishment in Virginia. As I have explained in this Part, however, it would be a mistake to
conceive of the normative constitutional meaning of that victory in terms of Evangelical
theology. The Evangelicals themselves never sought to write their religious beliefs into the
fundamental laws of the state. To do so would have transgressed those very beliefs, which held
that Christ’s kingdom was not of this world and that the state should be governed by its own

“Reason is natural Revelation, whereby [GOD] communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth,
which he has laid within the reach of their natural Faculties,” while “Revelation is natural Reason
enlarged by a new set of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately.” LOCKE, HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. IV, ch. XIX, § 4, at 698.
545

Backus, Draft, supra note 541, art. II, at 487.

546

ISAAC BACKUS, A DOOR OPENED FOR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY (1783), in BACKUS PAMPHLETS,
supra note 411, at 427, 436.
547

Backus, Draft, supra note 541, art. II, at 487.

In addition to the references to God’s “revealed will” and the “soul,” this language includes
“the full persuasion of his own mind.” This phrase, which also appears in the English version of
Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, ultimately derives from St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans.
See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 13 (“All the Life and Power of true Religion consists
in the inward and full perswasion of the mind . . . .”); Romans 14:5 (“Let every man be fully
persuaded in his own mind.”). All biblical quotations herein are to the King James Version,
which was in general use at the time.
548

See supra text accompanying notes 376-81 (Virginia Declaration), 466-80 (Jefferson’s bill).
In 1789, Backus praised Virginia for adopting Jefferson’s statute. See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING,
supra note 286, at 91.
549
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principles.550 And it also would have conflicted with the basic rhetorical strategy that
Evangelicals had followed from the beginning, which was to insist that a Revolution that aimed
to vindicate American freedom would be incomplete if failed to protect religious as well as civil
liberty.551 It was for these reasons that Evangelicals rallied around Jefferson’s bill with its
affirmation that the right to use one’s own judgment in religious matters was among “the natural
rights of mankind.”552
The revisionist position also takes another form. In an important book entitled The
Religious Roots of the First Amendment, Nicholas P. Miller argues that the founding-era view of
religious freedom derived from a particular strand of Protestant thought.553 At the heart of the
Reformation was the notion of sola scriptura – the belief that religious truth was to be found not
in traditional church teachings but in Holy Scripture alone.554 The question then became how –
and by whom – Scripture was to be interpreted. The jurisdictions that broke from Rome
generally established churches that asserted their own authority to interpret the Bible and to
impose religious doctrines with the backing of the state.555 Dissenting from this position, other
Protestant sects such as Baptists and Quakers insisted that every believer possessed a “right of
private judgment,” that is, a right to interpret Scripture for himself with the assistance of the
Holy Spirit.556
Miller contends that this notion of a right of private judgment was the starting point for
the modern conception of religious liberty. Initially, that right related only to biblical
interpretation.557 Over time, however, dissenting Protestants came to conceive of the right as

550

See, e.g., General Baptist Petition, supra note 529 (paraphrasing John 18:36); STILLMAN,
supra note 532, at 26 (same).
551

See, e.g., BACKUS, APPEAL, supra note 540, at 338-42; Memorial of the Presbytery of
Hanover (May 20, 1784), in SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 432, at 298, 298-99;
BAILYN, supra note 106, at 247, 260-72.
552

Jefferson Bill, supra note 467.

553

MILLER, supra note 11.

554

See id. at 17, 93.

555

See, e.g., id. at 23, 27, 29.

556

See id. at 1-3, 23, 31, 37-38.

557

See id. at 1-2
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extending to religious truth in general.558 In the late seventeenth century, the principle of private
judgment was given philosophical form by Locke.559 Eighteenth-century Americans then drew
on Lockean as well as dissenting Protestant thought when they asserted that individuals had an
inherent right to religious liberty that was entitled to legal and constitutional protection.560
Miller persuasively shows that this Protestant view made an essential contribution to the
American conception of religious liberty. At times, he describes dissenting Protestantism as a
movement that “worked alongside” and “converged” with “other ideologies” such as
Enlightenment liberalism.561 But Miller often seems to make a more far-reaching claim: that the
founding-era conception should be understood primarily in terms of dissenting Protestant
thought.562 On this view, Locke’s writings on toleration simply gave “philosophical and political
expression [to] what were perceived to be Protestant theological principles,” but did not add
anything essential to them.563 “It was Locke’s formulation . . . of dissenting Protestantism,”

558

See id. at 76-78.

See id. at 78-79, 88-89. As we have seen, a principal goal of Locke’s Letter Concerning
Toleration was to show that in religious matters “[e]very man . . . has the supreme and absolute
Authority of judging for himself.” LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 46. It should be
noted, however, that when Locke uses the actual term “private judgment,” it is generally in a
pejorative sense. See, e.g., id. at 48 (asserting that “the private Judgment of any Person
concerning a Law enacted in Political Matters, for the publick Good, does not take away the
Obligation of that Law, nor deserve a Dispensation); id. at 48-49 (similar statement); LOCKE,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk. II, §§ 88-89 (explaining that a basic goal of the social contract
is to ensure that disputes are settled by the judgment of the community rather than the “private
judgment” of individuals).
559

560

See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 11, at 53-54, 85-88, 145-46.

561

Id. at 1, 4, 7.

See, e.g., id. at 3 (asserting that the right of private judgment “grew from theological rather
than secular Enlightenment roots”); id. at 4 (contending that “[d]isestablishment in America was
a populist movement where religious, and not Enlightenment, influences predominated.”); id. at
13 (maintaining that dissenting Protestants “played [a] greater role [than Madison] in bringing
the principle of religious liberty and disestablishment to the early American republic”).
562

563

Id. at 77-82, 90; see also id. at 80-82, 89 (suggesting that Locke can best be understood as a
dissenting Protestant theorist).
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Miller concludes, “mediated by Madison, Witherspoon, and other key American thinkers, . . .
that carried the day in the founding of the American republic.”564
In my view, Miller’s stronger claim is unconvincing for two reasons. First, we should not
focus on dissenting Protestantism at the expense of other influences. While the right of private
judgment was a distinctively Protestant idea in origin, the same cannot be said of reason and
nature – ideas that were no less central to the eighteenth-century American understanding of
religious liberty. Among the sources of those ideas were modern natural science565 and the
tradition of natural law and natural right thought which stretched back through early modern and
medieval Scholasticism to classical Roman and Greek philosophy.566
Second, we should recognize that, over the course of time, the idea of a right of private
judgment evolved in ways that carried it far beyond its Reformation roots. As Miller observes, it
developed from a right to interpret Scripture for oneself to a right to seek religious truth in
general.567 The progression did not stop there, however. By the eighteenth century, the right to
private judgment was being described in broader terms. As Hutcheson put it, it consisted in the
“natural right” of “every intelligent being” to form all of “his own opinions, speculative or
practical, . . . according to the evidence that appears to him” – a right that arises “from the very
constitution of the rational mind.”568

Id. at 162; see also id. at 145 (referring to “the core theological and biblical issues that lay at
the heart of Madison’s belief in the right of personal liberty”). For another sophisticated version
of this argument, see SMITH, supra note 10, at 39-40 (arguing that “insofar as it fed into
American religious freedom,” the Enlightenment is best understood as “a conduit” for Christian
ideas).
564

565

See supra Part II.E.

566

See, e.g., HAAKONSSEN, supra note 192, ch. 1; SCHNEEWIND, supra note 224, chs. 2-8; LEO
STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953). Miller shows that even before Locke,
dissenting Protestant writers made appeals to reason and nature. See MILLER, supra note 11, at
69, 77-78, 81-82. But he does not explore the origin of those ideas, or recognize the ways in
which they depart from core principles of Protestantism like sola scriptura and the corruption of
human nature by the Fall, see supra text accompanying notes 293-95, 554.
567

See MILLER, supra note 11, at 76-78.

568

1 HUTCHESON, SYSTEM, supra note 193, bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 295-96. For an earlier statement
to this effect, see FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF
BEAUTY AND VIRTUE bk. II, § VII, at 186 (rev. ed., Wolfgang Leidhold ed., Liberty Fund 2008)
(2d ed. 1726), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hutcheson-an-inquiry-into-the-original-of-ourideas-of-beauty-and-virtue-1726-2004 [https://perma.cc/H564-34DY].
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In short, between the Protestant Reformation and the American founding, the idea of
private judgment underwent a fundamental transformation, so that it encompassed not only a
right of religious believers, aided by divine illumination, to interpret the sacred texts of their own
tradition, but also a right of all human beings to use their reason to search for religious,
philosophical, moral, and other forms of truth.569 It was this reformulation of the idea in the
universal language of natural religion and natural rights that enabled it to be integrated into the
intellectual worldview of the eighteenth century, to be used as the basis of a broad political
coalition for the protection of religious liberty, and to be incorporated into American legal and
constitutional documents that declared the natural rights of mankind.
V. THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS
A. The Debate over the Constitution
1. The Demand for a Bill of Rights
When the Federal Convention met during the summer of 1787 to draft a new Constitution
for the nation, the delegates focused on strengthening the powers of the national government and
reaching compromises between competing state and regional interests. Securing constitutional
protection for individual rights was at most a peripheral concern. Toward the convention’s end,
George Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved that a committee be
appointed to draft a bill of rights, but their proposal was rejected with little debate.570
This decision was “a critical error that almost proved fatal,” for the absence of a bill of
rights turned out to be the most effective line of attack against the Constitution when it was

Like Hutcheson, Witherspoon taught that individuals have an inalienable “right of private
judgment in matters of opinion,” thought, and knowledge, as well as “in all matters of religion.”
WITHERSPOON, supra note 245, at 56, 69. In his American edition of Blackstone, the
Jeffersonian jurist and Deist St. George Tucker articulated this more comprehensive view when
he wrote that individuals have an inalienable “right of personal opinion” which embraces both
(1) “liberty of conscience in all matters relative to religion” and (2) “liberty of speech and of
discussion in all speculative matters, whether religious, philosophical, or political.” 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND app. Note G, at 3-4, 6-7, 11 (St.
George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Young & Small 1803),
https://lonang.com/library/reference/tucker-blackstone-notes-reference/tuck-2g/
[https://perma.cc/5W6B-HWSA].
569

570

See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE
CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 538 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-debates-on-the-adoption-of-the-federal-constitutionvol-5 [https://perma.cc/PV6D-QH96] [hereinafter MADISON, DEBATES].
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submitted to the people for ratification.571 In state after state, Antifederalists excoriated the
document for failing to secure “the great, important rights of humanity” which were “essential to
liberty and happiness.”572 Together with trial by jury and freedom of speech and press, these
rights included “LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE.”573 As one writer put it, invoking the natural
rights/natural religion language of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, “all men have a
natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own
consciences and understanding.”574
In response, the Constitution’s Federalist supporters insisted that a bill of rights was
unnecessary (since federal officials would have “no particle of . . . jurisdiction” over subjects like
religion and press) and might even be “dangerous” (because it was impossible to enumerate all
the rights of individuals, and the failure to mention a particular right would imply that it was not
meant to be protected).575 But such abstract legal arguments did little to stem the tide of popular
support for a bill of rights. As Patrick Henry put it in the Virginia convention, “[i]f you had a
thousand acres of land” at stake in a transaction, you would insist that your rights be spelled out
in no uncertain terms; and this was all the more true when your “most valuable rights and
privileges” were involved.576

571

CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS ix (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
572

3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 317, 593 (2d ed. 1827) (remarks of Patrick Henry in Virginia
Convention), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/elliot-the-debates-in-the-several-state-conventions5-vols. Permanent citations for Elliot’s debates may be found at the following locations: volume
2, https://perma.cc/4FKE-NPSD; volume 3, https://perma.cc/FFY9-TBMA; volume 4,
https://perma.cc/2DZL-F3LY.
573

Id.; AN OLD WHIG NO. 5, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST § 3.3.25-26, at 34-35 (Herbert
J. Storing & Murray Dry ed., 1981).
574

CENTINEL NO. 2 (Oct. 24, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 573, §
2.7.55, at 152.
575

THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 422 (Hamilton); id. NO. 84, at 513-14 (Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
576

3 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 318.
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To overcome such opposition, Madison and some Federalist colleagues expressed a
willingness to adopt further protections for rights after the Constitution was ratified.577 A
number of state conventions proposed such amendments.578 The most fully developed proposal
on religious liberty came from Virginia:
That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the
free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that no
particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by Law in
preference to others.579
Four features of this proposal are striking. First, its assertion that religion “can be
directed only by reason and conviction” adopts the natural religion language of article 16 of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights.580 Second, the proposal amplifies that article’s natural rights
language by asserting that “all men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience.” Third, the proposal omits article
16’s admonition that all people should practice Christian charity toward one another. Finally, in
accord with the events of the mid-1780s, the proposal firmly links religious liberty with the
nonestablishment of religion.581
Virginia’s proposal was later endorsed by North Carolina and Rhode Island, both of
which refused to ratify the Constitution without amendments.582 Two other states called for a
bill of rights to be added after ratification. New York submitted an amendment declaring “[t]hat
the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right freely and peaceably to Exercise their
Religion according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought to

577

See Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP.
CT. REV. 301, 301 n.2, 324-25, 327-28.
578

These proposals are collected in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 14-28.

579

Id. at 19.

580

See supra text accompanying notes 375-81.

581

See supra Part IV.A.

582

See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 242, 244 (North Carolina); THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS §
1.1.2.7, at 12-13 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 6-7
(2005).
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be favoured or established by Law in preference to others.”583 New Hampshire simply would
have stated that “Congress shall make no Laws touching Religion, or to infringe the rights of
Conscience.”584 Additional proposals on religious liberty came from the delegates who dissented
from ratification in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland.585 Notably, all the proposals
that emerged from the state conventions articulated the principle of religious liberty in general
terms, and none made any reference to Christianity. Likewise, while some of the ratifications
thanked God for the opportunity to make a national Constitution, they did not use specifically
Christian language in this connection.586
2. The Ban on Religious Tests
Further insight into the conception of religious liberty that informed the Constitution may
be found in the debates over the clause in Article VI which obligated all federal and state
officials to take an oath to support the Constitution, but which added that “no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”587 The
ban on religious tests was adopted unanimously by the Philadelphia Convention despite Roger
Sherman’s suggestion that the provision was unnecessary in light of “the prevailing liberality” of
public sentiment on such matters.588 In the state ratifying conventions, some Antifederalists
objected that this provision would allow Jews, Catholics, Muslims, pagans, Deists, and even
atheists to hold federal office.589 These delegates asserted that “the Christian religion is best
calculated, of all religions, to make good members of society, on account of its morality.”590
Some delegates went so far as to say that “a person could not be a good man without being a

583

CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 22.

584

Id. at 16.

585

See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 582, § 1.1.2, at 11-12.

586

See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 176, (ratification by Massachusetts convention
“acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe”).
587

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.

588

MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 570, at 498.

589

See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 118, 148 (remarks of Dr. Jarvis and Major Lusk in
Massachusetts convention); 4 id. at 191-92, 199, 215 (remarks of Mr. Henry Abbott, Mr.
Caldwell, and Mr. Lancaster in North Carolina convention).
590

4 id. at 199 (remarks of Mr. Caldwell).
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good Christian,” and that “[a]ll those who have any religion are against the emigration of [nonChristians] from the eastern hemisphere.”591
The Federalists responded that the Constitution sought to reject this “intolerant spirit,”
which had led to “persecutions and wars of the most implacable and bloody nature . . . in every
part of the world.”592 As the Federalist leader and future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell
told the North Carolina convention, America had repudiated the view that “all wisdom” centered
in the rulers, and instead had embraced the more “modest[] and reasonabl[e]” view “that a man
may be of different religious sentiments from our own, without being a bad member of
society.”593 The ban on religious tests was “calculated to secure universal religious liberty” by
making all individuals eligible for office without regard to their beliefs.594 Iredell also discussed
Omichund v. Barker,595 the English decision which repudiated the notion that only Christian
oaths could be relied upon.596 As we have seen, this decision rested on the view that the practice
of oath-taking is not limited to Christianity but “follows from the Principles of Natural
Religion.”597
The idea of natural religion also appeared in other Federalist defenses of the religious test
ban. In the Massachusetts convention, the Rev. Daniel Shute, a Congregationalist minister,
observed that he did not limit his “charity and confidence to men of my own denomination,” but
instead believed “that there are worthy characters among men of every denomination – among
the Quakers, the Baptists, the Church of England, the Papists; and even among those who have
no other guide, in the way to virtue and heaven, than the dictates of natural religion.”598 To
disqualify people from public office on account of their religious views would infringe their

591

2 id. at 119 (remarks of Col. Jones in Massachusetts convention); 4 id. at 199 (remarks of Mr.
Caldwell).
592

4 id. at 192-93 (remarks of Mr. Iredell in North Carolina convention).

593

Id.

594

Id. at 196.

595

2 Equity Cases Abridged 395, 22 Eng. Rep. 337 (Ct. of Chancery 1744).

596

See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 197-98.

597

Omichund, 22 Eng. Rep. at 408 (opinion of Hardwicke, C.); supra text accompanying notes
181-86 (discussing this case).
598

2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 119 (remarks of Rev. Shute).
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“civil rights” without conferring any benefit upon the public.599 The state’s future chief justice,
Theophilus Parsons, added that it was impossible to formulate a religious test in a manner that
was neither unacceptably narrow (since no one today “is so illiberal as to wish [to confine officeholding] to any one sect of Christians”) nor so broad as to be meaningless, since the term
“Christianity” could be used to describe anything from strict Calvinism to “natural religion.”600
In the end, “the only evidence we can have of the sincerity of a man’s religion is a good life,”
and that is what voters should focus on.601
In these ways, the ideas of reason and natural religion played a significant part in the
Federalist defense of the religious test ban. Christian arguments were made as well. Iredell
asserted that “[t]he divine Author of our religion [that is, Christ] never wished for its support by
worldly authority.”602 Shute observed that “[t]he apostle Peter tells us that God is no respecter of
persons, but, in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to
him.”603 Isaac Backus went furthest in this direction when he told the Massachusetts convention
that “no man or men can impose any religious test, without invading the essential prerogatives of
our Lord Jesus Christ.”604 Yet even Backus rested his position on broader grounds when he
appealed to “reason” as well as to “the Holy Scriptures” for the view that “religion is ever a
matter between God and individuals” into which the state may not intrude.605 While the
Federalists offered some Christian rationales for the ban, their position ultimately was based on
liberal principles of reason. It was only in this way that they could assert that the Constitution
would promote “universal religious liberty.”606
B. The Free Exercise Clause and the Bill of Rights
In early 1789, Madison was elected to the First Congress with key support from John
Leland and other Baptist leaders, after assuring them that he believed the Constitution should be
amended to protect “all essential rights,” including freedom of the press and “the rights of

599

Id. at 118.

600

Id. at 90 (remarks of Mr. Parsons).

601

Id.

602

4 id. at 194 (remarks of Mr. Iredell).

603

2 id. at 119 (remarks of Rev. Shute).

604

Id. at 148 (remarks of Rev. Backus).

605

Id.

606

4 id. at 196 (remarks of Mr. Iredell).
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Conscience in the fullest latitude.”607 Madison strove to make good on this commitment by
persuading Congress to approve a bill of rights. The effort was a lonely one, for most Federalists
were at best indifferent to the project, while Antifederalists were more concerned with
fundamentally restructuring the constitutional scheme to diminish federal power.608 That a bill
of rights was adopted was largely due to Madison’s perseverance in the face of these
obstacles.609
On June 8, 1789, Madison presented his proposal to the House of Representatives. His
long speech on this occasion offers the greatest insight into the document’s meaning and
goals.610 As he explained, the American people had come to believe that constitutional barriers
should be erected to protect “the great rights of mankind” against abuse of power.611 In a
democratic society, the most serious danger came not from the executive or even from the
legislative branch but from “the body of the people, operating by the majority against the
minority.”612 The state declarations protected several categories of rights, including the “natural
right[s]” which they retain when they establish a government, as well as certain “positive rights”
such as trial by jury, which do not exist in a state of nature but which are made part of “the social
compact” since they are “as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the preexistent rights of nature.”613

607

Letter from James Madison to George Eve, 2 January 1789,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0297 [https://perma.cc/AN3REYTU]; see RAGOSTA, supra note 7, at 169-70.
See, e.g., Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and Adoption
of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 23 (1988).
608

609

See Finkelman, supra note 577, at 336-44.

See House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution, 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, Bill of Rights, doc. 11, at 20, 24-29, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss11.html [https://perma.cc/XF22-BW2L]
(remarks of Rep. Madison on June 8, 1789) [hereinafter Madison, Bill of Rights Speech].
610

611

Id. at 24-25.

612

Id. at 26-27.

613

Id. at 26.
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As Madison’s notes for the speech indicate, he regarded liberty of conscience as an
inalienable natural right.614 To protect this freedom, he proposed to amend the Constitution to
provide that “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”615 Together with his other
amendments, this proposal was considered first by a House select committee and then by each
chamber.616 As finally adopted, it read, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”617
Unfortunately, the congressional debates shed little light on the concrete legal meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause. Several broader points do emerge, however. First, religious liberty
was regarded as an inalienable natural right. This view was reflected not only in Madison’s
speech and notes but also in the draft bill of rights prepared by another select committee
member, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who placed “the rights of conscience in matters of
religion” first among the “natural rights which are retained by [the people] when they enter into
society.”618
Their colleagues undoubtedly agreed with this position, which had become widely
accepted in American thought. As we have seen, the idea of natural rights was associated with
the idea of natural religion. In the words of the Declaration of Independence, natural rights were
the rights bestowed on individuals by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.”619 Thus, the
fact that the framers of the Free Exercise Clause saw religious liberty as a natural and inalienable
right supports the view that the provision was informed by the concept of natural religion.
Further support for this view can be found in the fact that the framers saw an important
connection between freedom of conscience and freedom of expression. These two liberties were

614

See James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (c. June 8, 1789),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0125 [https://perma.cc/KMB95N3H] [hereinafter Madison, Bill of Rights Notes].
615

Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 610, at 25.

616

For a comprehensive legislative history and record of the debates, see CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 567.
617

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

See Roger Sherman’s Proposed Committee Report art. 2 (July 21-28, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 266, 267 [hereinafter Sherman Draft]
618

619

Declaration of Independence, supra note 370, ¶¶ 1-2.
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treated as inalienable rights both in Madison’s notes and in Sherman’s draft.620 Amendments to
protect religious liberty and the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly stood immediately next
to one another throughout the drafting process, from Madison’s original proposal through the
final version of the Bill of Rights, which consolidated all these rights into the First
Amendment.621 The notion that liberty of conscience and freedom of thought and expression
belong together also can be found in many of the writers we have discussed.622 It is consistent
with the idea that both of these liberties are encompassed within freedom of mind, or the liberty
of rational creatures to use their faculties to seek and communicate truth about the most
important matters. This view finds classic expression in Jefferson’s bill for religious freedom,
which proclaims that because “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” all individuals have a
right “to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion.”623
A final point concerns the relationship between religious liberty and nonestablishment of
religion. Once again, these two ideas were joined together in the text throughout the legislative
process.624 According to Madison, the ban on establishment was meant to respond to concerns

620

See Madison, Bill of Rights Notes, supra note 614; Sherman Draft, supra note 618, art. 2, at
267.
621

See, e.g., Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 610, at 25; CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 267 (Sherman proposal); id. at 38 (version adopted by House); id. at
48 (version adopted by Senate); U.S. CONST. amend. I. The two rights were also joined in
Madison’s proposal to bar the states from “violat[ing] the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in civil cases.” Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra
note 610, at 25. Although a revised version of this proposal passed the House, it was defeated in
the Senate, see CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 41 & n. 19, perhaps on the
ground that the Constitution should not impose greater limits on state power than it already did,
cf. id. at 188 (remarks of Rep. Tucker) (making this argument in the House).
622

See, e.g., LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 20, bk. IV, ch. XX, § 4, at 708
(condemning laws that seek to protect “the Religion of the Country” by denying people “the
Liberty and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry,” thereby “enslav[ing individuals] in that which
should be the freest part of Man, their Understandings”); PRICE, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 244,
at 124-37 (defending “liberty of discussion in all speculative matters, and liberty of conscience in
all religious matters”); 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 349, NO. 62, at 428-29 (asserting that
rulers act tyrannically when they attempt to regulate individuals’ thoughts and opinions
regarding religion and other subjects).
623

Jefferson Bill, supra note 467.

624

See, e.g., Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 610, at 25; CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 38 (House version); id. at 48 (Senate version); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
-95-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3623251

Origins of the Free Exercise Clause [June 9, 2020 draft]
that had been raised during the ratification debates by providing that “congress should not
establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship
God in any manner contrary to their conscience.”625 Of course, it is clear that, in Madison’s
words, a law of this sort would “infringe the rights of conscience,” and no one in the House
debates took issue with this view.626 But there was no consensus beyond this point. Some
members, like Daniel Carroll of Maryland, maintained that “the rights of conscience” were so
delicate that they could not “bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand,”627 while others,
including Peter Silvester of New York and Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut, feared that if
such a ban were interpreted broadly, it would “have a tendency to abolish religion altogether.”628
As Madison’s Memorial indicates, he himself believed that government had no legitimate
authority at all in the religious domain.629
In the end, Congress did not attempt to resolve this issue. One reason is obvious: as
Madison repeatedly emphasized, constitutional amendments could obtain the supermajority
required for adoption only if they were drafted in the form of general principles that commanded
broad assent.630 Accordingly, while the First Amendment prohibited federal laws respecting an
establishment of religion, it did not specify what that meant.
VI. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM CIVIL LAWS
A. Background
In this Article, I have argued that the central view that informed the Free Exercise Clause
was neither secular liberalism nor Evangelicalism, but natural religion and natural rights. This
view has a bearing on many of the doctrinal questions that arise under the Clause today. In this
Part, I briefly explore what this view can teach us about the original understanding on one of the
most important issues: whether the Free Exercise Clause gives individuals a constitutional right
to exemption from civil laws that conflict with their religious beliefs.

625

CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 157-58 (remarks of Rep. Madison on Aug.
15, 1789).
626

Id. at 158.

627

Id. at 157 (remarks of Rep. Carroll).

628

Id. (remarks of Rep. Sylvester); see id. at 158 (remarks of Rep. Huntington).

629

See supra text accompanying notes 440-44.

630

See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 167-68, 176, 200 (remarks of Rep.
Madison on Aug. 15 and 21, 1789); Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First
Amendment, 78 CHI. KENT L. REV. 531, 544-46 (2003).
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The Supreme Court has long grappled with this problem. Nearly a century and a half
ago, Reynolds v. United States631 held that the right to free exercise did not excuse one from the
duty to comply with civil laws.632 In 1963, the Court reversed course in Sherbert v. Verner633and
ruled that when a general law has the incidental effect of substantially burdening a person’s
religious practice, the law can be applied to that person only if the government is able to satisfy
strict scrutiny.634 In Employment Division v. Smith,635 however, the Court effectively repudiated
this approach and reverted to the Reynolds position.636 In turn, this led Congress in 1993 to
adopt the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which took issue with Smith and sought
to restore the Sherbert standard.637 In City of Boerne v. Flores,638 the Court reaffirmed Smith and
struck down RFRA as applied to the states. But the statute continues to apply to the federal
government,639 and many states have adopted RFRAs of their own.640 In recent years, the
problem of religious exemptions has only become more controversial as individuals and
businesses have challenged laws that required them to provide contraception to their employees
or to refrain from discriminating against same-sex couples.641

631

98 U.S. 145 (1879).

632

See id. at 164, 166-67.

633

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

634

See id. at 406.

635

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

636

See id. at 878-80.

637

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2015)).
638

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

639

See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2005).

640

See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839,
844–45.
641

See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d
140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123).
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B. General Views on a Right to Religious Exemption During the Founding Era
Although the majority opinion in Smith was written by Justice Antonin Scalia, a leading
originalist, it made no effort to explore the founders’ views.642 In a long and provocative article,
Michael W. McConnell sharply criticizes the Smith position on originalist grounds.643 Drawing
upon what I have called the revisionist view of history, McConnell argues that the Free Exercise
Clause should be understood not in terms of the “Enlightenment” rationalism of Locke and
Jefferson, but rather in terms of a view that accorded much greater protection to religion.644
McConnell contends that this broader view was championed not only by the Evangelicals but
also by Madison.645 At the outset of his Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison invoked article
16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights to argue that everyone has a right to exercise religion in
accord with “conviction and conscience.”646 “This right,” he continued,
is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of
men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot
follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a
right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to
render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable
to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation,
to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of
Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of the
Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate
Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the General
Authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of any particular
Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by

642

See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990) (relying on precedent rather
than original understanding to support its holding).
McConnell, supra note 7. A persuasive critique of McConnell’s historical position may be
found in Philip A. Hamburger, Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) [hereinafter Hamburger, Exemption]. For a
particularly thoughtful and nuanced assessment of the historical evidence, see KATHLEEN A.
BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW 116-22, 159-65, 214 (2015).
643

644

Id. at 1452-55.

645

See id. at 1453.

646

Madison, Memorial, supra note 438, § 1.
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the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance.647
McConnell reads this passage to “suggest[] an approach toward religious liberty
consonant with” an entitlement to religious exemptions: “If the scope of religious liberty is
defined by [an individual’s own understanding of his] religious duty . . . , and if the claims of
civil society are subordinate to the claims of religious freedom, it would seem to follow that the
dictates of religious faith must take precedence over the laws of the state, even if they are secular
and generally applicable.”648 Dissenting in City of Boerne, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor adopts
this reading of Madison and uses it to argue that the original understanding supports mandatory
religious exemptions.649
A little reflection, however, shows that this could hardly have been what Madison meant.
The position that he takes in the Memorial is absolute: “in matters of Religion, no mans right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society and . . . Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance.”650 If, as McConnell and O’Connor believe, this position should be understood to
refer to religious exemptions, the result would be an extraordinarily broad privilege to disobey
the law on grounds of conscience. For instance, no one who had a religious objection to paying
taxes would be obliged to do so. There is no reason to believe that Madison held this view.
The problem with the McConnell-O’Connor interpretation is that it overlooks the
political dispute that the Memorial was meant to address, and instead applies that document’s
reasoning to a very different problem. The Memorial was directed against Henry’s bill to
institute a tax for the support of the Christian religion.651 The petition’s first section argued that
when individuals entered the social contract, they granted civil society no authority whatever
over religious matters, and so the government had no power to tax the people for such purposes.
The argument was not that religious liberty imposed limits on the government’s authority to
make laws on civil matters, but that the government had no business legislating on religious

647

Id.

648

McConnell, supra note 7, at 1453.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 560-61 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 574-77 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring in part and in judgment) (describing McConnell’s account as “strong”).
McConnell’s scholarship is also relied upon by the petitioners who are urging the Court to
overrule Smith next Term. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, at
32 (No. 19-123).
649

650

Madison, Memorial, supra note 438, § 1 (emphasis added).

651

See supra text accompanying notes 430-55.
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ones. This insistence that religion and state are separate realms cuts against the view that
religious believers can demand exemption from civil laws. Indeed, the only part of the Memorial
that explicitly mentions exemptions criticizes them for making arbitrary distinctions between
religious groups.652
These observations point toward a broader understanding of the late-eighteenth-century
movement to promote religious liberty. The movement’s main objective was not to seek
exemptions from the state’s laws but to draw clear boundaries between the religious and civil
realms.653 As Baptists put it in the most widely subscribed petition against the Assessment Bill,
“Let religious Societies Manage the affairs of Religion and [let] Government exercise it’s
Concern about the Civil Right and Temporal privileges of Man.”654 In support of this view,
Evangelicals cited scriptures asserting that Christ’s kingdom is not of this world655 and
distinguishing between the claims of God and Caesar.656 As we have seen, many Evangelicals
also were willing to employ the language of the natural rights tradition.657 Indeed, they needed
to do so to pursue a second main objective of the movement: to ensure that the members of all
religious groups enjoyed equal rights within the commonwealth.658
This is the language that Madison uses in the first section of the Memorial. He begins by
quoting article 16’s classic expression of the core principle of natural religion: that “Religion . . .
can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.”659 Drawing upon

652

See Madison, Memorial, supra note 438, § 4.

653

See Hamburger, Exemption, supra note 643, at 936-46.

654

Westmoreland Petition, supra note 463, at 308.

655

See, e.g., Presbyterian Memorial (1776), supra note 508, at 270 (paraphrasing John 18:36);
General Baptist Petition, supra note 529 (same); STILLMAN, supra note 532, at 26 (same).
656

This passage in Matthew 22:21 was the text on which the Baptist Samuel Stillman preached
his election day sermon. See STILLMAN, supra note 532, at 5.
657

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 456-62 (Presbyterians), 518-30 (Baptists).

658

See, e.g., BRADY, supra note 643, at 136-44; BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 7, at 18, 26, 3031, 40, 68, 176-77; PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 93-99 (2002). On
the movement for religious liberty as a struggle for equality of recognition in society, see CHRIS
BENEKE, BEYOND TOLERATION 6-7, 157-201 (2006).
659

Madison, Memorial, supra note 438, § 1 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note
1, art. 16).
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Locke and other writers in this tradition, he then explains that religious liberty is an inalienable
right and that civil society and government have no legitimate power over religion. 660
On this Lockean view, religion and civil society constitute two fundamentally different
spheres.661 The latter is devoted to promoting the temporal interests of individuals, which
includes protecting their natural and civil rights.662 Although the state is empowered to use force
for this purpose, it may not intrude into the religious realm, within which individuals must be
free to believe and worship according to conscience.663 Civil society is concerned with life in
this world, while religion is concerned with life in the world to come.664 The key to protecting
religious liberty is to maintain a clear distinction between these two spheres.665
The difficulty with this position, as Locke himself recognized, was that there was an
important overlap between the religious and civil realms. Although belief and worship clearly
fell on one side of the line and matters like property on the other, both domains were concerned
with the way individuals lived their lives, for their “Moral Actions” affected the common good as
well as their prospects for eternal salvation.666 This raised the possibility of conflict between the
two spheres.667 From the perspective of Locke and natural religion, however, there was no
inherent tension between them. God was the source of physical as well as spiritual life. Both
realms were governed by the law of nature, which required individuals to live a “Good Life.”668
The state was responsible for enforcing that part of natural law which obliged individuals to
respect the natural and civil rights of others.669 Religion was concerned not only with

660

See id.

661

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 11-12, 24.

662

See id. at 12.

663

See id. at 12-15.

664

See id. at 45-48.

665

See id. at 11-12.

666

See id. at 45.

667

See id.

668

Id.

669

See id. at 12, 44-45; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk. II, §§ 6, 131.
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individuals’ conduct toward one another but also with their obligations toward God.670 All these
duties were founded upon reason.671 Thus, from the standpoint of natural religion, there was an
essential harmony between the civil and religious spheres. So long as the state’s laws were
consistent with natural law, they also would be compatible with the rights and duties of
individuals under natural religion.
Natural law also provided a basis for resolving any conflicts that did arise between
religious exercise and civil law. On one hand, the state was bound to use its power in conformity
with the law of nature, and so it could not legitimately make laws that conflicted with the natural
right to religious freedom.672
On the other hand, this view also set bounds to that freedom. The same law of nature that
protected individuals’ religious liberty also required them to use it in a manner that respected the
rights of others.673 Those rights fell into several categories. The first was religious liberty itself:
individuals who asserted a right to freely practice their own religion had to permit others to do
likewise.674 A second category comprised other natural rights such as life, liberty, and property.
Thus, a religious ritual would not be entitled to protection if it involved child sacrifice, for that
would violate the victim’s right to life as well as the natural law against murder.675 A third
category consisted of the rights that individuals possessed as citizens and that derived from the
social contract or the laws of society, such as the rights to vote and to be eligible for office.676
Although these rights did not arise from the law of nature itself, they were entitled to protection
under that law, which forbade individuals to harm others by violating their rights.677

670

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 8, 45-48.

671

See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.

672

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 48-49; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk.
II, § 135.
673

See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 20.

674

See, e.g., id. at 51; Madison, Memorial, supra note 438, § 4; MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra
note 401, pt. I, art. II.
675

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 37.

676

See, e.g., supra note 467 and accompanying text.

677

See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 20.
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In return for the benefits that individuals received under the social contract, they also
assumed certain positive duties toward the community, such as the obligation to pay taxes.678
Again, while these duties did not derive from natural law itself, they nonetheless were binding
under that law, which required individuals to keep their promises, including the ones they made
in social contract.679 At least as a general matter, the right to religious liberty did not exempt
individuals from these duties of citizenship.680 Still less did it exempt them from their most
fundamental duty to the community – the duty to keep the peace by obeying the laws that were
meant to protect the basic rights of other individuals.681
In short, founding-era Americans understood religious liberty within a broader
framework established by natural law and the social contract. Within the religious sphere,
individuals were free to believe and worship according to conscience without interference by the
state. But religious liberty did not give one a right to violate civil laws that were adopted to
enforce the duties that one owed to other people, such as the obligation to respect the natural,
civil, and religious rights of individuals and the peace of the community.
On the Lockean view, the main function of the state was to establish and enforce laws of
this sort.682 But the state also had the authority to pass positive laws for the promotion of
economic well-being and other aspects of the public good.683 Suppose that a public welfare law
of this sort required individuals to act in a way that conflicted with what some believed to be a
positive law revealed by God. In this case, did the right to religious liberty excuse them from
their duty to comply with the civil law?
In a Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke firmly rejected this position. Instead, he
maintained that while matters of belief and worship were reserved to individuals and churches,
civil matters were the province of the state.684 Under the social contract, the government was
empowered to make laws not only to protect the private rights of individuals but also to promote

678

See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk. II, §§ 130, 140, at 353, 362.

679

See id. §§ 14, 195, at 276-77, 395-96.

680

See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 46-49

681

See, e.g., id. at 20, 24-26, 59-60; MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 401, pt. I, art. II.

682

See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk. II, § 131, at 353.

683

See id.; LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 47.

684

See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 12-16, 18, 45-49.
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“the Temporal Good and outward Prosperity of the [whole] Society.”685 The government had no
authority to interfere with an individual’s own judgment in religious matters, but that judgment
did not relieve him from the obligation to comply with “a Law enacted in Political Matters, for
the publick Good.”686
This does not mean that Locke held that the claims of civil society were superior to those
of religion. On the contrary, he maintained that because nothing is more important to individuals
than attaining “eternal Salvation,” the duty to follow God’s will is “the highest Obligation that
lies upon Mankind.”687 Thus, “Obedience is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to the
Laws.”688 But people’s lives in this world were also given by God, who ordained civil society
and government for their preservation and well-being.689 It lies with government to determine
what laws should be made for these purposes. These laws are binding on all: as Locke put it in
another context, it is a fundamental principle that “No Man in Civil Society can be exempted
from the Laws of it.”690 If one truly believes that a law conflicts with God’s will, one should
follow one’s conscience and refuse to obey the law; but at the same time one must be willing to
accept the legal consequences.691 Both the religious and the civil realms ultimately derive from
God’s will, and so one cannot properly invoke one’s religious convictions to override one’s civil
obligations. Instead, the laws should apply equally to all individuals without regard to their
spiritual beliefs or the motives for their conduct.692 For example, if people may lawfully
slaughter calves, they must be permitted to sacrifice them for religious purposes.693 But if, the
public good requires a moratorium on the killing of livestock that have been decimated by a
plague, the belief that one has a religious duty to perform a sacrifice does not entitle one to an
exemption.694

685

Id. at 47.

686

Id. at 48.

687

Id. at 45, 47.

688

Id. at 48.

689

See, e.g., id. at 46-47; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk. II, § 13, at 275-76.

690

LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, bk. II, § 94, at 329-30.
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See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 42, at 48.

692

See id. at 37-38, 57-59.
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Id. at 37.
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Id. at 37-38.
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In this way, Locke made a powerful case against a right to religious exemptions from
civil laws. It is difficult to find any general, theoretical statement on the other side. As I have
indicated, Madison’s Memorial does not constitute such a statement.695 The passage that we
examined simply argues that government has no jurisdiction over religion because free exercise
is an inalienable right, and it does so on the basis of the same premises (for example, that one’s
highest obligation is to obey God) that appear in the writings of Locke and other writers who
clearly reject a right to religious exemption.696
Yet whether or not the Lockean position was convincing in theory, there were situations
in which religious minorities made claims which many people found appealing. The clearest
example is the demand by Quakers and other pacifists for exemption from the duty of citizens to
serve in the militia – an issue that led to spirited debate during the founding period.
C. The Congressional Debates over Religious Exemption from Militia Duty
1. The Debate over the Bill of Rights
The Quakers and other sects held a firm religious belief in pacifism.697 During the
ratification debates, three state conventions urged that the Constitution be amended to provide
“[t]hat any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment

695

See supra text accompanying notes 646-65.

As we have seen, for example, Madison’s argument echoes one found in the Essay on
Toleration by the dissenting minister Philip Furneaux. See supra note 443. In another work,
Furneaux explains that while the Protestant dissenters believe that one must “obey God rather
than men,” Acts 5:29,
696

there is nothing in this sentiment, in the smallest degree, inconsistent with civil
obedience: “rendering unto God the things which are God’s,” is no objection to
“rendering unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s.” The Dissenters are so far
from setting up the supposed interests of religion . . . against lawful magistracy, or
the peace and good order of society, that they allow the exemption of none from
the authority of the civil magistrate; holding all to be equally under his
jurisdiction; and that no plea of a sacred character, or of religion and conscience,
is to be admitted in bar to his procedure, in matters of a criminal, or merely civil
nature.
FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, letter VII, at 211 (quoting Matthew 22:21).
697

See, e.g., FROST, supra note 390, at 29-43, 62-69.
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of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.”698 These proposals resembled the
protections found in five state constitutions.699 Madison incorporated such a provision in his
draft of what became the Second Amendment.700 As reported by the House select committee,
that amendment read: “A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the
best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;
but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.”701
During the House debates, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey supported the proposed
exemption on the ground that there could be no “justice . . . in compelling [individuals] to bear
arms, when, if they are honest men they would rather die than use them.”702 Some of his
colleagues responded that it would be unjust to require some members of the community to
defend others unless the latter were obliged to pay an equivalent.703 Other representatives
contended that the issue of religious exemptions should be left to the legislature.704 As Egbert
Benson of New York put it, “No man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious
persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the
Government.”705 The House narrowly rejected a motion to strike out the religious exemption
clause,706 but amended the clause to provide that conscientious objectors should not be

698

See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 19 (Virginia); THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 582, § 4.1.2.5 (North Carolina), at 182; 1 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 335
(Rhode Island). The Maryland minority proposed a similar amendment. See THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 582, § 4.1.2.1, at 181. For an insightful discussion of the debates
over including such a provision in the Bill of Rights, see Victor Philip Muñoz, The Original
Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1109-19 (2008).
699

See Muñoz, supra note 698, at 1110 & n. 140 (citing constitutions of Delaware, Pennsylvania,
New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont).
700

See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 12.

701

Id. at 182.

702

Id. at 198-99 (remarks of Rep. Boudinot).

703

See, e.g., id. at 183 (remarks of Rep. Jackson).

704

See id. at 183 (remarks of Rep. Sherman); id. at 184 (remarks of Rep. Benson); id. at 198
(remarks of Rep. Scott).
705

Id. at 184 (remarks of Rep. Benson).

706

Id. The vote was 24-22. Id.
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compelled to bear arms “in person,” thereby giving the legislature the option of requiring them to
pay an equivalent.707 In the end, however, the religious exemption clause was rejected by the
Senate and did not become part of the Bill of Rights.708
2. The Debate over the Militia Bill of 1790-91
During the winter of 1790-91, the First Congress took up a bill to organize the militia. In
a rich debate that has attracted little attention in the free exercise literature, the House once again
struggled with the problem of conscientious objection to militia service.709
On December 22, 1790, Madison proposed that the bill exempt “persons conscientiously
scrupulous of bearing arms.”710 In an eloquent speech, he declared that it was “the glory of this
country, the boast of the revolution, and the pride of the present constitution, that here the rights
of mankind are known and established” more fully than ever before.711 This was especially true
of “the rights of conscience.”712 And even if the rights involved were less clear, the Quakers had
shown themselves to be “deserving of [this] high privilege” because they had long generously
extended religious liberty to everyone within their own settlements in Pennsylvania and
elsewhere.713 Finally, as a practical matter, Congress could not force the Quakers to fight, and so
it should “make a virtue of this necessity, and grant the exemption.”714 As for whether they
should be required to pay money instead, Madison’s own view was that the exemption should be

707

Id. at 199.

708

See id. at 39 n.13.

709

The fullest account of these debates may be found in the Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily
Advertiser in December 1790 [hereinafter Pennsylvania Packet] and its successor newspaper,
Dunlap’s Am. Daily Advertiser in early January 1791 [hereinafter Dunlap’s]. Madison’s
contributions are reproduced in his collected papers. See infra notes 710, 729-30.
710

Militia, [22 December] 1790, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-020245 [https://perma.cc/KGY7-FK3F] (remarks of Rep. Madison).
711

Id.

712

Id.

713

Id.

714

Id.
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granted “on terms perfectly gratuitous,” if this could be done “with justice to the other sects in
the community, or if the other sects were willing to withdraw their plea for an equivalent.”715
Madison’s proposal drew strong criticism from several of his colleagues, including James
Jackson of Georgia, William B. Giles of Virginia, Michael J. Stone of Maryland, William L.
Smith of South Carolina, and Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania. They argued that under the social
contract every individual was entitled to protection by the community and in return owed a duty
to aid in the common defense.716 The burdens of this effort should be borne by all alike.717 One
of the “glories of the American revolution [was] that all religions were put on a level.”718 It
would be unjust, or even unconstitutional, to discriminate in favor of particular groups based on
their religious beliefs.719 Moreover, if the government began to draw such distinctions, there
would be no logical stopping point; for example, individuals who objected to militia service
might also object to paying taxes for military purposes.720
The most interesting response to these arguments came from Boudinot, who maintained
that when Americans entered into a new “social compact” during the Revolution, they had
embraced the Quakers with full knowledge of their pacifist beliefs and without insisting that they

715

Id.

716

See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 709 (Dec. 28, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on
Dec. 22); Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Giles on Dec. 22, 1790);
Dunlap’s (Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790). For an account of the
reciprocal relationship between the right to protection and the duties of citizens in social contract
theory and American constitutionalism, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government:
Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).
717

See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 709 (Dec. 28, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on
Dec. 22, 1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 4, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Smith of South
Carolina on Dec. 23, 1790); Dunlap’s (Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790).
Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 10, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Scott on Dec. 24, 1790); see also
Dunlap’s (Jan. 5, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 24, 1790).
718

719

See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 709 (Dec. 31, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on
Dec. 22, 1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Giles on Dec. 22,
1790); Dunlap’s (Jan. 5, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 24, 1790); Dunlap’s (Jan. 7,
1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790).
See, e.g., Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 4, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Smith of South Carolina
on Dec. 23, 1790); Dunlap’s (Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790).
720
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perform military service.721 In this way Americans had implicitly “established the principle, that
[the Quakers] should be taken into our society with all their privileges and rights as men; among
which were acknowledged the rights of conscience.”722 It would be wrong to break “this tacit
engagement” by denying them “an indulgence, which they have been in the habit of receiving,
and which custom has rendered in some degree sacred to them.”723
Despite these differing views, there also were important points of agreement. On one
side, the critics of exemptions recognized that to actually compel pacifists to bear arms would
impact their rights of conscience and did not insist that this should be done.724 As Scott put it,
although “every man owes equal duties to the community,” it was not “necessary, that every man
should discharge that debt in the same manner.”725 Instead, money could be accepted in lieu of
personal service.726 On the other side, Madison and his allies recognized that a purely gratuitous
exemption might be considered unjust to other sects.727 At one point, a consensus appeared to be
emerging that the bill should exempt pacifists who paid an equivalent.728 On December 23,
Madison introduced a new amendment to that effect.729 Ultimately, however, compromise
proved impossible to reach, and that amendment was rejected by a vote of 39 to 10.730
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See Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 4, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Boudinot on Dec. 23, 1790)
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Id.
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Id.
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See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 709 (Dec. 31, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on
Dec. 22, 1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Giles on Dec. 22,
1790).
725

Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 10, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Scott on Dec. 24, 1790).
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See id.
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See, e.g., Militia, supra note 710 (remarks of Rep. Madison on Dec. 22, 1790).
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See Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Smith on Dec. 22, 1790).

729

Militia, [23 December] 1790,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0246 [https://perma.cc/ZDU2UP46].
See Dunlap’s, supra note 688 (Jan. 10, 1791) (debate of Dec. 24, 1790). In the end, Congress
failed to pass a bill to organize the militia that year. See Militia, [24 December] 1790,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0248 (editor’s note)
730
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3. Conclusion
The defeat of Madison’s amendment should not be taken to show overwhelming
congressional opposition to the idea of conscientious exemption from military service, for many
members were concerned with such issues as how the amendment was drafted,731 how the
government could screen out fraudulent claims for exemption,732 and whether militia regulation
simply should be left to the states.733 The fact remains, however, that during the militia-bill
debates Madison and his allies were unable to persuade a majority to endorse such an exemption
even in principle. The same is true of the debates over what became the Second Amendment.734
Remarkably, in neither of these disputes did anyone suggest that the Free Exercise Clause
itself would require such an exemption.735 As we have seen, there is no persuasive evidence in
the legislative history of that Clause that it was understood to mandate religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws.736 Nor during this period can one find general theoretical arguments
that the right to religious liberty requires such exemptions.737 On the contrary, leading writers
like Locke, Furneaux, and Leland clearly rejected this position.738

[https://perma.cc/6HCF-H94D]. When it finally did so the following year, it left the issue of
conscientious exemption to the states. See Second Militia Act § 2, 1 Stat. 271, 272 (1792).
See, e.g., Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 6, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Laurance on Dec. 24,
1790).
731

732

See, e.g., id.

See, e.g., Dunlap’s, supra note 709 (Jan. 5, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Livermore on Dec. 24,
1790).
733

734

See supra Part VI.C.1.

735

See, e.g., BRADY, supra note 643, at 160-61 (discussing debates on drafting of Bill of Rights);
Muñoz, supra note 698, at 1085, 1106, 1117-19 (same).
736

See supra text accompanying notes 697-708.

737

See supra text accompanying notes 695-96.

738

See supra text accompanying notes 684-94 (Locke); supra note 696 (Furneaux); LELAND, The
Yankee Spy, supra note 530, at 227-28; see also Hamburger, Exemption, supra note 643, at 94246 (discussing Leland and other dissenters).
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D. Some Implications for Contemporary Free Exercise Doctrine
1. Religious Exemptions from Public Welfare Laws
For these reasons, one cannot convincingly argue that the original understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause points toward a constitutional rule that mandates religious exemptions to
religiously neutral laws. As a non-originalist, I do not believe that this should necessarily
preclude the Supreme Court from adopting such a rule today.739 Reasonable arguments can be,
and have been, made on both sides as to whether the government should be required to meet
some form of heightened review before it can apply a general public welfare law in a manner
that imposes a substantial burden on the practice of a minority religion, as the peyote ban did in
Employment Division v. Smith.740 Although the history does not show that founding-era
Americans understood the Free Exercise Clause to mandate exemption, it does show that many
people were sensitive to the impact that general laws of this sort could have on the rights of
conscience.741 This history provides a modicum of support for a rule that would subject such
laws to heightened scrutiny, but no more than that. More clearly, it shows that at this time
Americans believed that it was sometimes appropriate for laws or constitutions to grant
exemptions under particular circumstances, as several states did for conscientious objection to
militia service.742
2. Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Civil Rights
By contrast, the history we have explored sheds considerable light on the problem of
conflicts between religious liberty and civil rights. In this section, I first discuss how this history
can help us think about cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,743 in which wedding-related businesses with religious objections to same-sex
marriage contend that they are entitled to exemptions from state civil rights laws that require

739

See STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 223 n.54 (2008) (discussing the
reasons for holding that the meaning of a provision like the First Amendment evolves over time).
740

494 U.S. 872 (1990). The literature on this issue is voluminous. For some arguments in favor
of such a rule, see BRADY, supra note 643; McConnell, supra note 7. For some opposing
arguments, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL (rev. 2d ed. 2014); Marshall, supra
note 15.
741

See supra Part VI.C.

742

See, e.g., Hamburger, Exemptions, supra note 643, at 929; supra text accompanying note 699
(describing militia exemptions).
743

138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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them to serve same-sex couples on the same terms as opposite-sex couples.744 I then briefly
discuss the implications of this history for the case that the Court has agreed to hear this fall,
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.745
One of the clearest teachings of the natural rights/natural religion tradition is that
religious liberty may not be used in a way that violates the civil rights of others.746 The category
of civil rights comprises (1) the natural rights for the protection of which individuals enter civil
society, and (2) the positive benefits they receive as members of society.747 Because they are
equal by nature and enter society on equal terms, individuals are entitled to equality in civil
rights.748 Among the most important of these rights is the ability to participate in the economic
life of the society.749 To bar individuals from equal participation in this economic life is
wrongful. And it is even more wrongful when it is based on a notion that they are inherently
inferior, for this treats them as though they are not full and equal persons and members of the
community.750
For reasons like these, American law has long held that enterprises that offer to serve the
public should be regarded as public accommodations.751 Such enterprises must serve everyone
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on equal terms and may not discriminate on invidious grounds. After the Civil War, many states
adopted civil rights laws that prohibited discrimination based on race.752 Over time, those laws
have expanded to include many other forms of discrimination, from religion and gender to
veteran and marital status.753 In recent years, more than twenty states as well as many localities
have banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.754 These provisions are rooted in the
same view that animates such Supreme Court decisions as Romer v. Evans,755 Lawrence v.
Texas,756 and Obergefell v. Hodges,757 which affirm that LGBT people have the same inherent
rights to freedom, equality, and dignity that all human beings are entitled to.758
The implications of this discussion for the wedding-service cases are clear. States are
fully justified in adopting civil rights laws that bar public accommodations from discriminating
based on sexual orientation. The founding-era history teaches that the right to religious liberty
does not permit one to violate the civil rights of others. It follows that those who operate public
accommodations generally have no right to religious exemptions from laws that require them to
serve everyone without regard to sexual orientation.
An important caveat is in order. Although I have argued that wedding-service providers
generally are not entitled to demand a religious exemption, that does not necessarily mean that
the government may not grant one. For instance, a legislature may consider giving certain
exemptions as a matter of prudence (say, to avoid a backlash against same-sex marriage by
providing the public time to become used to it) or for the sake of compromise (say, by granting
religious traditionalists certain exemptions in return for their support for adding sexual
orientation protections to a civil rights law that currently lacks them759). Exemptions of this sort
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may be acceptable insofar as they advance the ultimate goal of ensuring equality for all. But
while such practical considerations may be taken into account by legislatures, courts should be
governed by principle when they interpret the Constitution.
In Masterpiece, the Court articulated an approach that resembles the one suggested here.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy declared that “[o]ur society has come to the
recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in
dignity and worth.”760 States act upon this principle when they require public accommodations
to serve everyone without regard to sexual orientation.761 Although “religious and philosophical
objections” may be protected by the First Amendment, “it is a general rule that such objections
do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law.”762 Kennedy left open the possibility that some providers, such as bakers
who create custom cakes with religious symbols, may be entitled to a free exercise exemption.763
But he cautioned that any such exemption “would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all
purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in
effect be allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for
gay marriages,’ something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons.”764
The conflict between civil rights and religious liberty will soon return to the Supreme
Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.765 In that case, the city contracted with private
organizations to certify individuals and couples to serve as foster parents.766 After Catholic
Social Services (CSS) stated that for religious reasons it would not consider same-sex couples for
this role, the city terminated its contract with the organization for noncompliance with the city’s
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nondiscrimination policy.767 CSS’s free exercise challenge to that decision was rejected by the
district court768 as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.769 The
Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case next Term.770
The view that I have outlined suggests a way of approaching the problem presented in
cases like Fulton. The concept of civil rights includes equal access to the benefits that society
provides its members, including eligibility to hold positions of authority or service within the
community.771 Thus, when the government establishes a foster-care program, it should not bar
otherwise qualified couples from serving as foster parents based on traits like race, gender,
religion, or sexual orientation. This principle clearly would apply if the government itself
undertook to certify foster parents. By the same token, when the government contracts with
private organizations to perform this function, it may insist that they comply with the same
nondiscrimination requirements that would apply to the government itself. The right to religious
liberty does not entitle organizations to demand an exemption from such requirements, which are
adopted to protect the civil rights of prospective foster parents. Surely this is the position we
would take if an organization refused to certify interracial couples for this role, and it is difficult
to see why a different rule should apply in cases involving same-sex couples. Again, there may
be circumstances in which a government reasonably could choose to grant an exemption to
religious organizations – say, if there are plenty of other groups that are willing to work with
same-sex couples and an exemption would benefit the foster-care system as a whole.772 But the
history we have explored counsels against interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to allow the
right to religious liberty to trump the civil rights of other members of the community.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the eighteenth-century American conception of
religious liberty was deeply informed by the concepts of natural religion, natural law, and natural
rights. In its widely accepted form, natural religion did not refer to a particular belief system that
stood in contrast to others like traditional Christianity. Instead, natural religion offered an
account of the nature of religion. Religion was rooted in the relationship between God and the
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rational beings he had created. In the words of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, this
relationship could be based only on “reason and conviction,” and so individuals had an
inalienable right to form and express their own beliefs and to worship and act in accord with
them. This broad view was endorsed by a wide range of people from Deists like Thomas
Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, to rationalist Christians like Jonathan Mayhew and James
Maury, to Evangelicals like John Leland and Isaac Backus. It was incorporated in key
documents such as the state bills of rights, Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, Evangelical petitions against the Assessment Bill, and
the religious liberty proposals that emerged from the state ratifying conventions – documents that
in turn provide great insight into the ideas that underlie the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause.
In addition to explicating the nature of religion and the justification for religious liberty,
natural religion offered an account of the most fundamental substantive principles of religion.
According to this account, reason taught that human beings were created by God and had a duty
to worship and obey him. God’s will could be found in what the Declaration of Independence
called “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”773 – laws that established the inherent rights of
individuals and the duties they owed one another. This view of the principles of natural religion
held a central place in many fields of eighteenth-century thought including political theory,
natural jurisprudence, Anglo-American law, moral philosophy, natural science, and Radical
Whig ideology.
In this way, natural religion and its associated ideas profoundly shaped the worldview of
Americans during the founding era. Within this general view there were significant differences.
Deists like Jefferson believed that religion should be based on reason alone. By contrast, most
Americans followed Locke in holding that reason and revelation were both essential and that
they provided complementary means of discerning God’s will. This position allowed the idea of
natural religion to be widely held in a country in which most inhabitants were Christians, and it
enabled that concept to establish common ground between various denominations of Christians
as well as between Christians and non-Christians.
At the same time that it illuminates the intellectual world of eighteenth-century
Americans, our exploration of this history highlights the great distance that lies between that
world and our own. Natural religion found support in the leading scientific and philosophical
views of the day. After the rise of Darwinian evolutionary theory and other modern scientific
developments, it is no longer widely accepted that human beings can rely on reason alone to
establish the existence of God or the moral laws of nature. Instead, as Charles Taylor has
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-116-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3623251

Origins of the Free Exercise Clause [June 9, 2020 draft]
written, we now live in “a secular age” in which the status of religious beliefs is far more
controversial.774
It follows that the ideas about religion that flourished during the founding era cannot be
applied in any straightforward way today. Instead, the question of whether and how those ideas
can be translated to our own context is one that calls for much careful consideration. Of course,
this is not the place to embark upon such an inquiry. But some present-day lessons do emerge
from the history we have explored. First, the Free Exercise Clause was primarily based not on
an Evangelical commitment to the promotion of Christianity but on the idea that all human
beings should be free to use their own minds in religious matters. This is the light in which it
should be understood.
Second, the history sheds some valuable light on our current debates over exemptions. It
is difficult to find any eighteenth-century support for a general principle that religious believers
have a right to exemption from civil laws. However, there was at least one context – military
service – in which many people found a claim to religious exemption sympathetic. In view of
this history, it is an open question whether the Supreme Court should adopt a rule applying some
form of heightened scrutiny to laws like the one at issue in Employment Division v. Smith – a law
that imposed a substantial burden on a group’s religious practice merely to promote the state’s
view of public welfare. But civil rights laws present a very different issue. One of the clearest
lessons that emerge from the history is that the right to religious liberty does not authorize
conduct that violates the civil rights of other people. This suggests that the Masterpiece Court
was right when it articulated a general approach along these lines. It is in this way that we can
best realize the founders’ vision of a society in which all of the “rights of mankind” are fully
protected.775
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